

PARADOXICAL EFFECTS IN THE PASS

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If the end of analysis is conceived as a crossing of the fantasy, the function of the operation is to ascertain this crossing and homologate it. The cut is clean; the Pass may even be assessed according to the measure of a 'perfect Pass'.

In the case where the end of analysis is conceived of as a '*savoir-y-faire*¹ with the symptom', things are not so clear. What the cartel recognises is not so distinct, it is not possible to imagine a perfect '*savoir-y-faire*'. There are only particular forms of '*savoir-y-faire*'. Training, apprehended on the basis of the results of the subject's own analysis, gives full worth to the particular knowledge of *jouissance* that the analysand discovers. The pragmatic perspective seems to allow for more vagueness in the terms of the outcome. Within its shelter, the misunderstandings flourish so much more given that pragmatics seem to distance themselves from any standard reference.

I will give an example right away. A relatively major symptom remains unchanged throughout the whole analysis; the subject has learned to put up with it; he presents this acquired knowledge to the Pass as a '*savoir-y-faire*' and requests it to be recognised as such. Such a usage raises a number of questions: can we allow for a major symptom to remain unaffected despite an analysis having been carried through? Is its having become 'ego-syntonic' sufficient to speak of identification with the symptom? Do these two notions overlap? Is there not here rather a source of confusion?

This is not the only one. The more we take into account the pragmatic perspective, the cartel finds itself in the position of having to orient itself within a plurality of confusions. We could order these confusions thus: they are erroneous interpretations of the functioning of the four terms inscribing the discourse at the outcome of the experience.

I shall therefore present some reflections elaborated from some confusions and paradoxical effects observed by cartel B6 of the World Association of Psychoanalysis on the functioning of S_1 , S_2 , $\$$ and a .

The confusion regarding S_2

The knowledge obtained by the subject concerning his unconscious is situated in an *extimate* position with regard to established forms of knowledge, introducing a new dialectic tension in the relation to knowledge. This is the stake of analytic training. However, a de-supposition of there being any knowledge in the Other as such may result as a paradoxical effect of this downfall of the subject supposed of knowledge.

The confusion of these two perspectives can lead to a new reading of the outcome that Lacan, the first, qualified in 1960 as 'cynical'. It produces a subject who believes in nothing beyond the knowledge acquired regarding his *sinthome*. All the rest would be irrelevant for this subject whose sole orientation is the bronze law of his *jouissance* and his '*savoir-faire*'. When, in a later period of his teaching, Lacan conceives of psychoanalysis as a questioning regarding the relations between life and *jouissance*, he introduces us to a pragmatics that could be compared to what is called 'new hedonism' at the beginning of the 21st century. In the very movement whereby psychoanalysis produces the subject's master-signifiers, it displaces the subject's relation to established forms of knowledge. In this sense, it renders him a non-dupe; a non-dupe regarding the knowledge that the university discourse fetishises, as well as the 'challenges to knowledge' in the hysteric's discourse. This is a productive aspect of the traversal of the analytic experience.

However, it can lead the subject to be a non-dupe of the psychoanalytic discourse itself. The 'non-dupes err' when they are no longer the dupes of the analytic discourse they serve. This leads them to consider knowledge on the very objects of psychoanalysis as trivial. Here, in the best of cases, analytic practice is deviated towards the automaton of a *savoir-faire*; and in the worst, towards a certain form of imposture. This is precisely why analytic training must lead the subject beyond this point.

Lacan located an unprecedented relation to knowledge in the overturning of the subject supposed of knowledge, the consequence of the subject having reached a dead end in his treatment. The cynical version promotes the generalised fall of knowledge at the very movement of the fall of the subject supposed of knowledge. Since no knowledge is of any worth with regard to the knowledge obtained in the treatment, what results is a generalised lounging about, the Sunday of life.² As early as 1956, Lacan pointed out the antinomy between the practice and objects of knowledge. This antinomy can be extended and generalised.

The cartel became aware of the confusion between the fall of the supposed subject of knowledge and the de-supposition of knowledge in a number of cases. The dialectic of knowledge has to be put back on

its feet such as it is produced in the treatment. Prior to analysis, the neurotic subject leaves it to the Other to determine him. Through the work of deciphering the unconscious, the subject comes to know what determines him, that is to say, he knows how he is involved in scenes of *jouissance* connected to signifying networks. He is thus able to raise his determinations to the level of the *matheme*. The Other is hence struck with non-existence in the sense that thereafter, the subject's liberty is nothing but that of his own determination. His relation to the world is radically upturned. He no longer needs the Other to know it. Once reduced to a *matheme*, the subject no longer lacks anything.

The error would be to conclude from this that knowledge as such has no other use. On the contrary, it is only from this crossing point that the subject may become a response from the real, which leaves him responsible for not being aware of any determination of this real. To attain the lawless real, some idea of the said laws remains necessary.

The paradox regarding the barred Subject

The perspective of the *matheme* is not Lacan's last word to broach the end of the treatment. In one of his late texts on the Pass, he chooses the term '*hystorisation*' to qualify the reduction of the analytic operation transmitted in the procedure of the Pass.

This perspective is different from that of the writing of a *matheme*. This is to say that we do not end up with a *matheme* but rather a *history* supported by *mathemes*. By using the term *hystorisation*, Lacan brings forth the dimension of fiction, of narrative necessary to circumscribe a position of *jouissance* connected to master-signifiers. It is also necessary to understand that psychoanalysis permits of elaborating a response at that place where the master's knowledge proved to be impotent in answering the question of the hysterical subject. Though he had conceived of relieving the hysteric of her master-signifier through the crossing of the fantasy, Lacan summons a response to this question for every neurotic subject at the end of the treatment. This chicane can result in a certain number of confusions.

We might say that, in one sense, the term *hystorisation* destroys the expressions 'crossing of the fantasy' and 'fall of the *subject supposed to know*', in giving rise to a kind of hysterical functioning of the subject as a question addressed to the locus of established knowledge. However, a question still remains.

In another sense, this *hystorisation* is a kind of purified hysteria, a question with regard to the question. We might say that for the analysed subject it is a matter of de-completing the Other. This perspective supposes a relation to the Other relieved from the adherences of meaning that the subject bestowed upon the Other. The correct use of this 'remainder of the question' could be to articulate the finitude of the treatment with the interminable aspect of training.

Paradox regarding the S_1

It is difficult to get the experience of the Pass to inform us of the exact status of the relation of the analysed subject to the master-signifier. The fact that in the treatment the subject has separated itself from its master-signifiers can introduce a confusion. The canonical terms that characterise this kind of confusion may be summarised under the signifier *anarzyst*. The subject produced in this way might extend his new incredulity to the set of possible master-signifiers.

Nevertheless, Lacan warned of the fact that the treatment produces not the disappearance but rather a new use of the S_1 function. The subject's discovery of the contingency of the value of the variable S_1 and the unveiling of the *jouissance* attached to it still do not for all that abolish the function. That is the reason why analysts have to testify not only to the fact that they are no longer dupes to a certain number of discourses, but also that they remain dupes of the discourse they serve. Is not *the desire of the analyst* a way for Lacan to be able to name this perspective before he wrote it as a discourse?

Though we are no longer in the era of *anarzysts*, can it really be said that no confusion remains there? The temptation of solitude, even of separation from, or avoidance of a community that assesses the merits or faults in each one's work is still to be seen in a certain number of analysts. This solution is a dead-end to the treatment of the function S_1 . Analysts have to consider the necessity of this function in order to allow for the existence of vivid and admissible commentary on the conceptual articulation of the corpus of Lacan's teaching. This perspective is unrelated to effects of bearing or to political manoeuvres aiming at the leadership of the group. It opens out into a political dimension, which is one of the three axes according to which we locate the co-ordinates of the experience. Perhaps we are not using the operation well enough to bring subjects to better formulate their relation to the master-signifier in their testimony, that is to say their relation to the political as such. Though we may not manage to learn the fate of the S_1 function beyond signi-

fying production, it is easier to perceive the focus and the effects, in certain treatments, of master-signifiers quilting the subject.

Paradox regarding jouissances

From the moment that the doctrinal emphasis is laid on the drive, a number of events encountered in testimonies are ascertainable. Of course, there is that of the subject for whom drive circuits are not constituted into signifier networks. There is that of the subject whose way of not wanting to know about the object animating him consists in speaking about another object. There is also the subject who privileges in the object what is glimpsed of it in its imaginary dimension to the detriment of unconscious deciphering. This amounts to forgetting that the law of deciphering is a satisfaction that must be completely exhausted, in other words S (A). Conversely, it happens that a subject may be fascinated by effects of meaning, by the unconscious machinery, without this engaging the treatment of *jouissance* proper. To insure that there really is an object cause, it is necessary to verify that both aspects — deciphering and the body that experiences *jouissance* — are grasped at the same time. In other words, there can be no deciphering unless an object extracted from the body ballasts its trajectory.

One of the paradoxical effects of placing the emphasis on *jouissance* as linked to the drive is that the other side of *jouissance*, the side that is in league with the phallus, is left in the dark.

A perspective

The operation of the procedure of the Pass has already undergone modifications that reinforce the character of agent of some of its constitutive elements. We remember the emphasis laid on the responsibility of the secretariat in awarding or refusing permission to enter the procedure. The character of agent of cartels could be accentuated in so far as they can speak up in order to interpret the paradoxical effects observed in treatments as a result of accentuations of doctrine. This is a renewed reading of the cartels from a third position in relation to the analytic bond, a point of *extimacy* to analysis.

Thus, it would appear that the cartels' commentaries do not come to an end with the sole commentary on the *passant's* treatment, but would rather be addressed to the entire School. In this sense, they would be participating with the Analysts of the School (AS) in the analysis of the experience.

Translated by Victoria Woollard and Marc Thomas

1. The expression *savoir-y-faire* resists direct translation in English, its meaning being 'to have a knack for something' or 'to know how to make do' with it [TN].
2. '*Le dimanche de la vie*' is the title of a book by Raymond Queneau. See *Seminar XX*, page 106 [TN].

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