

DISCRETION OF THE ANALYST IN THE POST-INTERPRETATIVE ERA

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I borrow the term 'post-interpretative era' from Jacques-Alain Miller, who uses it to describe the situation of psychoanalysis today. He stated a thesis, 'the unconscious interprets', which is a response to what psychoanalysis is as it can be deduced from the work of Lacan.¹ I propose to grasp some of the consequences of this thesis for psychoanalytical practice, those which I can perceive at present. Others will no doubt appear, as the time to understand is necessary.

If, today, a practice which takes account of the thesis 'the unconscious interprets', can be said to be discretionary for various reasons, it is not for all that any less determined. Lacan is no more, nor is the time when his stature, so dominant in the intellectual world and in the world of psychoanalysis, constituted for many either a scandal or a motif of hypnotic admiration, especially, where the question of short sessions provoked condemnation. The contemporary figure of the analyst is different, although his practice is still often congested with a hardly discrete mimetism of the dead master rather than with a fidelity to his work and his concepts.

But if I speak of discretion, it is rather in order to evoke three consequences that the thesis 'the unconscious interprets' has for analytical practice.

— The analyst is discrete because he is effaced in his interpretative action behind the one of the unconscious. He leaves it up to the unconscious...only to take over 'in the interloan' [*l'entreprêl*].² This does not mean, quite the contrary, that he should abstain from all intervention or find refuge in the convenience of a textbook neutrality.

— The analyst acts with discretion: his discernment (the sense given by the *Littré* dictionary to *discretion*) is required in his action, his judgement is called for, and this just as much if he leaves its place to the work of the unconscious.

— Lastly, analytical practice is a practice of the discrete, of the discontinued. If analytical practice is based on the interpretation of the unconscious, then it has to be homogeneous with its pulsating structure, its structure of opening and closing. This statement has precise consequences, especially for seizing that which separates the Lacanian orientation of psychoanalysis from other 'post-modern' practices and other conceptions of the unconscious. It is in every case a condition required for situating psychoanalysis, as Freud and Lacan defined it, in its articulation in parallel to science, and not against it as it often seems to be the case today.³

1) The discrete analyst: leaving it up to the unconscious

The action of the analyst has to be subordinated to the interpretation emanating from the unconscious. Freud's practice was not like this at the start. In the beginning, he often translated an object-language, that of the dream amongst others, into a metalanguage of symbols. Testifying to this in a number of places, *Traumdeutung* was nevertheless corrected by the theory of double inscription which became so pleasing to Lacan's students to the point of irritating him.⁴

The break with Jung allowed, on this topic, a radical recentering, that of *Metapsychology*. The theory of the unconscious developed by the inventor of psychoanalysis then shows that the decisive step did not concern the distinction between the manifest and latent contents of the dream, but rather putting free associations into play.

The move to put on the same plane the associations of the dreamer and the contents of the dream (an apparently innocent move but profoundly iconoclastic) in effect gave the psychoanalytical

practice a footing on which Lacan in his turn will make his famous formulae which today have become aphorisms: 'There is no metalanguage' or 'There is no Other of the Other'. From the side of the analyst, the method of 'floating attention' and the free associations of the analysand to which it responds, are indissociably linked. They denote the little interest Freud shows toward the signification of the patient's statements [*diress*], toward his intentionality; Freud does not subscribe to the tradition of Dilthey.⁵ What interests him, and it is there that the method is homogeneous with his theory of the unconscious, is a deciphering of the unconscious enunciation from the statements, the means of seizing the inscription of the repressed movements of the drive budding in the statements [*les dits*] (that which is read from the repressed drive in that which is said). Elaboration of the significations of the dream, in its relation to the reality or history of the patient, is only a means to this aim. The Freudian texts of the 20s on the dream are in this respect quite revelatory of his position⁶: the dream is presented there as an activity in the service of *jouissance* ('chunks of the fantasmatic activity in the service of protecting sleep'), and the deciphering of its rebus is far from becoming for Freud an obligatory task; it is to be done if the analyst deems it necessary but is not an absolute requirement.

As early as 1912, and in the same sense, Freud already posed that the text of the dream is as such inexhaustible, and the analyst is recommended to communicate his point of view only with reserve.⁷ Further, he does not deem it necessary to come back from one session to the next to the analysis of the same dream. It is clear that a break in the pursuit of the conscious discourse is not damaging, and is even advisable for the effectuation of the analytical task. The analyst follows three objectives: to situate the fulfilment of desire in the dream, to evaluate the 'pressure of resistance' (that which conditions the possibility of an intervention), and, above all, to search for the 'cause of distortion', that which seems to him a central point.

Lacan spent a long period of time before refinding this Freudian liberty. (He will evoke in this respect 'ten years of concubinage with Jaspers'). Lacan refinds it with brilliance by bringing forth the function of speech and the field of language in his Rome Report. Nevertheless, this escape of psychoanalysis from the trodden path into which it had fallen will also have its own unpredictable consequences. The passion for the formations of the unconscious and the identification of the concept of the unconscious to the laws of language (metaphor and metonymy), led some of Lacan's students to an erratic use of homophony, transforming in the worst cases the psychoanalytical treatment into an exchange of formations of the unconscious, those of the analyst coming into rivalry with those of the analysand. In *L'Etourdit*, in a paragraph which sounds like setting the record straight for the benefit of his students, Lacan makes it precise that homophony is indeed one of the chosen modes of interpretation (in the sense of the analyst's intervention) on the condition 'that the analyst makes use of it where it is fitting',⁸ and he reminds us that the point is to get hold of it to effect the *Spaltung* of the subject, which we can understand as a means of provoking the split in the analysand, the division which is the mark and the consequence of interpretation by the unconscious.

But the thesis 'the unconscious interprets' also aims to make the analyst revert to a certain discretion as regards the appreciation of the efficacy of his action. Freud laid foundations which today have been perhaps a little forgotten. If, in effect, the unconscious interprets (interweaving *jouissance* and sense in its formations), it also decides the outcome of any intervention which the analyst could make. It is the unconscious which indicates whether or not the analyst knew how to touch the cause of desire. Freud noted this in particular in relation to dreams: it is of little importance whether they lie or tell the truth, whether the analysand lies, whether he accepts or refuses the analyst's intervention. The result of an interpretation can only be assessed by the production of new material: another formation of the unconscious, a production of symptom (even the negative therapeutic reaction)⁹ or a simple negation ('I hadn't thought about it'). Therefore the question is not to know which of the two, the analyst or the analysand, is right, as "there is no confrontation at this level. When there is a confrontation, one is on the imaginary axis".¹⁰ What, therefore, crowns the success of intervention, is a new manifestation of the drive which calls for a new lifting of repression.

For Lacan, the true interpretation was for a long time the one which revived desire, which carried the mark of desire as a lack-of-being. In effect, it is doubtless a facet of the unconscious: to renew the

division of the subject, to make S_1 come out again — “the signifier — irreducible, traumatic non-sense [to which] it is subjected as subject”.¹¹ However S_1 , as a rule, calls for a S_2 , and the effect of producing the lack-of-being is never equivalent to some pure desire. There are two kinds of valency in the concept of desire. If desire revives signification through the produced void, it also goes in circles. One is keen to praise the celestial bird but there is also the ungraspable ferret which rages endlessly in the cage of dissatisfaction, of impossibility or avoidance.¹² And what remains unperceived in the excitement of desire is that it is also, just like sense, a vehicle of *jouissance*. “The true consent, the consent of being which is the one toward which the analytical work has to lead, is a consent to the unconscious as repressed, that is to say as vehicle of *jouissance*”.¹³ Interpretation today, the one which allows for the pass, has to lead therefore in this direction, and at the same time bear on - ϕ and *a*, the phallus of castration and the remainder of *jouissance*: It is there that the thesis ‘interpretation in reverse’ fulfils the thesis ‘the unconscious interprets’.

II) The Discretion Of The Analyst: His Discernment, His Judgment

The use of the term *interpretation* has spread and it now designates in a generic fashion all aspects of the analyst’s action. It has numerous denotations in language [*langue*] such as translation, falsification, performance, acting, declaring the will of higher forces, explaining the sense, etc.

‘Death of interpretation’¹⁴ does not mean that the analyst no longer intervenes in the treatment; what is aimed at is the interpretation where the analyst injects sense following his caprice without indexing himself on the unconscious of the patient, an interpretation in the weak sense of the word. On the contrary, the ‘duty to interpret’¹⁵ underlined by Lacan in his time, acquires all the more depth. The analyst is bound to this duty, he ‘pays with words, with his person and with what is the most intimate in his judgment’.¹⁶ The modalities of exercising this duty remain nevertheless within his discretion, and he uses it when he deems it necessary, against the backdrop of silence, with parsimony and with good reason. He is the sole judge of his *timing*, of his tactfulness. Lacan reminded us of it in a solemn tone: “as alone as I have always been in my relation to the analytical cause”.¹⁷

If the thesis ‘the unconscious interprets’ in no way exonerates the analyst from having to intervene — since, just as well, as Lacan indicated it, he “is part of the concept of the unconscious as he constitutes its address”¹⁸ — it nevertheless forces us to question anew what it is that the analyst does. To interpret (in the narrow sense), to construct, to communicate, to support the transference — such are the sides between which his task is divided.

To interpret

What does the thesis ‘the unconscious interprets’ bring out at this point? Let’s note, to begin with, that it is a novel formulation. Neither Lacan nor Freud posed it before.¹⁹ The formulation does, however, evoke the famous formula ‘desire, it is its interpretation’. And yet, the two formulae are not equivalent. ‘The unconscious interprets’ adds that interpretation, understood in the broad sense of the analyst’s intervention in the treatment, can certainly provoke desire, the lack-of-being, but frequently also the *jouissance* which is incarcerated in *lalangue*. And indeed, one can enjoy [*jouir*] one’s unconscious or, more precisely, the formations of one’s unconscious or the interpretations of one’s analyst. But one can no longer enjoy [*jouir*] the interpretation by the unconscious in the strict sense as used by J.-A. Miller. That is why the thesis ‘the unconscious interprets’ calls for the complementary thesis ‘interpretation in reverse’.

In effect, what does the Freudian interpretation do? It certainly goes against signification, against the discourse of the subject’s ego, but it aims at a sexual sense; the drive remains subjected to the Oedipal myth, to the function of the imaginary father. In this frame, consequently, the end of analysis stumbles against the rock of castration: impossible for women to be detached from the father, impossible for a man to accept treatment from another man.

According to Lacan, interpretation aims elsewhere, it aims at the enunciation not the statement. It certainly goes against signification but also against sexual sense, it aims for the cause of desire, this cause of distortion which Freud was able to isolate. This means equally that interpretation attempts to take its effect beyond the Oedipus or the family saga, beyond Freud's primal scene in which the woman remains always contaminated by the mother. In the final analysis, for Lacan, it is therefore a question of bringing to light by means of interpretation the last signifier, the signifier of the primarily repressed. It is the attempt of metaphorical interpretation, the one which favours highlighting of the phallus as the signifier of desire. One is, however, hindered by the fact that desire itself is enclosed within the limits of fantasy.²⁰ In his later work, and through the elaboration of object *a* and, above all, the tables of sexualisation, Lacan proposes, as the aim of interpretation, the place of the drives, that of the absence of the sexual relation. It is a place 'inhabited by silence',²¹ for it corresponds to that which cannot be said (no more than desire could be said directly), and also to what is enjoyed [*se jouit*] beyond that which is said (surplus-enjoyment). It is thus necessary to resort to interpretation through metonymy. It brings the subject back to its division, finding its formula in the interpretative scansion which does not decide the sense in the place of the subject but forces the latter to decide upon it. The 'surplus' added by the analyst to the formation of the unconscious, or to the analysis made by the patient himself, is an almost-nothing, even maybe a simple temporal break. It signifies in any case: 'I agree with you but you said it first!.'

Let's approach now what J.-A. Miller proposes with his 'interpretation in reverse'. I will stress in it two aspects. This thesis accounts for the fact that interpretation has to be homogeneous with the task of analysing, and therefore aims, in the final analysis, for the drive. This is to say that interpretation has to lead to a convergence of the analysand's statements [*dits*] (Lacan was in this respect much interested in Fibonacci's series and the reference to the golden number). Although it would not be precise to state that Freud already grasped it, one can nevertheless take the view that he had a certain intuition in relation to this.²² Nevertheless, what the thesis 'interpretation in reverse' proposes is something else. It concerns reaching a crossing of the limit, not only the convergence toward the silent saying but the subversion of this silence. J.-A. Miller described this as that which does not enter the semantic flow, although he notes that the scansion of punctuating brings it back to it again. That is why he opposes this interpretation to scansion and calls it the cut, thereby giving again its precision and weight to Lacan's term. The step made here consists in isolating a novel modality of interpretation. 'It does not interpret in the service of the pleasure principle',²³ that is to say for *jouissance*. It brings us back, not to the division of the subject, but to that which he calls, by referring to psychosis, 'perplexity'. It is the beyond of defence of the subject which is then aimed at, not desire which itself 'is of defence'. The practice of the cut, in relation to the practice of punctuation, is asemantic, and it touches directly the enjoyed in saying [*le joui dans le dire*]. It corresponds to the moment of conclusion of the pass.

To construct

On this point, Freud and Lacan take a similar view of the task of the analyst: there is no doubt that it is up to him to construct. In this respect, *Constructions in Analysis* remains exemplary. Construction, unlike interpretation, draws scattered and heterogeneous elements together in a linear causality, and is a discretionary practice of sense (but not of signification). It aims for the internal coherence of the analytic experience. Freud reserved the task of construction for himself and left that of remembering to the analysand; for him, to construct meant to assure oneself of the truth of the analysis.

Indeed, this operation aims for at least one aspect of truth, that of internal coherence. To construct is indeed to assure oneself of consistency, of rules of deduction. This is why, in analysis, construction and the elaboration of the axiom of the fundamental fantasy are homogeneous with one another. Together they contribute to situating the place of object *a*, which, in psychoanalysis, has the status of logical consistency. This operation is necessary due to the fact that, on the side of the unconscious (as Freud highlighted through the interpretation of dreams and as Lacan remarks in the *Introduction to the German Edition of Ecrits*), meaning escapes. But, while Freud did not really distinguish construction from interpretation, Lacan separates them very clearly. Construction aims for the internal consistency of analytical work, namely a truth of *fixion*, while interpretation finds its efficiency in the allusive virtues of language in order to create a point of emptiness in the response of the Other and thus produce a half-

saying (*mi-dire*) of truth. In a commentary *Constructions in Analysis*, Jacques-Alain Miller affirms that “the Lacanian analyst must construct, that goes without saying”,²⁴ and he adds that if Lacan is not interested in construction as such, it is because for him it designates structure (in the sense of clinical structure). Thus interpretation in reverse takes its bearings only in reference to construction.

To Communicate

It is in this respect that the judgement of the analyst is mostly solicited. When to produce an interpretation, when to communicate a construction but also in what form, and with what content?

Freud never shied away from stating his opinion. He never worried about a potential effect of suggestion and measured the value of his intervention with the indirect confirmation of the unconscious. The problem is otherwise situated for Lacan. As for Freud in the case of the Wolf Man, it is still a question of obtaining certainty in the patient, but this in a way regulated by the crossing of the fantasy and subjective destitution, both being limit-operations. And yet the end must win the conviction of the patient, it is even required. Here again, and maybe one should even say particularly here, confirmation is to be sought more in the indirect ratification by the unconscious than in the agreement of the patient.²⁵

As to knowing whether the analyst must be silent or communicate, there is a lot of suspicion on that point: the suspicion that silence, recommended by Lacan as the background against which interpretation could unfold and then also as minimal principle of interpretation-scansion, the one which avoids suggestion, may often translate as faintheartedness on the analyst's part. A silence of commodity, a lesser evil in a way. It is true in many a case, but it is important to give its right place to this silence and to the scansion which leaves the analysand the possibility of receiving from the Other in an inverted form the message that is his. Nevertheless, it is Lacan himself who was able to measure how much the systematic practice of silence, punctuation without a way out of the semantic system, contributed to make of analysis an infinite task, as infinite as the productions of the unconscious. This is why, in the later years of his teaching, he incites analysts to speak up, in his own terms to open their mouths [*l'ouvrir*], but also not to feed the symptom with sense.²⁶ These indications may seem contradictory.

And indeed, the interventions of analysts can be shared out between two polarities, those which make the - j appear on the one hand, and aon the other. What is at stake is to restart through interpretation the flow of desire, when threatened by the premature attack of the signifying chain, by evoking the unconscious knowledge yet to be explored (metaphoric interpretation), and, on the other hand, to appease the signifying efflorescence, to jam the *jouissance* of empty speech, and there rather through interpreting with the structure (metonymic mode of interpretation). Most frequently, the scansion punctuates the session to signal a partial point of possible conclusion

But the interpretation of the unconscious, correlated to the interpretation in reverse of the analyst, namely interpretation in a restrained sense, that which indicates a true act of the analyst, has another weight: it must radically separate *jouissance* from the signifying chain which carries it. It is not only the formula ‘the word is the murder of the thing’ which applies here — a formula which has taken on a weakened meaning, thus allowing one to think that all the virtues of psychoanalysis can be reduced to a mode of expression; of ‘verbalisation’. The reference is taken from the Lacan of a little later, that which equivocates between *jouissance* and enjoyed-sense (*sens-jou*). Thus it suited him to reserve the term analytic act (which produces a new subject) for this type of interpretation, which makes an S_1 emerge all alone by making it jump in some way out of the signifying chain and its implacable starting again. One inevitably sees that such an interpretation must precipitate the moment to conclude for the analysand because it calls for certitude and consent.

To Support the transference

According to Lacan's formula the analyst supports the transference. He localises the semblants. This does not depend upon his judgement but upon what he offers through the position that he occupies. He

thus does not cause the transference, which anybody can do, as much as he causes the work of the analysand's unconscious, through transference. There on the other hand his judgement is required.

Opposed to the conception of transference conceived as a phenomenal repetition, opposed to the pedagogical role of the analyst (deviations which have permitted the practice in the IPA), Lacan defined transference as a pure dialectic, that is to say that he challenged all psychologisation of the cure in order to put the accent radically upon the fact that "the concept of the exposition is identical to the progress of the subject; which is to say the reality of the treatment".²⁷

Nevertheless, he will later on be led to correct what in this definition could be excessively nominalistic (albeit a realist nominalism) in order to account for *jouissance*. Transference is thus presented as the permanent mode of constituting objects. Then, from Seminar XI onwards, transference and interpretation are indissociably linked.

Transference, in so far as it is mobilised by analysis, is not pure repetition of past loves [*énamorations*], it is linked to moments of opening and closing of the unconscious. Once we admit that the unconscious is interpretation, transference presents itself as the supposition of a knowledge in the unconscious (cf. the algorithm of transference).

In explaining the sort of interpretation which goes with the thesis that 'the unconscious interprets', that is to say the cut which dries up the Zuyderzee of the unconscious and isolates the S_1 without S_2 , J.-A. Miller illuminates the question of the fall of the subject supposed to know at the end of an analysis and its corollary: the cancelling of the subscription to the unconscious. This takes up a proposition which he had already put forward for the couple transference and interpretation: to ground transference on the subject supposed to know, as Lacan did at first, means that the transference is first of all *interpretandum*, to be interpreted. Not to interpret by aiming at the repetition of infantile experiences, but interpreting the cause of desire; in other words by bringing interpretation to bear upon the signifying interval (thus through the half-saying [*mi-dire*], through equivocation).

"The desire of the analyst, in so far as it is implicated in his interpretation, goes against identification, which is to say that it goes towards being. And that one will not recognise as a Lacanian the analyst who only makes interpretations which are metaphors, that is to say who delivers, already worked out, the master signifier into the hands of his analysand".²⁸ Interpretation as cut thus aims at indirectly isolating the repressed master signifier, and, in that, it opposes the proliferation of added meanings, particularly those that could stem from the intervention of the analyst. Equivocation, yes, if it is metonymic, between enigma and citation, metaphor no.

III) Discretion In The Analytic Act

There is no doubt that this thesis that 'the unconscious interprets' emphasises discretion, discontinuity in the mathematical sense (quantities that only vary as the whole values). It brings to light the fact that the unconscious is only inscribed through ruptures, ruptures in sense and ruptures in the enjoyed [*jouir*]. Unconscious, unborn [*in-né*], unconscious of revelation, apophantic. This is how the unconscious has appeared since Freud; but it took Lacan to remind us: through surprise. And let's face it, mostly unpleasant surprise, as a rupture in meaning and signification, as unknown *jouissance*, repressed and quite frankly bad. Thus the unconscious is not the unknown accommodated by all psychologies, it is first of all encounter and revelation,²⁹ it is not the expression of feeling. These are the thoughts which carry it, but it is first of all explosion, perplexity.³⁰ It is even through this that it has an ethical status. Freud showed it clearly, for example in 1925: "It is oneself that one must hold responsible for malign feelings and dreams. What can one do otherwise? If the content of the dream — properly speaking — is not the fact of inspiration of another; but part of my being".³¹ A rupture in ideals at the same time as a rupture in the thread of conscious thought: the ego gets it. It is to this place that Lacan assigns the subject \$, this place where the id was and where I must come to be. The unconscious is therefore this rupture which makes

this gap appear, but an act is necessary for it to inscribe itself, as such 'firmly distinguished from the status of the doing',³² an act of speech from the analyst.

To speak of interpretation as being deployed on the other side of sense and to interpret, as Jacques-Alain Miller has done, is to emphasise that, for it to be equivalent to the act of the analyst, it must not only be secondary to the action of the unconscious but also act like it, that is to say through subtraction of sense, to produce what Lacan calls nonsense (*insensé*) in Seminar XI, and which cannot be attained, no matter how, for it aims at the cause of desire.

Yet the unconscious is not given *a priori* in psychoanalysis; what is there from the beginning is the symptom and its trail of complaints; what is there as given is malaise, suffering, unhappy consciousness which seeks to pour out in the other, at the same time as it produces the other as the source of its troubles — paradoxes of reflexive consciousness linked to retaliatory aggressivity commonplaces of psychology and psychotherapies.

For a psychoanalysis to begin, there must be a rupture in this register: we need interpretation in the strong sense. No doubt, this interpretation is not the one of the end, but it is the one which opens the unconscious. This is to say that it brings to light a principle of rupture. Lacan says as much in *Science and Truth*³³: the subject of psychoanalysis, that of the *Spaltung*, cannot be approached through the empirical fact, the practice of analysis supposes an *epoché*, a reduction. This reduction always rests on the absence of a relation, absence of a relation between *jouissance* and the formalism of science, absence of a relation between the symbolic and the real in psychoanalysis. In 1965, Lacan thinks that truth as cause allows in psychoanalysis to drill the place of the subject, the place which restitutes the subject foreclosed by science.

The thesis 'the unconscious interprets' emphasises once more the rupture between the enjoyed [*jouir*] in the real and the symbolised. But it adds to the Lacan of that time, whose peak in formalisation is to be found in *Position of the Unconscious*, the Lacan of the *Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, and for whom truth is the sister of *jouissance*.

The interpretation in reverse aims at the cause in the real and at the cut which produces the subject having cancelled his subscription to the unconscious,³⁴ not the truth of the subject but a *véri-fixé* subject,³⁵ that is to say with a certainty as to his *jouissance*, his mode of enjoyment [*mode de jouir*].

Translated by Philip Dravers, Véronique Voruz and Bogdan Wolf

1. J.-A. Miller, *Interpretation in Reverse*, see above pp. 9-16.
2. J. Lacan, *Television*, Norton, transl. J. Mehlman, 1990, p.46.
3. On this point read the conversation between J.-A. Miller and François Ewald in *Magazine littéraire* devoted to Freud.
4. J. Lacan, *Le Séminaire XVIII, D'un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant (1970/71)*.
5. W. Dilthey, *Selected Writings*, Cambridge University Press, ed., transl. and intr. by H.P. Rickman.
6. S. Freud, *Remarks on the Theory and Practice of Dream-Interpretation* (1923) SE XIX; *Josef Popper-Lynkeus and the Theory of the Dreams* (1923) SE XIX; *Some Additional Notes upon Dream-Interpretation as a Whole* (1925) SE XIX. Especially the last text begins with the paragraph called *The Limits of the Interpretable*.
7. S. Freud, *Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psychoanalysis*, SE XII.

8. J. Lacan, *L'Etourdit* (1972), *Scilicet No 4, Paris, Seuil, 1973, p.48.*
9. J.-A. Miller insists on this point in *Marginalia de Constructions dans l'analyse, Cahier No 3.*
10. J.-A. Miller, *Marginalia de Constructions en analyse, op. cit., p.24.*
11. J. Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, transl. A. Sheridan, Penguin, 1977.
12. See on this point J.-A. Miller's Seminar *Donc* (seminar 12 January 1994).
13. J.-A. Miller, *Marginalia de Constructions en analyse, op. cit., p.27.*
14. J.-A. Miller's formula used in *Interpretation in Reverse.*
15. J. Lacan, *Le Seminaire XI, Postface, p.252.*
16. J. Lacan, *The Direction of Treatment and the Principles of its Power in Ecrits Selection*, Transl. A. Sheridan, Tavistock/Routledge, 1977.
17. J. Lacan, *Founding Act in Television*, transl. J. Mehlman, Norton, 1990.
18. J. Lacan, *Le Seminaire XI, Postface, op. cit.*
19. In *Seminar XI*, Lacan gives a following indication: "The analyst's interpretation only reflects the fact that the unconscious, if it is what I say it is, namely a play of the signifier, already has in its formations — dreams, slips of the tongue, witticisms or symptoms — proceeded by interpretation" (Seminar XI, p.130), however 'the unconscious interprets' radicalises the weight of this thesis; it always reminds the analyst today of it, and combines it with the thesis of interpretation which removes sense. It concerns rereading of Seminar XI with, and starting from, Seminar XX and *L'Etourdit*.
20. J.-A. Miller reminds us of this point with an insistence in his seminar *Donc* an in developing it starting with Lacan's indication (e.g. *Seminaire XI, p.32*).
21. C. Soler, *Silences* in *La Cause freudienne, No 32, p.30*. It is Colette Soler to whom we owe this beautiful expression.
22. In 1925 he stipulates, for example, that in the conditions where the subject's resistance does not avoid the work of the unconscious, the associations concerning dreams are from the start.
23. J.-A. Miller, *Interpretation in Reverse, op. cit.*
24. J.-A. Miller, *Marginalia de Constructions en analyse, op. cit.*
25. J.-A. Miller, *To Interpret Cause from Freud to Lacan* in *Newsletter of the Freudian Field No 3, ½ Spring/Fall, 1989, pp.30-50*. In this article in particular, the link between the cause in psychoanalysis and the principle of the discrete is developed.
26. J. Lacan, *Conférence à Genève sur le symptôme* (1975) in *Le Bloc-notes de la psychanalyse No 5*. Lacan defines there a symptom as a voracious fish which does not admit to feeding on sense.
27. J. Lacan, *Intervention on Transference* (1951) in *Feminine Sexuality*.
28. J.-A. Miller, *Interpretation et transfert* in *Actes des Journées de l'ECF No 6*.

29. In Seminar XI, Lacan uses the terms 'not-born', 'not-realised'.
30. It is purposefully that Jacques-Alain Miller uses this term, traditionally used in the field of psychosis, with reference to his thesis known as 'generalised foreclosure'.
31. S. Freud, *Some Additional Notes upon Dream-Interpretation as a Whole* (1925) SE XIX, p.125.
32. J. Lacan, *De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité* (1967) in *Scilicet No 1, Paris, Seuil, 1968, p.56*.
33. As well as in Seminar XI.
34. This theorisation 'the unconscious interprets' is essential to operate the right cut between the operation of psychoanalysis and, on the one hand, a logical formalism which will never be able to deal with *jouissance*, and, on the other hand, a nauseating hermeneutics which, for example, allows a Paul Ricoeur to say: 'One does not sufficiently underline the role of conscience-witness, that of the analyst, in the constitution of the unconscious as reality.' (Paul Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations*, Paris, Seuil, p.107).
35. In this perspective, the reduction carried out by psychoanalysis is not to identify cause and truth of the subject. It is something else to say, as Jacques-Alain Miller does, that the subject re-elects the unconscious and assumes responsibility of this place with a consent. Lacan's famous formula 'burned ring in the jungle of the drives' seems adequate to evoke at the same time one's cancelling of one's subscription to the unconscious, subjective destitution, consent to primarily repressed *jouissance*, and the effect of being that it poses. It is thus possible to serialise proximate terms which concern the end of analysis. It is no longer a subjective division referring back to lack-of-being that is the point here, but no doubt the constitutive division of the speaking being [*parlêtre*] which re-elects the defect in the Other correlative to the subject, defect from which the Oedipal delusion has constructed itself for the neurotic.

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