What Lacan borrows quite willingly from Hegel, whom he often quotes, is the master/slave dialectic, which he makes use of in the service of psychoanalysis. At first, one may be surprised by this, as there are no longer any slaves, and, if we are to believe him, there are no more masters either: “what happens between the discourse of the classical master and that of the modern master, which is called capitalist, is a modification in the place of knowledge”.2

Philosophical tradition would have a responsibility in such a transmutation: “What remains is indeed, in effect, the essence of the master, namely, that he does not know what he wants. There you have what constitutes the true structure of the discourse of the master. The slave knows lots of things, but what he knows even better still is what the master wants, even if the latter does not know it, which is the usual case, for without that he would not be a master. The slave knows it, and that is what his function as slave is. It is also for this [reason] that it works, for, all the same, it has worked for a fair while. The fact that the all-knowledge has moved into the place of the master is something that, far from throwing light on it, obscures a bit more what is in question, namely, truth”.3

All this is obviously derived from Hegel.

The Dialectic of Master and Slave in Hegel

After having run through these forms of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, that sense-certainty, perception, force and understanding are, one arrives at what Hegel calls self-consciousness, about which he says: “With self-consciousness, we have entered upon the native ground of the truth”.4 (p.146 French) With it, the categories of life and desire are deduced. One then discovers that “Self-consciousness is in-itself and for-itself when and because it is in-itself and for-itself for another self-consciousness, that is to say, it can only be such qua being recognised”.5 Three moments are distinguished:

1o ‘For self-consciousness there is another self-consciousness’.6

Dialectic between each consciousness and its alterity,

2o The struggle between two consciousnesses: the trial by death, which renders apparent the essential character of life, but at the cost of one becoming the slave of the other, the master (in German Meister, and Knecht, which at the same time signifies slave and valet).

3o The master/slave dialectic proper.

Roughly put, this dialectic passes through the following moments:

```
Master 1o
\[ a \]

Thing object of desire
\[ b \]

Slave
\[ a \]

Consciousness
\[ b \]
```

The master is the consciousness which is for itself, and no longer only the concept of this consciousness — albeit through the mediation of an other — which demands to make a whole, a synthesis with Being, the thing in general. The master is related to this consciousness and this thing, ‘object of desire’. The master is thus first of all immediately consciousness (1o), then mediation which is only through the other (2o) - and is then related, Hegel says: “a) immediately at the two moments, b) medially at each moment by the means of the other. Indeed, the master is medially related to the slave by the intermediary of the independent being (the thing that is in between, the stake: life, work) - but
similarly he is related ‘medially to the thing by means of the slave”; the slave behaves negatively with respect to the thing and, in truth, suppresses it, “he therefore only transforms it through his work.” Conversely, “for the lord… the immediate relation becomes through this mediation the sheer negation of the thing, or the enjoyment of it; that which is not carried out through desire is carried out through the enjoyment of the lord: to do away with the thing: assuagement in enjoyment[…] The aspect of its independence he leaves to the bondsman, who works on it. In both of these moments the lord achieves his recognition through another consciousness”.6 “A recognition that is one-sided and unequal.” At the same time, “what the bondsman does is really the action of the lord”, but ineffectively, in that he does nothing else but imitates the master, for whom the thing also was nothing[ness]. What therefore lacks in order for recognition (equality) to be effective is that the master does to himself what he does to the other individual, that the slave does to the master what he does to himself. That the master “may become the slave of the slave, and the slave, the master of the master”, as Hyppolite says.7

Here, one will go no further than this first great phase, which Hyppolite calls ‘domination’, and which will be followed by ‘fear’, and then by ‘culture or formation’, (das Bilden), of the individual, until the conflictual process, resolved, reaches the superior stage of thought (stoicism, scepticism, unhappy consciousness).

In the place of a simple dialectic — in which one would pose A, defined in opposition to non-A, and in which A and non-A, opposed to each other would pass into each other, B being the result of A plus non-A — one now has the following dialectic: M (‘master’) holds T (‘thing’) to turn it into a stake [enjeu] against S (‘slave’), and at the same time M depends on S to access T. A relation is then knotted between, on the one side, S and T, and on the other side, T and S, at the end of which the result of one of the two sides is effected in its turn on M, while M effects in his turn the result on the other side, etc. One only reaches the supposed synthesis of the moments through inequalities, unilateralities, asymmetries, and recognition is constantly deferred.8 In this, Hegel therefore very directly inspires the whole Lacanian problematic of desire and jouissance, of the Thing and being, of consciousness and the other.

As for the master and the slave, how can this dialectic be inscribed in the Freudian Field? There is no doubt that, here, one should introduce the difference between respective readings of the phenomenology and of Hegel’s system in general, by Alexandre Kojève and by Jean Hyppolite.

In a few words, for Hyppolite, the phenomenology designates a field in which one describes the things as they appear to a consciousness. It is the relation of spirit to itself as phenomen, as is indicated by the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences.9

On this topic, one must distinguish between two states of the doctrine:

1) In 1807, the Phenomenology of Spirit is presented as the first part of the ‘System of Science’10 and as a ‘Science of the Experience of Consciousness’.11 The order followed at the time is: Consciousness, Self-consciousness, Reason, Spirit, Religion, Absolute Knowledge. The Preface indicates that the task is to ‘lead the individual from his ignorant state to knowledge’.12 The dialectic of consciousness leads this individual to the State, Religion, Philosophy, Universal History.

2) In the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (the first edition of which is dated 1817), there is a part proper to consciousness (§ 413 to 439), but the ‘Spirit’ is first the object of a ‘psychology’ and thus leaves phenomenology (§ 440 to 482, subjective spirit), before becoming the objective Spirit (the State….§ 483 to 552), then the Absolute Spirit (art, religion, philosophy, § 553 to the end).

What the Phenomenology of Spirit is about, as Hyppolite remarks, is the “spontaneous development of an experience as it gives itself to consciousness and as the latter gives itself to the former”.13 History is deduced only after this, but in this Phenomenology of Spirit, we are not in real History. Hence then the pointed absence of proper names and the allusive treatment of figures. Thus, one recognises Antigone in the brother/sister dialectic in Chapter VI, although she is not named. We are as in the reflexive element of allusion.

As for Kojève, he in a way ‘realised’ the system. For him, with the master/slave dialectic, one enters history: “If then, at the start, in the given World the slave had a fearful ‘nature’ and had to submit to the master, to the strong man, it does not mean that this will always be the case. Thanks to his work, he can become other; and, thanks to his work, the World can become other. And this is what actually took place, as universal history and, finally, the French Revolution and Napoleon show. This creative education of Man by work (Bildung) creates History, i.e., human Time….”.14 Kojève’s position is however not necessarily that of Hegel: “Independently of what Hegel thinks, the Phenomenology is a philosophical anthropology. Its theme is man as human, the real being in History. Its method is phenomenological in
the modern sense of the word. This anthropology is thus neither a psychology, nor an ontology. It wants to describe the integral ‘Essence’ of man…”15

And, while Hyppolite follows all the forms of consciousness by granting to each of them its relative importance, Kojève may assert: “In fact, then, we can say this: Man was born and History began with the first fight that ended in the appearance of a Master and a Slave. That is to say that Man — at his origin — is always either Master or Slave; and that true man can exist only where there is a Master and a Slave […]. And universal history, the history of the interaction between men and of their interaction with Nature, is the history of the interaction between warlike Masters and working Slaves. Consequently, History stops at the moment when the difference, the opposition between Master and Slave disappears….Now, according to Hegel, it is in and by the wars of Napoleon, and, in particular, the Battle of Jena, that this completion of History is realised through the dialectical overcoming (Aufheben) of both the Master and the Slave”.16

It is clear that nothing quite so determined can be read in Hegel, and that the extension of the master/slave dialectic to the whole of human history is a forcing by Kojève. But such a daring reading could seduce the audience in the 1930s.

The citizen is thus the synthesis of the master and the slave. History is dead, and Hegel is its undertaker.

What results is that Kojève:

a) always returns to the master/slave dialectic, according to him the principal matrix of the Phenomenology.

b) extends his developments on the desire of the Other, intersubjectivity, to nearly all of the Phenomenology, rather than stopping on each form of consciousness proper: “Desire is human - or, more exactly, ‘humanising’, ‘anthropogenetic’ - only provided that it is directed toward another Desire (for the thing). To be human, man must act not for the sake of subjugating a thing, but for the sake of subjugating another Desire (for the thing)”.17

c) develops to too great an extent chapter VIII on absolute knowledge.

In Lacan’s Work

It is known that Lacan started by attending Kojève’s lectures, between 1933 and 1939, at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes. Then he must have read Hyppolite’s thesis, Genesis and Structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1946, and the translation of the book itself, published the following year, in 1947.

In Kojève, Lacan must have, first of all, found a kind of master (although the only one he really names as his master is Clérambault). From this mention in the Note sur la causalité psychique from 1946: “The Soul of the world, that he (Kojève) recognised in Napoleon”,18 until this homage in Seminar XVII, in 1970: “Me for example, I may never have encountered Kojève. If I had never encountered him, it is highly likely that, like all French people educated in a certain period, I would never have suspected that The Phenomenology of Spirit was something”.19 As well as in L’Etourdit in 1972: “Kojève, whom I consider to be my master, for having initiated me to Hegel, had the same bias towards mathematics. […] This contempt, which was his, sustained his discourse from the beginning which was also where he returned: The senior officer knew how to treat the buffoons as well as others, namely as the subjects, which they are, of the sovereign”.20

As in the work of Kojève, Lacan therefore grants a privilege to the master/slave dialectic and to absolute knowledge (as well as to the ruse of reason, the law of the heart and the delusion of presumption): “The ruse of reason, subtle form through which Hegel made it [the question of truth] idle, but at the cost of disturbing those ruses (one should read the political writings), which are merely dressed up as reason”.21

However, it is difficult to know what he searches for, or, rather, what he finds in Hegel, about whom he is apparently nearly always enthusiastic, although he ends up proclaiming that there is never any synthesis, nor absolute knowledge, nor ruse of reason, as this change of direction about dialectical progress testifies to: In 1950, in Fonctions de la psychanalyse en criminologie: “Dialectic provides the unconscious law of the formations, even the most archaic ones, of the adaptation apparatus, thus confirming Hegel’s gnoseology which formulates the law generating reality in the process: thesis, antithesis, synthesis”.22

But, at the other end, in 1973: “Plenitude of dialectised contrasts in the idea of historical progression of which it should be said that nothing for us testifies to the substance”.23
Let us follow the landmarks of this evolution, itself dialectical:

Recognition and Intersubjectivity:
In Ecrits, on the subject of aggressivity in psychoanalysis, in 1948, he says of Darwin: “Before Darwin, however, Hegel provided the ultimate theory of the proper function of aggressivity in human ontology, seeming to prophecy the iron law of our time. From the conflict of master and slave, he deduced the entire subjective and objective progress of our history, revealing in these crises the syntheses to be found in the highest forms of the status of the person in the West, from Stoic to the Christian, and even to the future citizen of the Universal State. […] If, in the conflict of master and slave, it is the recognition of man by man that is involved, it is also promulgated on a radical negation of natural values, whether expressed in the sterile tyranny of the master or in the productive tyranny of labour. We all know what an armature this profound doctrine has given to the constructive Spartacism of the Slave recreated by the barbarism of the Darwinian century”.24

In 1953, in Discours de Rome, within the framework of what Lacan calls “the dialectic of self-consciousness, such that it is realised from Socrates to Hegel”. “These remarks define the limits within which it is impossible for our technique to fail to recognise the structuring moments of the Hegelian phenomenology: in the first place the master-slave dialectic, or the dialectise of the belle âme and of the law of the heart, and generally whatever enables us to understand how the constitution of the objects is subordinated to the realisation of the subject. But if there still remains something prophetic in Hegel’s insistence on the fundamental identity of the particular and the universal, an insistence that reveals the measure of his genius, it is certainly psychoanalysis that provides it with its paradigm by revealing the structure in which that identity is realised as disjunctive of the subject, and without any appeal to tomorrow”.25 Indeed, according to Lacan, this division of the subject concerns in the same movement the individual and the collective.

In 1953-54, in Seminar I, this essential text where Hegel’s myth is no longer the essential law of human becoming, but rather the law of the imaginary. The structure of the imaginary is separated from itself: “namely, between a and a’, the specular relation”.26 The allusion to Hegel fits here within a development on intersubjectivity: Lacan takes up the example of the perverse relation between the narrator and Albertine in Proust. The limit of this structure is “a fatal relation structured by the following two abysses — either desire is extinguished, or the object disappears. That is why, at every turn, I take my bearings from the master-slave dialectic…”27 The thesis put forward is the following: “The master-slave relation is a limit-example, because, to be sure, the imaginary register in which it is deployed appears only at the limit of our experience. The analytic experience is not a total one. It is defined on another plane than that of the imaginary — the symbolic plane”.28

Alienation:
To summarise, 1) Hegel would here give the law of the imaginary. 2) The dialectic would designate the drama that the desire of man is the desire of the Other. (Dialectic, which in Plato is dialogue and ascent, in Aristotle, apparent reasoning, in Kant, necessary illusion, is, in Hegel, founded on the principle of contradiction: A = non-A. In Lacan, the dialectic culminates in alienation.) 3) The law of the intersubjective relation takes place between the imaginary and the symbolic, between work and jouissance. A correlation is further indicated with a clinical interpretation: the slave as obsessional neurotic.

In Discours de Rome of 1953, on this topic, the mechanism of alienation is already in place. There is a forced choice of Work, which I must make and which does not belong to me. The text, which brings together the whole problematic, deserves to be quoted in its entirety: “This meaning [sens] is sustained (in the obsessional) by his subjective relation to the master in so far as it is the master’s death for which he waits. In fact, the obsessional subject manifests one of the attitudes that Hegel did not develop in his dialectic of the master and slave. The slave has given way in face of the risk of death in which mastery was being offered to him in a struggle of pure prestige. But since he knows that he is mortal, he also knows that the master can die. From this moment on he is able to accept his labouring for the master and his renunciation of pleasure [jouissance] in the meantime; and, in this uncertainty of the moment when the master will die, he waits. Such in the intersubjective reason, as much for the doubt as for the procrastination that are character traits of the obsessional subject. In the meantime, all his labour falls under the heading of this intention, and becomes doubly alienating by this fact. For not only is the subject’s handiwork taken from him by another — which is the constituting relation of all labour — but the subject’s recognition of his own essence in his handiwork, in which this labour finds its justification, also
eludes him, for he himself ‘is not in it’. He is in the anticipated moment of the master’s death, from which
time he will begin to live, but in the meantime he identifies himself with the master as dead, and as a
result of this he is himself already dead”.29

The same reference in the same year in Variantes de la cure-type: “The imaginary formation,
aïvely objectivised by psychologists as synthetic function of the ego, rather shows the condition which
opens it to the alienating master/slave dialectic”.30

In 1954-55, in Seminar II, a step seems to have been made: energy, the machine are presented
as the true revolution rather than Napoleon and his Battle of Jena. Explicit critique of Hegel, and implicit
of Kojève, all the more so as Lacan engages in a dialogue with Hypolite in this session. “I think that
according to Hegel, everything is always there, all of history is always actually present, vertically so.
Otherwise, it would be a childish tale. And the thing with absolute knowledge, which indeed is here, ever
since the first Neanderthal idiots, is that discourse closes in on itself, whether or not it is in complete
disagreement with itself, whether or not everything which can be expressed in the discourse is coherent
and justified.” “Hegel is at the limit of anthropology. Freud got out of it. His discovery is that man is not
entirely in man. Freud is not a humanist”.31

A few more landmarks: in Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire, there is a
reference to absolute knowledge: “I say its philosophical pertinence, for such, in the last resort, is the
schema Hegel gave us of History in The Phenomenology of Spirit”. The resort to Hegel is somewhat
attenuated: “Hence, let it be noted, my entirely didactic reference to Hegel, by which I wished to say
something, for the purposes of the training that I have in mind, about the question of the subject, in so far
as that question is properly subverted by psychoanalysis”.32

In Position of the Unconscious, Lacan criticises Hegel in favour of Descartes: “And the much
sought after [recherchée] latency of this founding moment, as Selbstbessusstsein [self-consciousness],
in the dialectical sequence of Hegel’s phenomenology of mind, is based upon the presupposition of
absolute knowledge. Everything, on the contrary, points to the distribution of consciousness in psychical
reality — however the latter’s texture is ordered — consciousness being heterotopic in terms levels and
erratic at each level”.33 And the issue then: “The negation [dénégation] inherent in psychology in this
regard should rather, following Hegel, be chalked up to the law of the heart and the delusion of
presumption”.34

Here Lacan has given up on synthesis, on absolute knowledge, on consciousness itself as being
an imaginary concept. On this, he will say that there is never any synthesis.

From now on, he places the emphasis on knowledge, S2, rather than on Work. On the subject of
alienation, he acknowledges in Seminar XI, from 1964: “It is in Hegel that I have found a legitimate
justification for the term alienating vel. What does Hegel mean by it? To cut a long story short, it
concerns the production of the primary alienation, that by which man enters into the way of slavery. Your
freedom or your life! If he chooses freedom, he loses both immediately — if he chooses life, he has life
deprieved of freedom”.35

Hence the idea of a deception: the Master has not really risked death, and thus, nor did the
slave. Yet Hegel does not thematise this choice as such, but rather the idea of an Aufhebung, where
nothing is really suppressed, because of repression, nor preserved, because of the transformation of the
terms. The master has two deaths, that of pure prestige, which he avoided, and that which he will have in
the end, which for Hegel corresponds to an access to thought. While Lacan would stop Hegel’s dialectic
on a form of consciousness, without moving on to the next one, by the recourse to Euler’s circles, which
characterise alienation and separation, and to the object a which falls out. Thus the figure of Sygne de
Coëfontaine of Claudel: his forced choice (to lose the Pope or to commit perjury) is blocked and
paralyses her for ever. The Pope is saved, certainly, but she has lost everything. The dialectic does not
go any further.

Discourses:

```
U  M  H  A
S2 → a  S1 → S2  $ → S1  a → $
S1  $  $  a  a  S2  S2  S1
```
The relation to knowledge, S2, takes a new turn when Lacan no longer wants to make the Hegelian approach the key of the imaginary, or the law of intersubjectivity, or the operation of alienation, but a discourse.

He then thinks the modern master while witnessing the events of May 1968. Seminar XVII, thus, in a sense, substitutes discourse for the imaginary.

“In the discourse that I call of the master, it is simply the teacher, the legislator (Lycurgue, as he sometimes dares to call himself), who supports the law, this law of which it is amazing that one can say that its ignorance is no excuse, since it is the teacher himself.” And he adds: “it is in this spirit that Hegel persuades the slave that, by working, he will reach the absolute through his knowledge, that the empire of the master will be his own empyrean: he can reach this Sunday of life...The knowledge coming in the place of the agent, it is the quarter of a turn from which Charlemagne, let us say, institutes the discourse of the university.” (Clôture du Congrès de l’Ecole Freudienne de Paris on 19th April 1970).36

What is a discourse? “A certain number of stable relations inside which there is something that is much larger, that goes much further than the effective enunciations”. ‘Through the tool of language’,37 the ordering is done between the following, well known propositions:

A1 “The unconscious is structured like a language” (S, $).
A2 “The signifier represents the subject for another signifier” (S1, S2, $).
A3 “The subject is in internal exclusion to its object” (object a).

“The following suggestion forms itself here — since there are four places to characterise, perhaps each of the four permutations could yield us, from within itself, the place that stands out the most to constitute a step forward in an order of discovery that is nothing other than the one called structure”.38

According to subtle variations following the proportion a/b = c/d, the places are: master-signifier above subject in relation to knowledge above jouissance, where one will find the master, the subject, the slave and the surplus-value respectively; then desire above truth in relation to the Other above loss; and, finally, agent above truth in relation to the other above production. The four configurations of S1, S2, $ and a in these four places will give birth to the discourses of the master, the university, the hysteric and the analytical discourse respectively. One will refer to the formulae of the four discourses.39

Therefore, the main point is that today's master is knowledge. This is what, in a sense, defines the modern world: “Except that what has to be understood in this schema — as was already indicated when in the discourse of the master S2 was put in the place of the slave, and when in the discourse of the modernised master it was then put in the place of the master —, it is that it is not the same knowledge”.40 Indeed, in the discourse of the master of Antiquity, knowledge is in the place of the other, the slave, while in that of the modern master, it is in the position of agent, which turns it into a form of the discourse of the university. But is there not something fishy about this? Is it not difficult to reconcile this with the idea that Science, which rules the modern world, is the negation of systems of knowledge, as Lacan remarks concerning the Cartesian doubt?

The solution lies in the fact that 'it is not the same knowledge' that the one[s] Descartes pushed aside, than modern knowledge, now implicating that science is in a way the new master which causes the discontents of civilisation. The dominant discourse is articulated as follows:

S2 → a ← place of the slave
S1 $ ← product of consummation

Science functions therefore as knowledge of the master (capitalist, for example). It is the new ‘tyranny of knowledge’.41 (Unconscious) knowledge is now in the place of truth only in the discourse ordered by pure loss, to wit, the analytical discourse. And this is what Hegel seems to have perceived: “There, in the last discourse on the right, what place is he in? In the place that in the discourse of the master Hegel, the most sublime hysteric, designates for us as being that of truth”.42 Because he located the place of truth under the master, and because he believed he could thus, progressively, reach absolute knowledge, Hegel then prefigures something of the analytical discourse. But at the same time, “[the discourse] eludes the distinction that would enable to be perceived the fact that if this historical machine, which is in fact only the progress of the schools and nothing more, ever ended in absolute knowledge, this would only be to mark the annulment, the failure, the disappearance at the end-point of what alone motivates the function of knowledge — its dialectic with jouissance. Absolute knowledge would purely and simply be the abolition of this end-point. Whoever studies the text of Phenomenology closely can be left in no doubt about this”.43 What Lacan precisely calls ‘the hysteria of discourse’. The hysteric would have looked for a master to the point of absolute knowledge, in order to, once there,
dominate him: to reduce his jouissance through the reabsorption, in a way, of the surplus-enjoyment (object a).

Summary

With the master/slave dialectic, Lacan has thus tried successively to think:
• the limit of intersubjectivity and the dividing law of the imaginary.
• the alienation of the subject.
• the other side of psychoanalysis (or the discontents of civilisation).

In the end, the imaginary, τα δοκουντα, ‘appearances’, to speak like Parmenides, doxa, opinion, are reduced to a simple term, a circle, like the one of the symbolic and like that of the real — indistinguishable in a knot.

After 1970, the Lacanian thesis of antiphilosophy, applied to Hegel if one really wishes to, would not signify a rupture with Hegel, but the Aufhebung of the discourse of the most sublime of hysterics: the philosopher turned professor, the modern destiny of philosophy.

One can thus note that Hegel has occupied nearly every place (like Socrates, incidentally). Hegel putting in the place of what orders the process, successively or alternately: S1, as master (in philosophy), or S2 as knowledge (absolute), or $, as hysteric (the most sublime), or even a, when, as analyst (hysterical!), he knows how to locate knowledge in the place of truth (that which is thematised in effect in the Phenomenology of Spirit).

It is precisely about jouissance, that Lacan poses what is perhaps his last Hegelian question: “This is what we have to interrogate now. S, is it a hole, R, ex-sistence, I, consistency? These categories are not easy to handle. They have, however, left some traces in history. It is from a traditional philosophical extenuation, the summit of which is given to us by Hegel, that something has surged up under the name of a Kierkegaard […] Think of this bringing out of repetition as more fundamental in experience than the resolution thesis/antithesis/synthesis on which Hegel was weaving history”. Was Hegel’s mistake to get rid of jouissance by misrecognising repetition? Since, as Lacan says: “the measure of this function is to be found in jouissance”.

But the fact is that if philosophy does not ignore jouissance, differing in this from psychoanalysis, it rather finds a way of losing nothing of it. Instead of jouissance being faced with its loss, or with the hole, or even with the mortal insistence of repetition, it is rather returned to its perenity. May we say that it is no longer the same jouissance? Is there pure loss only for psychoanalysis? The proof? It lies in the last word of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences: “The idea [of philosophy], Hegel says, being eternally in and for itself, is manifested, engendered, and enjoys genießt itself eternally as absolute spirit”.

Translated by Véronique Voruz and Bogdan Wolf

1. At a guess: more than twenty times in Ecrits, even more in Seminars I, II, VII, XX, in Scilicet No 1, 2/3 and 4, and more in Omicar? No 4, 5, 17/18, 26/27, 28, 32, Hegel is quoted from one end to the other in the teaching of Lacan.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p.111.
6. Ibid., p.111.
8. One will find later the difficulties of recognition almost in every instant in the relation of two self-consciousnesses. Then, much later, in chapter VI (The Spirit) concerning evil and forgiveness: ‘this is what I am’ does not follow the response of a confession of the same kind. This judging consciousness was not having any of it, etc., p.196 (French translation).
9. W. G. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, “§ 413.
13. See J. Hyppolite’s Génèse et structure de la phénoménologie de l’esprit, Aubier, 1946, and then the notes which accompany the French translation.
14. Ibid.,
24. Ibid., p.222.
25. Ibid., p.222.
31. Ibid., p.262.
35. Ibid., p.49.
36. For example, Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, p.31, 61, Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, p.21.
37. Ibid., p. 38.
38. Ibid., p.34 and 35.
39. Ibid., p.38.
40. Ibid., p.38.
41. Parmenides, Fragment 1, line 31. (Consider as valid ‘the diversity which demonstrates’ the appearances).
43. Ibid., p.104.
44. W. H. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, § 588.

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