


Kant *with* Sade



**NLS Seminar
2003-2004**

London Society of
The New Lacanian School



NLS-Seminar 03-04

'Kant with Sade':

Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment

The London Society's NLS seminar of 2003-2004 centred around Jacques Lacan's 'Kant avec Sade' from the French 'Écrits' (Seuil, 1966). Unfortunately it is not included in the Selection that forms the English version of the 'Écrits' (Routledge, 1977).

A translation, 'Kant with Sade' by J.B. Swenson, is however available in a publication entitled 'October' (MIT Press, Mass., 1989). The page numbers in the following articles correspond to this translation.

The texts in this collection were transcribed from the spoken NLS seminar in London. The subsequent editing sought to retain the style of an informal seminar.


The first five seminars that dealt with Lacan's text in greater detail and used a closer reading of it, best elucidated the difficult premise of his very profound and original thesis of the fantasy. With this collection we now have an expansive commentary to this demanding text that will help to navigate through its logic and clarify some of the intricacy of its notions.

Special thanks go to the speakers involved: **Jean-Louis Gault** (Nantes), **Alexandre Stevens** (Brussels), **Vicente Palomera** (Barcelona), **Pierre-Gilles Guéguen** (Paris) and **Pierre Naveau** (Paris). As members of the Ecole de la Cause Freudienne, they all have been coming to London for many years; formerly under the aegis of the Freudian Field, and now the New Lacanian School. I thank them for accepting our invitation, their inspiring talk and their support in this collection.

I would like to thank Phil Dravers and Roger Litten for their proof reading and their general suggestions and comments as well as practical help regarding the editing of the seminars at hand.

The cover image was conceived and executed by Phil Dravers!

NATALIE WULFING



NLS
SEMINAR ON 'KANT WITH SADE'
Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment

1

JEAN-LOUIS GAULT

'THE 'TRUTH' OF KANT'S MORAL LAW'

I am very glad to be back here in London and want to thank you for being here with me, on this lovely afternoon, for the first of this year's seminar of the London Society of the New Lacanian School. As programme you have chosen the text 'Kant avec Sade', by Lacan, and I'd like to say a few words of introduction after which I'll give a more detailed commentary on the first 3 or 4 pages of the text.

About the title, 'Kant with Sade': to throw together Kant and Sade is very surprising. It is unusual, although maybe less so now that we know Lacan's work and have forgotten how strange it is to link Kant with Sade. But in 1962/63 - the text was written in '62, and published in '63, in a review called 'Critique' - the publication of Sade in France was still forbidden and the editor, Jacques Pauvert, was persecuted and taken to court for it, whereas Kant was the main pillar of French university education.

From a distance, Kant is the philosopher of morality and duty. He teaches us what we must do in life and which duty to respect. We are all familiar with Kant's more general maxim of morality, the Categorical Imperative. I think in English it is something like this - there are about 4 or 5 versions of this maxim - 'Act...', it is something which is told to a person, 'Act only on that maxim for which you can at the same time will that it should become universal law'. You have to act, you, in particular, in a way which could be taken as a law by everyone in their life. For Kant this is a duty, a respect for others, that what you do must be valid for others. Kant was the philosopher of respect, the respect of the law.

In his Critique of Practical Reason we find two things. Abbott renders this sentence: "*Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heaven*

above and the moral law within." (p.191) Here we have in one sentence, the admiration and respect for the heavens, and for the moral law inside me.

In contrast, with Sade we have a person who was not very respectable, not very commendable. He was a debauched man, a rake, who had a desolate life, from the moment he was 20, when he was put into jail and so it went on for all his life. It was a life of debauchery, including prison, perversion, and above all, the things he wrote - what kind of things! Unreadable things, forbidden to be published, for which he was imprisoned. Even though debauchery was quite common at the time of the revolution in France, it was intolerable to circulate these writings.

So, on the one hand we have a professor, a teacher, who lead the life of a bachelor, who stayed all his life in one city, Königsberg, where he lived a rigorous and timed life of daily routines – let's say from 5 o'clock to 9: reading and preparing lectures; from 9 to 11: lectures; from 11 to 12: a small meal and then a little sleep and then conversation, and then back to bed, etc...

On the other hand we have Sade, who lived his life in misery, ending up as a homeless person, and above all, in a psychiatric hospital, Charenton, and who gave a display of horrible things in his writing.

Thus, before Lacan, nobody brought Kant together with Sade. It is provocative, and it seems like a scandal! Even if in the 60s, when Lacan wrote this paper for 'Critique', people, at least in France, were interested in Sade, it was not to the point of mixing Sade with Kant. If they were interested in Sade they were interested in perversion, in sexuality. But what does this man's writing have to do with morality, with the Kantian moral law? Nothing! It is the genius of Lacan to bring these two works together. Why does he do this? What was he looking for?

The fact that Kant and Sade were read together by Lacan, has to be understood in the context of Lacan's teaching. I will say a few words about these first years of Lacan's seminars. Beginning in 1953, he gave six seminars in the six first years. They were seminars about technique, about the ego, about psychosis, about the relation to the object, about the formations of the unconscious and about desire. These are things that are crucial for practitioners to act in their work as analysts. The first seminars are thus guides for action, action in psychoanalysis. They are seminars about what we could call the signifying structure of the experience, where the analytical experience is taken as something rational and logical, something organised by the structure of speech and language.

In these first six years, Lacan explores the mechanics of the experience by building up the graph of desire, which is the exposition of that mechanics that is operating between the person that is speaking and the Other.

And then, in 1959, came the 7th seminar, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, which is a rupture in Lacan's teaching. It is a rupture in relation to the first six seminars, because in this seminar on Ethics, Lacan stresses the fact that all this

mechanical and logical experience, the structure of which he explored, in short all this experience of the signifier, is now sunk into an ethical element. It is not only a fact of mechanics, it is not only a fact of logic, it is not only the fact of the logic of the signifier. All that happens in that experience has an ethical significance or a moral meaning. It is not only at a mechanical level, as when we consider the biological structure of the organism. There we can look at it, study it from a mechanical point of view, even when we include that organism in its Umwelt, in its context. But at the level of the experience of the speaking person, everything we do has another meaning, has a moral meaning. All things that appear at the level of the phenomenon have another meaning, have at the same time a relation with something that is transcendent in relation to that first level of the experience.

This means that at the level of the speaking being's experience we have to introduce the notion of a will.

Will is a word we come across throughout the text of 'Kant with Sade'. We always have a will. Nothing appears merely mechanically. Behind any event there is always a will. Always. We cannot consider the individual at the level of a personal experience without considering that there is a will. It may be my will or the will of another, the will of my father, the will of my mother... but you cannot exclude the level of the will. This is what we call the ethical level. It is the level where there is a will, where any action is a result of the will and not the result of a mechanical process. It means that anything that I do includes that dimension of a will and is inscribed in an ethical element. It can be the will to do this, or the will to do the contrary. Even 'not to want to do' also includes a will.

This constitutes the rupture introduced by Lacan in the 7th seminar. However, there is also a continuity between the 7th and the previous seminars, simply because Lacan maintains the logical level, which is also the mathematical level, the level of the signifier, the structural level. Except that now, all these notions are submitted to an ethical exigency. This ethical exigency is translated, at the level of the experience, into the dimension of a will. That means that when Lacan speaks about ethics it is not about the ideal or about what happens in heaven. He is speaking about what happens in actual life, and how we reach the level of ethics in the life of the everyday person, and he says that we reach it by our will.

Why am I here this afternoon? Why are you here this afternoon? Because you wanted to be here and because I wanted to come to London. It was my will! This is the level of the ethics. The level of the ethics is the level of the will.

Thus, in the 7th seminar, introducing the dimension of ethics in analytical experience, Lacan refers to the most ancient tradition in philosophy, which is, to begin with, Aristotle's ethics. This leads him to consider Kant's philosophy which is itself also referred to by Freud. So, it is in relation to that dimension of ethics, and the dimension of the will, that Kant takes his place in Lacan's teaching. That is easy to understand.

In the seminar on Ethics, Lacan tells us that when you consider the ethical element, when you consider the question 'What do you want?', 'What is your will?' the answer is that I will and I act always in the name of the Good. What I am doing is always done in the name of something that I consider more important than anything else, and this is what I call 'Good'. That is Aristotle's definition of ethics. The individual acts in his life in the name of a sovereign Good, which is the Good that is above all kinds of common goods. What is the sovereign Good in the Freudian experience? If we take the point of view of Kant, of Aristotle's ethics, what is the Good in Freudian experience? What did the Freudian discovery of the unconscious change in the Good, which was always the sovereign Good as considered in philosophy?

The discovery that Freud made is in relation to a new dimension of the Good. On the one hand we have philosophy that tries to define what the sovereign Good is, and on the other hand we have the individual experience of psychoanalysis. At the level of the individual experience Freud discovers a good, not a universal or common or sovereign Good, not something which is true for everyone, but a good that is true for only one person. Lacan, in the Ethics seminar, gives a name to that kind of Good, he calls it 'desire'. Desire as Good, means that in analysis there is something that is good, and it is desire. But in analysis there is also something that is neither good nor bad, but something we have to deal with, called enjoyment. From the point of view of Freud, enjoyment or satisfaction, in German *Befriedigung*, is not something bad or good, but it is a problem. Satisfaction, what Lacan called in French 'Jouissance', is neither good nor bad, but something the individual has to deal with.

Thus, at the level of the individual, in the Freudian experience, there is a will. This will is related to the Good, which is represented by desire, which is what we consider as the good in individual experience. Despite the fact that we are now a little far removed from Kant and we are not usually considering a universal moral law, we have to consider that every one has to acknowledge their desire and their relation to desire. At the end of the 7th Seminar on Ethics, Lacan's response to the Kantian maxim is 'Do not give up on your desire'. This maxim defines a duty. From the unconscious point of view, your duty is not to give up on your desire. This answer is rigorously related to the problem of duty, traditionally stated in philosophy. But with the discovery of the unconscious we have to approach a new dimension, which was ignored in traditional ethics, and which is the dimension of desire. Desire creates a new duty. In relation to desire the answer is easy, you must not give up on it. Desire is a Good. But in relation to satisfaction there is a small problem isolated by Lacan, because there is a more complicated relation involved that is neither a good, nor a bad. This means that you have to find a way to establish a relation with satisfaction, keeping in mind that at a certain level desire and satisfaction go hand in hand, whereas at another level, they are opposites. Desire opposed to satisfaction underlines a tension between desire and satisfaction, which is present in every personal life.

This is where Sade comes in. Lacan, in 'Kant avec Sade', referred to only one book of Sade. It is the 'Philosophy in the Boudoir'. I believe that 'Boudoir' is now an English word. A Boudoir is not a bedroom. A Boudoir is between the bedroom and the lounge. 'Boudoir' was invented in France around the 1760s, by Bougainville, a French sailor who made a long trip around the world. He had a frigate he called 'La Boudeuse', from the French verb 'bouder', 'to sulk'. La Boudeuse means the one who sulks. One day, on the 2nd of April 1768, while he was sailing through an archipelago, he came across a high and craggy mountain which he named after the name of his ship, 'La Boudeuse Peak', or 'Le Boudoir'. Starting from his own name 'Bougainville', he went to 'Boudeuse', and 'Boudoir'.

The word 'Boudoir' then made its way to France to designate a new room in everyday life. Located between the living room, where conversation takes place, and the bedroom, where love reigns, the boudoir is the place where philosophy meets love. The 'salons', around the 17th and 18th century, were places where mainly women used to come together, every week, with philosophers and scientists for philosophical conversation. Thus, 'le salon' was a room where philosophy took place. It constituted a new room in the house. It was 'Le salon de Madame la Marquise de Pompadour' for example. The bedroom, on the other hand, was not for conversation, the bedroom was for love, without conversation. It was Sade who invented a new place, between lounge and bedroom, where a conversation, about love, Eros, satisfaction, or sexual satisfaction, could take place. Previously, the bedroom was for sexual satisfaction, whereas with Sade we have in 'La Philosophie dans le Boudoir' the meeting of philosophical conversation and sexual satisfaction. A philosophical conversation about sexual satisfaction would take place in the Sadean Boudoir.

You can imagine now the angle from which Sade comes into Lacan's consideration of ethics. Because, for Lacan, and according to Freud, we have stated the new maxim of the Freudian experience, namely the duty of not giving up on one's desire, and at the same time the problem with relation to satisfaction. Those two things, the question of desire and the relation to satisfaction, are submitted to a will. You have to will what you desire or not to will what you desire. You can will to go in the direction of satisfaction or not. There is a necessary dimension of the will in relation to desire and in relation to satisfaction.

With Sade, in 'Philosophy in the Boudoir', we have something very strange, we have the application of the will to satisfaction, because for Sade satisfaction is a duty. Sexual satisfaction cannot be repressed or prohibited. It would be wrong to prohibit any kind of sexual satisfaction. In this way we are introduced to a new right, the right to satisfaction. This is how we should understand the nature of the problem that is at the basis of Sade's thinking, namely: what must I do with satisfaction? What kind of relation should I establish with satisfaction? The Sadean answer is: your duty is to obey any kind of satisfaction. That is a new right, just like human rights, a right that would be defined by a law. The law gives you the right to come here, for example, at least for the moment, it is not forbidden to have meetings such as this. In some

countries it is forbidden to have meetings in which you talk about psychoanalysis, or sexuality, or Kant, or Sade.

With Sade we are introduced to the dimension of satisfaction as a right. And now we understand how Sade occupies his place in the Lacanian reflection on ethics, which means Lacan's consideration of the relation the individual has with satisfaction.

Thus, we ought to consider what Sade's philosophy wants to establish because the 'Philosophy in the Boudoir' is not only a novel or a play. (Even if Sade, the playwright he mainly was, wanted it to be a play to be performed at the Comédie Française where some of his works were indeed performed.)

The book, 'Philosophy in the Boudoir', has two parts, one of which is presented as a play, with a dialogue between six people. This is the instruction and education of a young girl of 15 with the name of Eugenie. The complete title of the book is: 'La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, ou Les Instituteurs Immoraux', 'Philosophy in the Boudoir or The Immoral Schoolmasters'. The schoolmaster is Dolmancé, who is aided by Madame de Saint Ange, Saint Angel, in the project to educate Eugenie. If you assemble these initials you can configure the name of SADE.

It doesn't take long to educate the girl, only 3 hours, from 4 o'clock to 7. She gets all her education from 4 o'clock to 7, just before dinner, and the play ends with the last sentence which is: "And now, good friends, let's to dinner..." Throughout the main part of the play we have the dialogue that is nothing other than the education of a young girl in the field of enjoyment. Any kind of means will do to obtain satisfaction. With a man, with a woman, in any way. It is very simple, merely a question of combination. Eugenie learns very fast and enjoys her teaching very much. Then, in the middle of the play, there is the other part of the book that is a reading of a pamphlet, which was actually edited in Paris in 1795, a few years after the revolution in the first years of the New Republic, therefore after 1792. The title of the pamphlet is 'Frenchmen, one more effort to be Republican', where, in the name of the republic, the new rights introduced through the French Revolution are listed. The republic must reject all ancient religion, all the old prohibitions, everything that was forbidden before, because now the path is open to all kinds of satisfaction.

It is a philosophical text which reinforces what we have been shown in the first part, in the practical education of the young girl. Eugenie is experiencing what satisfaction is, starting from knowing nothing about satisfaction as a virgin and having had no sexual relations before, she is experiencing those relations now and in every way. Then, in the middle, we have this text, this pamphlet that constitutes the theory of that education in which satisfaction is emphasized. You can do what you want, whatever might give you satisfaction. To obtain sexual satisfaction it is allowed to be with a man, with a woman or with a child. That is not a problem. Nor is it a problem to be with your father, brother, mother, sister. There is no prohibition.

Satisfaction is the will that has every right. For example: Sade examines the question of robbery. Is it right to rob another person? Yes, because it is natural. Sade explains that nature admits robbery and rejects any kind of property. Murder? Of course, murder is possible, it is natural. Nature gives us examples of murder everyday. Can you murder your mother? 'Of course', answers Eugenie. 'Yes, that is what I want to do'.

'I want to kill my mother', says Eugenie, who only just left her house, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, where, being 15, she lives with her mother. When Eugenie is not yet home at 6 o'clock, the mother goes out to try and find her, and she finds her in the house of Madame de Saint Ange. The mother falls into the trap, and the three main protagonists, helped by two others, do what they wanted to do, which is to kill the mother. But before they do this, they subject her to all kinds of satisfactions, whatever they want, which they enjoy, but which the mother all rejects. In the end, there is no solution for her, they don't stop until the murder. But as Dolmancé is more perverted than the others, he says that murder is too short and that when you are still alive the suffering is better. So he invents something more sophisticated to give death to that woman. He calls a man who is sick with, it was not AIDS, but small pox, a kind of syphilis. The mother is taken by that guy so that she will get this disease. The suffering will be immense and over a long period of time before she dies. After this they let her go and say: 'Now lets have dinner'. It all took 3 hours, a 3 hour play, like in classical theatre.

What do we come across in Sade's philosophy? In Sade we come across the exploration of satisfaction without any kind of prohibition, a satisfaction by right, a duty to be always heading for satisfaction. This is announced with a maxim, which is not the Lacanian maxim of desire, but the Sadean maxim, on page 58 in the English translation of 'Kant with Sade': "*I have the right of enjoyment over your body, anyone can say to me.*" Note that Lacan does not put any part of this maxim in quotation marks. The way Sade puts his maxim is not so simple.

In the Kantian maxim you have 'Act...' etc, an imperative told to a person. 'Act in this way!' In the Lacanian maxim we also have an imperative. 'Do not give up on your desire', it is a kind of imperative. In the case of Sade it is not an imperative, it is more a declaration, but a declaration of a right. It is very precise. The subject says "I have the right of enjoyment over your body, anyone can say to me". Which means that the person who is saying the whole sentence is not identical with the person who is saying the first part of the sentence. The first part of the sentence: 'I have the right of enjoyment over your body' is a quote. It is a declaration of enjoyment, made by someone else to the person who speaks, and reports what could be said to her. The person who reports that first sentence, adds his own statement: 'Anyone can say to me'. The declaration of the right of enjoyment can be made by everyone. The person who speaks and says 'I', reports a quote, so 'I' does not refer to her, but to someone else. 'I' is a pronoun for the Other. I articulate, through my mouth, a declaration that is said by someone else, and this 'someone else' can be anybody. This is the way that

Sade presents his maxim. It is to be understood in this way, that if I go out into the world I could meet anyone who can say to me: 'Stop, I have the right of enjoyment over your body'.

The main point is that the person who says that sentence is not the person who assumes the declaration. The declaration is assumed by everyone in the world. We are at a level where the person, the individual, is in relation to an Other. It means that that sentence makes an Other exist. An 'anyone' whom I can meet anytime, an Other who can say to me 'I have the right...'. That is the Sadean fiction in which there is a new law, a new right, the right that is not for the person, but for the Other, because the law is the law of the Other. In the Sadean fiction I cannot oppose the law of the Other. There exists no objection to the Sadean maxim - no objection to the will of the Other. For Sade the will is at the level of the Other, and, what is even more interesting in Sade's 'Philosophy', is that the will is the will of the Other.

This is not so evident in Kant. In Lacan it is evident, in the sense that it is present at the level of desire. For Lacan, desire is the desire of the Other, which means that desire is not a property, it is not an individual property. Desire is always in relation to an Other, because I don't know what my desire is. I cannot know my desire. Lacan tells this anecdote in Seminar XI in which he goes to a Chinese restaurant and, well, now we know more about Chinese restaurants, but at that time Lacan finds that he cannot read the menu. In those days you had no idea what was written in the menu, so you needed the help of the Other to tell you what was written in the menu. So he asked the waitress, 'la patronne', to translate to him the Chinese of the menu, but, in the same way, to translate his own desire, which was also Chinese for him. I don't know what I could eat, because I can't read the Chinese of the menu, but also because I don't know what I want to eat, because my desire is written in a language I can't read, which is Chinese for me, so I need a translator to know my desire.

And this is how it is with desire. It is Chinese to us. The language of my desire is like Chinese, the Other has to help me learn the Chinese of my desire. This is what was so interesting for Lacan, in reading Sade, to perceive that dimension of the will of the Other at the level of satisfaction.

With Sade's philosophy we have the erecting of a supreme Other in 'Evil'. Years before that, Lacan built up his theory of the name of the father, who is the 'supreme Other in Good', of course, because he makes the law, makes things go well in the world. But with Sade we have a new dimension of the Other. An Other who only wants evil. The seminar on Ethics, and 'Kant with Sade' are the main texts of Lacan on Freud's approach to that dimension of the Other as the supreme Other in 'Evil', namely the superego. These texts constitute Lacan's comment on the superego, which is Freud's superego, which does not appear as the Other who wants good, but the Other who wants evil.

What Sade highlights is that, at the level of satisfaction we come across a will. It is not only a question of sensation, or a question of feeling, good, or well, or bad. It is not only an individual experience, because at the level of satisfaction

appears the dimension of the will of an Other. In 'Philosophy in the Boudoir', the purpose of the play is to make the person free in relation to satisfaction, to reject any kind of prohibition in relation to satisfaction. When you begin with satisfaction, it first seems very peaceful, like peace and love. When you take a bath you feel very satisfied because it is very pleasant to be in a warm bath, or indeed a cold bath, as last summer, when it was necessary to read and work in a cold bath, it was so hot. This is an experience of satisfaction, and it seems very simple, at least at the beginning, but after a while more satisfaction is wanted, just like in the Sadean play, where the protagonists include everything in the quest for satisfaction, be it with children, with your mother, whatever.

What you perceive at that level is that when you go in that direction of satisfaction you come across a will, a will that leads you to the extreme, the supreme 'Evil'. It is exactly like this in Sade. Nothing can happen without Dolmancé, the schoolmaster. Nothing happens without the master. It is the schoolmaster who wants to educate the young Eugenie, and who, step by step, wants to get over every obstacle. 'Can I do this, and transgress it?' 'Yes you can.' 'Is it allowed to use children? To rob?' 'Yes, it is allowed.' There is a process at work, it goes step by step, as in any kind of education, in which you always make progress step by step. The education of Eugenie also goes step by step. But to go all the way you need a will. Why can't you stop? You can't stop because there is always a will that pushes you to go further. That dimension of will is very interesting.

We come across the dimension of will in Kant as well, where his definition of the moral law is related to a will. You find this in Chapter 2 of the 'Critique of Practical Reason'.

"By a concept of the object of practical reason I understand the idea of an object as an effect possible to be produced through freedom. To be an object of practical knowledge, as such, signifies, therefore, only the relation of the will to the action by which the object or its opposite would be realised;" (Abbott, p.76)

To consider an object of practical knowledge is to consider the relation between a will and an action. This is where the reflection of Kant takes us. The relation between a will and an action, is the very level at which you can have an ethical reflection. And further: *"And to decide whether something is an object of pure practical reason or not, is only to discern the possibility or impossibility of willing the action by which, if we had the required power (about which experience must decide), a certain object would be realised."* (p.76)

This is the definition of the ethical level: the possibility or impossibility of willing the action by which a certain object would be realised. The law is considered a priori as the determining principle of the action. So we have the action and we have the will, but behind my will there is a law, and that is the principle that determines my action. The question is only whether we should will an action. This is the ethical problem. I either will or I do not will that action. It is at the level of willing an action that the ethical problem takes place, which makes it the question of the moral possibility of an action. It is not the practical possibility

but the moral possibility of the action. The law of the will is the determining principle of the action.

This relation between law, will and action is exactly the same in Sade. Sade's 'Philosophy in the Boudoir', published in 1795, eight years after the publication of the 'Critique of Practical Reason' in 1787, is a kind of parody of the 'Critique'. There is the Law, there is the Will, and we have the Action, except that now Sade gives priority to a very peculiar law, which is not based on a universal moral law, but on the reign of individual satisfaction.

For Kant, 'Act only if your maxim could be taken by others as the principle of their action' implies a relation between my action and the Other. My freedom, in acting, is limited by the Other. The selected maxim is acceptable only if the action it determines in me is welcomed by the Other, and conversely, only if the same maxim taken by the Other as a guide of his action determines an action which I agree with. This is how the problem is stated in Kant.

In Sade we have exactly the same formula. We have the will and we have the law, which is a new moral law: satisfaction has every right. The relation with the Other is put in a very different way. The Other, not me, takes a certain maxim. The Other can tell me: 'I have the right of enjoyment over your body'. This aspect is new. The structure, at the beginning, is the same, but then we find Sade introduces a completely new consideration. With Sade we come across the consideration of satisfaction and across an Other who wants to reach that satisfaction at any price. That Other does not want anything good for me, because he is only looking for his satisfaction, and he finds it in evil, so he wants my Evil.

While in Kant we have the consideration of the Good whereby his maxim is put under the principle of a certain Good, with Sade we have the same structure, but with an inversion. What was 'Good' for Kant is now rejected, and what was 'Evil' in traditional ethics, is good for Sade. It is an insight into satisfaction never encountered before, never before Sade was there such a raw light thrown on satisfaction. A will of satisfaction, 'une volonté de jouissance' in French, which is not limited by anything, a satisfaction without any kind of repression. We have here the dimension of satisfaction based on the existence of an Other who wants 'Evil' for me, and this is very instructive at the clinical level.

Concerning the truth of Kant's moral law, Lacan writes on the first page of Kant with Sade:

"That the work of Sade anticipates Freud, be it in respect of the catalogue of perversions, is a stupid thing to say, which gets repeated endlessly among literary types; the fault, as always belongs to the specialists.

Against this we hold that the Sadean bedroom is equal to those places from which the schools of ancient philosophy took their name: Academy, Lyceum, Stoa. Here as there, the way for science is prepared by rectifying the position of ethics." (p.55)

So, the Sadean Boudoir is like the Platonic Academy, like the Aristotelian Lyceum, like the Stoa of the Stoics, which means that we have to add another

school to the list of the classical philosophical Schools, and the place that goes with it. That new philosophical place is the Sadean Boudoir. Lacan stresses the point that the 'Philosophy in the Boudoir' rectifies traditional ethics. We can see this now, keeping in mind that with Sade, we have a reversal of the Kantian ethics. Through Sade's references to the new law of the French Revolution, the human rights, we have an introduction to a new dimension of satisfaction, in relation with law. Today we see a claim to the right to enjoyment. In English law there is a legal right to enjoyment of one's property. In France too, the law gives the right to enjoy one's own possessions. In France, in 1968, the student's revolt's motto was taken from the Sadean maxim: 'The right to enjoyment'. The right to satisfaction has come as a new right in our societies and we harvest the effects of this. The reference to satisfaction is something new in our societies, since the middle of the 20th century.

In contrast, the Kantian moral rejects any kind of satisfaction. To exclude that dimension of satisfaction in the consideration of ethics, Kant underlines the difference that exists between the two words 'Good' and 'Well'. Kant stresses the difference that exists between the two German words 'Gute' and 'Wohl', and we can do it in English, where there are also two equivalent words. To feel well is not necessarily acting for a 'Good', which means that pleasure is no reason for action. Similarly, to feel pain could be the right way to act in the direction of 'Good', which means that pain is not a reason not to act.

These are the disjunctions between the two considerations of 'Good'. In French we do not have this distinction, we only have 'bien', like in Latin, where there is only 'bonum'. As Lacan says, on the second page of the text, all of Kant's considerations begin with a remark on the philology of the German language. He says that the German language has the good fortune to possess expressions that do not allow this difference to be overlooked, the difference between 'das Gute' and 'das Wohl'.

So, there is a time that Lacan calls a turning point in ethics, where you can feel 'well' in 'Evil' or feel 'bad' in 'Good'. Traditionally, before Kant, you felt 'well' in 'Good' and 'bad' in 'Evil'. But with this disjunction between the feeling and the moral level you have the possibility, stressed by Lacan, to feel 'well' in 'Evil'. You can know "Happiness in Evil".

On the side of Freud, the pleasure principle is the law that is on the side of the 'well', 'das Wohl' in German, the level of feeling pleasant or feeling unpleasant. The level of the 'Good', 'das Gute', is not at the level of the pleasure principle. Kant rejected that level of the sensations, the level of pleasure or displeasure. Sensation and feeling, i.e. the pleasure principle, are not on the moral level, where we talk only about 'Good' and 'Evil'. Kant's project amounts to a rejection of the drive, the feeling or the sensation. With Sade, feeling is re-introduced as a new 'Good', so what you feel is now good.

This is not Lacan's position in Seminar VII. In this seminar he makes a difference between the pleasure principle, where you feel pleasant or unpleasant, and 'Good', which is the level of desire. Desire does not necessarily put you in a

pleasant situation. On the contrary, it can be unpleasant to desire. And it usually is disagreeable to desire. There is a contradiction between the pleasure principle and desire, or between well or pleasant and 'Good', which is desire. So, where do we put satisfaction? With 'Good' and desire, or with 'well' and the pleasure principle? It is a question, because satisfaction is at the level of the pleasure principle, and there is also a satisfaction that is beyond the pleasure principle.

Satisfaction was never rejected, neither by Lacan nor by Freud. Freud and Lacan do not reject satisfaction, but they consider a certain relation to satisfaction by the way of desire, or by the way of love. Desire and love have no place in Sade. There is no word for love in Sade.

But love, for Lacan, since the 4th Seminar, the seminar on the relation to the object, is put as the pivot of the experience, and it is not only the early Lacan. You find the same problem in Seminar XX, 'Encore', where, from the very beginning to the end, Lacan deals with the question of the relationship between love and satisfaction. Generally, there is a certain opposition between love and satisfaction, for instance many men cannot love and have satisfaction at the same time, with the same woman. It is very difficult because there is love and there is also satisfaction, and they are two different things, opposed most of the time. The problem for a man is his relation to love, and his relation to satisfaction, how to tie the two in his love life. For a woman it often looks easier, because a woman has satisfaction through love. For a woman, love is included in satisfaction, and satisfaction is woven into love. This is the problem we come across in the seminar 'Encore'. But here, in 'Kant avec Sade', we have the introduction to that new problematic of the relation of the subject to satisfaction. Is it a 'Good' or not a 'Good'? In the Sadean fiction it is a 'Good'.

The relation between Sade and Kant is the following. The dimension of satisfaction, that is to say the pathological level, which was rejected by Kant, is re-introduced by Sade. It is in this way that Lacan can say that "*Here Sade is the inaugural step of a subversion of which, however amusing it might seem with respect to the coldness of the man, Kant is the turning point...*" (p.55) By making a distinction between 'well' and 'Good' Kant took the first step, which makes possible the Sadean subversion. The subversion came with Sade because what was rejected by Kant is reintroduced by him as a 'Good'. This means that Sade completes Kant's reflection on ethics because there is no answer in Kant's ethics about the destiny of the pathological level he had first rejected. And Sade is the one who gave an answer concerning the level of satisfaction. For him it became the sovereign 'Good'. If you reject something, you have to think about what happens to it. Kant left the dimension of the pathological out as a remainder, and Sade came to consider that remainder. What was rejected from the symbolic of Kant's 'Critique' came back into the real of Sade's practice. Sade is in accordance with Kant, and completes him by considering what he had left aside, but, according to Lacan, he did more, he gave the truth of the 'Practical Critique'.

I will try to say in a few words why the Sadean Boudoir is the truth of Kant's Critique. This dimension of satisfaction rejected by Kant does not disappear miraculously. It does not disappear inside the Kantian 'Critique' either. You cannot just reject something, because the thing you reject always returns somewhere. The rejected satisfaction returns in the 'Critique' itself as the categorical imperative, the father of the superego. What was presented as a law, very peaceful, namely the maxim 'Act in such a way that the maxim can be taken by another...', is an imperative. And when you are under a certain imperative you are under a will.

The imperative is a will at the beginning, but you do not know where that will will go. Kant wants us to be educated, the schoolmasters are all Kantian, but while they are Kantian they ignore that they are Sadean. They are Sadean because the imperative always has a Sadean dimension. The Kantian imperative has the structure of the Freudian superego. The superego, which is presented at the beginning by Freud as a moral instance, appears actually as a will, but a will that does not want my 'Good'. A will has only to be satisfied at the level of the will, so what was rejected by Kant, namely satisfaction, returns in the satisfaction of the will of the imperative. This smuggled satisfaction is included in the implementation of the Kantian maxim. At that level there is a satisfaction that is the satisfaction to be obeyed, and there is also a satisfaction to see that the law is the law, meaning a satisfaction derived from the law itself, from there being a law. That satisfaction is the same kind of enjoyment as any other kind of satisfaction. At the level of the will, present in Kant, there is the satisfaction which was rejected, but which returns, hidden, under the will.

What do you want when you want the 'Good' for the Other? When you want the 'Good' for the Other, like a kind of Sadean schoolmaster you are always looking for a certain satisfaction for yourself. This is the truth, given by Sade, to the Kantian moral law, which cannot reject the dimension of the will. The Freudian superego presents itself as a moral authority, built on the same pattern as the Kantian categorical imperative. Freud discovered that the superego actually has a Sadean dimension. The superego recovers for itself the satisfaction it forbids the individual to have. So sadism is the truth of moral authority, and Sade is the truth of Kant's moral law.

Discussion:

The ethics of psychoanalysis is not a Sadean ethics. It does not promote the right to satisfaction. Absolutely not. But nor is the ethics of psychoanalysis a Kantian ethics, because it does not reject the dimension of satisfaction. The ethics of psychoanalysis takes into account the dimension of satisfaction but also the dimension of desire and the dimension of love. Lacan never abandoned that. At the end of his teaching, when Lacan dissolved his school, I was in analysis with him, I received the news, like a thousand others did, through a letter from him that was addressed: "To those who still love me". That means that, for Lacan

in 1980, at the end of his teaching, at a critical and decisive moment of the history of his teaching, he dissolved his school and called for love. If we are here this afternoon, it is in the name of love, it is not in the name of a will of enjoyment.

Q: What is the relation between desire, love and satisfaction?

Lacan says that it is only through love that satisfaction can lead to desire. We have the dimension of satisfaction in the Sadean world, which is the realm of satisfaction, but in the Lacanian world, which is our world, the Schools respond to love. The School obeys only love. To be here, and to study in the Freudian Field, you have to love the School, you have to love Lacan, you have to love Freud, you have to love psychoanalysis, you have to love the unconscious, you have to love desire... And you have to love the NLS and the London Society. Love is not a Sadean solution, or a sceptic's solution, or a stoic solution, or an Aristotelian solution. It is not a Kantian solution either, which ignores the dimension of satisfaction. We do not ignore the dimension of satisfaction.

Q: What about the ideal?

Of course there is an ideal in Kant. Whether there is an ideal in Sade is not so sure, maybe it is a perverted ideal. Is there an ideal in psychoanalysis? Of course there is an ideal in psychoanalysis. The Freudian Cause is for us an ideal. What is the difference with the common relation to an ideal? The main difference in relation to the ideal in psychoanalysis, in the Lacanian way, is that we do not have a group relation to the ideal. We have an individual relation to the ideal. We do not have a mass relation to the ideal, which is the usual way. When you have an ideal in the common world it is always a group identification to the ideal, you make a set and you are in relation to the ideal.

Lacan, when he founded his school, said: "Alone as I have always been in my relation to the analytical cause, I found this School". He means that he was alone in his relation to that ideal. So in psychoanalysis we have that kind of relation to the ideal. We have ideals, of course, but we have a solitary relation to those ideals, which leaves us alone. We have relations with others, but we do not make a mass, or a group out of it.

Q: The signifier of the father that creates lack at the level of satisfaction.

The concept of the Name of the Father, in Lacan, and already in Freud, has at least two main faces. On the one hand it is an instance of peace, and on the other hand it is an instance of war. Lacan had to deal with those two faces of the father, both, at the level of the signifier, where it either serves a peaceful function, or is related to satisfaction, mostly in a kind of un-peaceful effect.

Q: The relation between 'Kant with Sade' on the one hand and the Republic on the other. How to link 'Equality, Liberty, Fraternity' to 'Kant with Sade'?

Fraternity is always based on segregation. If you want to be brothers, you have to exclude others. Fraternity is good, but not too much, because it implies segregation.

Freedom, for Lacan, is totally delirious. There is no freedom at all for Lacan. The only free man is the madman. The real problem of freedom is in relation with the signifier that creates you. If you reject that dimension of the signifier that creates you, you are free, but you are completely mad. It is a very interesting possibility, because after that, you have to accept the consequences of that freedom, and that is very difficult, but could lead you to invent. It is more comfortable to choose the other way, but there is a loss in that way too, because you are less creative.

Thank you.

Critique of Practical Reason Immanuel Kant; translated by T.K. Abbott, Prometheus books, NY, 1996

Kant with Sade Jacques Lacan; translated by J.B. Swenson, October, MIT press, 1989

Philosophy in the Bedroom Marquis de Sade; translated by Seaver and Wainhouse, Arrow Books, 1965, London

Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment

2

ALEXANDRE STEVENS

'THE PARADOX OF THE UNIVERSAL'

Lacan extracted from Sade's text 'The Philosophy in the Boudoir' the Sadean Universal Maxim. I see that the English translators have rendered 'boudoir' into 'bedroom', although a boudoir is not a bedroom. The term exists in English, does it not? As in French, the term is a little odd. Lacan did not actually extract the maxim, but rather constructed it because it does not exist as such in Sade's work. He neither said nor wrote this maxim as Lacan formulated it. Lacan deduced this maxim from the text, in which we can find an example that is very close to it.

The basis for the maxim constructed by Lacan is to be found in the "pamphlet within a pamphlet" (as Lacan puts it in 'Kant with Sade') that has the title: 'Frenchmen, yet another effort to be Republican'. This title is to be taken with humour. We are in the period of the French revolution and also only a few years after Kant's 'Critique of Practical Reason'. In this pamphlet one of the heroes of the 'Boudoir' gives us a lecture on practical rules that guide his action. This means that he gives us his perverse ethical rule. From this base comes what Lacan formulates into a maxim: "I have the right of enjoyment over your body anyone can say to me, and I will exercise this right without any limit stopping me in the capriciousness of the exactions that I may have the taste to satiate."

'The right of enjoyment' is a translation of 'le droit de jouir' – you know that in the English translations the Lacanian term of 'jouissance' is frequently not translated, whereas in your seminar title it is. It is translated with enjoyment, "Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment". 'Jouissance' in French is absolutely not pleasure! Pleasure is one of the limits of jouissance. What turns into pleasure is not jouissance. Jouissance stops when pleasure comes in. Sexual jouissance is the most frequent type of jouissance. But when it is pleasure then the term jouissance is not appropriate to describe that sexual enjoyment. The difficulty with using the English word 'enjoyment' for 'jouissance' is that there is a use of the word in 'Enjoy Coca Cola' that is the opposite of jouissance. Lacan insisted

that it is not possible to translate 'jouissance' with 'enjoyment' when it is possible to say 'Enjoy Coca Cola'.

In French, 'jouissance' is linked to sexual enjoyment but also to a legal term in relation to the 'right of possession'. We can say 'La maison jouit d'un vu sur mer' – 'The house enjoys a sea view.' Furthermore, for Lacan, jouissance is also linked to the death drive, apparent in the pronouncement that pleasure is one limit to jouissance and pain is the other.

I will come back to the Sadean maxim then. 'I have the right to enjoyment over your body - anyone can say to me.' There are some remarks in 'The Philosophy in the Boudoir' that come very close to this, if not exactly. In the pamphlet within the pamphlet, Dolmancé says that, after having established that we have no right to say that a woman is our possession, we can therefore say that we – and everybody - have the right to constrain her. (Footnote on page 319 in Seaver and Wainhouse, Arrow Books). No one has the right of possession over anyone else but everybody may say that they have the right of enjoyment over someone else's body.

The Sadean maxim is: 'I have the right... the right to use, to enjoy'. This points to the paradox in the maxim when it takes the form of the universal law, like the categorical imperative of Kant, which is a universal law but not a general possibility. Lacan in 'Kant with Sade' underlines this paradox: "Black humour at best, for any reasonable being, to be distributed between the maxim and the consent which it is presumed to have..." (Kant with Sade p.58)

Before I develop the link to the object I want to make two remarks, one about the superego and the second about reciprocity. The presence of the superego, which you will find in this text by Lacan, is undoubtedly evoked by the Sadean maxim. The 'black humour' that is present in the maxim emphasizes this effect due to its imperative form. "We now know that humour is the betrayer in the comic of the function of the 'superego'" (p.58) It makes its appearance not only as a form of internal law of the subject but also as a requirement for enjoyment.

This would be the same for the moral maxim in which we find a will to renounce enjoyment – (I will use enjoyment and jouissance interchangeably, because you have translated jouissance with enjoyment) – as well as a requirement for enjoyment. Note that this renouncing of enjoyment is also an enjoyment. It is a form of jouissance to renounce jouissance!

I will give you a simple clinical example of this kind of enjoyment. It is the mother who sacrifices everything for her child. If she thinks it is useful for her child she will always be ready for more abnegation. This can extend to an excessive invasion of the child's privacy, as we sometimes see in infantile psychosis. What seems to be the most difficult or impossible thing to do for such a mother is to sacrifice her own sacrifice, to renounce the enjoyment she gets from her renunciation of enjoyment. One can easily recognise here a kind of jouissance of the superego linked with the death drive.

Another example that underlines the effect of the jouissance of the superego, albeit a more public one, came to me on the Eurostar this morning. It reminded me of an old affair while I was reading about a new affair. The old affair concerns President Bill Clinton and the attorney Kenneth Starr. You all heard

about it, regarding a little piece of sexual enjoyment, very normal except for the White House. On this affair Kenneth Starr has written a report 500 pages long that demonstrates nothing other than this *jouissance* of the superego denouncing enjoyment. His only conclusion is that Clinton has lied – this whole long report is written up to show that Clinton lied – because if he lied about Monica Lewinsky it is possible that he lied about more important things too. In order to prove this single point this long report denounces the enjoyment and - reading it is easy to see – there is an enjoyment in this denouncing of the enjoyment.

You can sometimes sense the same feeling reading psychoanalytical authors on the subject of perversion. The question arises there – who is the pervert? – The author or the subject he describes? Masud Khan is such an example, from the British Society. I do not know if he is still alive. He left the British Society, I think, before they could exclude him!

To come back to Starr and Clinton – I was reminded of that affair while reading the Daily Mail on the Eurostar this morning. We see there that such an affair is much more economical in England. What took 500 pages with Starr took one sentence in the British Press. 'Prince Charles has denied "unpublished incident"'. It is wonderful, it has exactly the same structure. This "unpublished incident", in inverted commas, is the equivalent to a 500 page report, namely nothing other than the *jouissance* of the superego.

The superego, Lacan says, is the imperative of *jouissance*. I will give you two examples of that. When the superego pushes you to renounce your *jouissance* there is a new *jouissance* that enjoys the renunciation of your *jouissance*. This is very much apparent in 19th century moral texts where there is explicitly a *jouissance* lodged in the renunciation. The other face of this – like the two sides of a coin – is the *jouissance* of the moraliser, the man who pushes you to renounce your *jouissance*. That is the position of the prosecutor or the judge for example. Both cases are linked to the renunciation of *jouissance*.

Regarding reciprocity, Lacan writes in this text that there is no reciprocity possible because of the signifier: "And one would not want to miss this opportunity to denounce the exorbitance of the role which is conferred to the moment of reciprocity in structures, notably subjective ones, to which it is intrinsically repugnant.

Reciprocity, a reversible relation because it establishes itself upon a simple line uniting two subjects who from their 'reciprocal' position hold this relation to be equivalent, can only situate itself with difficulty as the logical time of any crossing-over of the subject in his relation to the signifier..." (p.58, bottom)

That is the position of Lacan. "Whatever it may be, it is already a point in favour of our maxim" - of the Sadean maxim of course - "that it can serve as paradigm of a statement which excludes as such reciprocity (reciprocity and not trading places)." (p.59)

In the 'I have the right of enjoyment over your body', you understand that there is no possible reciprocity at the same time for two subjects. Because it is evident that one of the two will be in the position of subject and the other in the position of object ($\$ \rightarrow a$). I'll develop later which one is in which position, because it is not so easy, not so simple. There is no reciprocity because one is in

the position of \$ and the other in position of a. What we may name reciprocity is that we have the same right between us, a reciprocity that is only possible when two persons are in the same position, which, for Lacan, does not exist.

When you read some recent American IPA texts you can see that there is an ideal of a democratic reciprocity in the analytical session, which was tried a long time ago by Ferenczi. In the last period of his life, when he 'invented' the counter-transference, he proposed to some patients that the patient, after he had finished his session with Ferenczi, do a second session, where he, Ferenczi, would lie on the couch saying what he thought about what the patient and he himself had said in the first session. That is the maximum form of counter-transference. It has to be said that at that moment Ferenczi thought that the fantasy does not lie, which means that what is determined for the subject by the fantasy is something that really happens as a trauma. He thought that the real trauma was that the parents were liars. On this basis Ferenczi would say 'I am not a liar' to the patient, inviting the patient to listen to him on the couch, as proof. That is the idea of reciprocity. While, of course, a hysterical patient said to Ferenczi, that it was not fair that it was always she who had to go on the couch first. You see from this remark of Ferenczi's patient that reciprocity is impossible, as Lacan said.

And in this formula ($\$ \rightarrow a$) . ($a \rightarrow \$$) that becomes very clear, because there are not two signifiers or two subjects, only different positions: one in position of \$, the other in position of a. Thus no reciprocity because these are not symmetrical places. Although the possibility of trading places does exist - each one in his turn. In sado-masochistic practice, for example, it is possible to trade places. But it is not reciprocal at the moment that an act happens. It is more a question of a deal, as we can read in Sacher Masoch, the contract that determines each in his turn. The deal may be more complex but it is not the same as reciprocity - it is structurally non-reciprocal. It is important to understand this!

This non-reciprocity is the name, at that time of Lacan's teaching, of the non-existence of the sexual rapport. How do you translate this? Do you say rapport or relation? In French, 'rapport' is a mathematical relation. (in English the mathematical aspect is evoked in the term 'relation') To say 'the sexual relation does not exist' means that there is no complementarity between the sexes. There is no reciprocity.

I think that the non-reciprocity about which Lacan speaks is the name for the later non-existence of the sexual relation. In Seminar XX, Encore, the non-reciprocity will be constructed by Lacan as two kinds of sexual jouissance, male sexual enjoyment and feminine sexual enjoyment, without reciprocity between the enjoyments. Male sexual enjoyment is, in Seminar XX, the polymorphous perverse enjoyment of the male, or phallic jouissance, which for Lacan is a little autistic. The male part of humanity is a little autistic.

When he is looking at sexual enjoyment, this male sexual enjoyment can be written, in that the subject is oriented towards the finding of an object petit a, which is Lacan's way of writing the logical object that he extracts from the partial object ($\$ \rightarrow a$). Although I will not develop the object a for the moment, it is a fact

that for sexual enjoyment, the man looks not for a woman, not for a person, but for a partial object. This is relatively easy to understand once you hear men speak in analysis about what particularity, what part of somebody, of a woman, is attractive. That is the object a he sees, or hears, because it may be the voice also. This object is then not a partner but a partial object, the singular sexual object of this particular man. A little autistic then, because he is evidently not with another person but with a partial object that merely completes him.

Luckily there are women, who, in feminine jouissance, introduce the Other that allows the man not stay on his side of autistic enjoyment but to have a link to the Other. Feminine sexual enjoyment includes the Other and is thereby another kind of jouissance. The woman, as Lacan says in Seminar XX, has access to phallic jouissance, but also to another one, a supplement, with the inclusion of love in the enjoyment. These are the different positions of the man and the woman, for what is named love. It is not that the man could not be in love, but it does not have the same place as for woman.

In the feminine version of sexual jouissance, for Lacan, she first has access to phallic jouissance. Note that this is exactly what Freud said when he said that a little girl first has a clitoral jouissance and then she has to find another mode of jouissance, which Freud named vaginal enjoyment. That was an idea of Freud's. Lacan formulates the same thing but in a very different manner, because first she has access to a phallic jouissance and then she has access to another, an Other jouissance, which we can see at two levels.

Jacques-Alain Miller has developed this in an issue of 'La Cause Freudienne'. I don't have the number here with me. The Other in feminine jouissance can be seen at two levels. First, physically, because it is unlimited. Whereas male jouissance is limited, it is an enjoyment limited to the organ, like clitoral jouissance. But the part of jouissance that Lacan named the Other jouissance, feminine jouissance, is seen as unlimited in the body, not limited to the organ, to say it differently. And secondly it includes love. That means signifiers, it means the Other! That's why Lacan said that the woman has this link to the Other with which she can introduce the man to the Other.

You can see that when Lacan said this in Seminar XX, there is at that moment a radical definitive non-reciprocity between the sexual enjoyment of these two parts of humanity.

After these two remarks I will come back to the maxim to distinguish perversion as clinical structure and fantasy, or as trans-clinical or trans-structural. Let us first take the structure of perversion from this Sadean maxim. We have to remark that here are two terms in this maxim. We have a first term: 'I have the right of enjoyment over your body'. And then we have the second one: 'anyone can say to me':

I have the right of enjoyment over your body	Anyone can say to me
subject of the statement	subject of enunciation
perverse subject	Other
a	\$
body	subjectification
agent of torment	victim
immodesty of the one	modesty of the Other
organ, your enjoyment	bars the Other (A)

We have two subjects and we have two parts of the sentence.

We have a third part that completes what exactly I may do to you. "...and I will exercise this right, without any limit stopping me in the capriciousness of the exactions that I might have the taste to satiate" (p.58) But that is not so important. It only evokes the scenario.

The structure in this sentence is given in the two first parts. The subject of the statement and the subject of the enunciation are here separated, artificially separated by the effect of this maxim. The subject of the enunciation is situated at the point from where the enunciation comes: from the Other - 'anyone can say to me'. Then you have the subject of the statement in the part of the statement, 'I have the right...', which functions as a kind of imaginary separation between the two subjects in the sentence. It must be clear that this is the side of the Other. The Other may tell me 'I have the right...'

The enunciating subject is on side of the Other, and the subject of the statement is on side of the perverse subject. That has a consequence, a very simple consequence. It means that the subject, the divided subject, in perverse structure, is on the side of the Other. It means that the subject is on the side that is usually named the victim, whereas the object is on the side of the perverse subject. It is the perverse man who is the object, who is objectified, and the victim who is subjectified.

I will give you a clinical example that will hopefully convince you. Before I do that, I will explain these two positions of the fantasy a little more. When you have the maxim 'I have the right...' it means that that is the part where the body is, which is the object. Lacan said this: "This object, isn't it there in the Sadean experience descended from its inaccessibility and unveiled as Dasein of the agent of torment" (p.60)

This is what I would call the perverse subject. It is the agent of torment. We have a clinical proof of this immediately given by Lacan, which is very interesting to understand. After that I will give you a case of my own practice. The clinical example that Lacan gives is this: "For modesty is amboceptive of the conjunctures of being: between two, the immodesty of the one being by itself the rape of the modesty of the other." (p.60) Let us say that an exhibitionist is the rape of the modesty of the victim, of the Other. But the rape of the modesty of the

Other means it bars the Other, it anguishes the Other, it causes a barred subject, a divided subject.

A clinical example from my own practice: A female patient, a 20 year old woman, tells me that a man stopped her in the street and asked her... - it is, as usual in these cases, a little dark and the street is surrounded by wasteland - that is the cinematic context - the man asks her: "Do you want to see the cock of a man?" (in French 'le queue') You encounter here exactly the same structure. My organ, my body, is to you this position of enjoyment. Do you want to see? And on the other side, the little girl is divided, anguished, endures the rape of her modesty, and the subject is sufficiently barred to run away immediately, having seen nothing. It was a failure for the perverse man. You see the position of the pervert and the position of the neurotic girl... No, it was not a failure. In my experience, what I hear from my patients, is that the exhibitionist shows his penis to a little girl usually when 500 other people are around, and nobody else has seen anything, except the girl, which is exactly what is attempted by the exhibitionist. My patient's experience with the one who asked her this question is perhaps not so much an exhibitionist than a sadist. Because it is done with the voice that he divides her. But of course I don't know this man, I don't know more clinical features about him.

From my patient I have a clinical event where some months after this, after working through, she went to the door of the bathroom to see the penis of her father through the keyhole. She made a little noise there by the door, to which her father asked 'who is there?' And she immediately goes away. This finishes the whole episode. You have exactly, the primal scene, the traumatic scene, then the effect of repression and then the return of the repressed, in trying to see it a second time, and then it is finished. Which is the difference between the pervert and the hysteric. The hysteric, at the second moment, when she goes to the hole in the door, goes there divided, not in the position of the object, and immediately makes a noise that the father hears.

This is the first point to take into consideration with the structure of perversion. This matheme, $(S \rightarrow a)$, has non-reversible positions. You see that in the fantasy you have something close to that, $(\$ \langle \rightarrow a)$, but not exactly the same thing.

This singular little structure is also present in perverse traits in other structures, not only in the perverse structure, for example in Rousseau's 'Confessions' where you have little perverse traits that appear, although Rousseau was a psychotic. When he was 4 years old he received a spanking after which he has a perverse trait. At a little fountain, where girls come to take water, he presents his arse, his bottom. It is a little perverse trait that exists until the moment the police arrive.

The second point to take into consideration in perversion is that beyond this object that is the position of the perverse subject, there is something of a will. I will read Lacan on what he terms the 'opacity of the transcendence', 'the jouissance of God', the 'being supreme in wickedness': "When jouissance is petrified in it, it becomes the black fetish, in which the form - most definitely

offered in such place and time, and still today for one to adore god – can be recognised.” (p.61)

This is how Lacan defines 'the will of jouissance'. You see that also in the pamphlet of Sade. In this pamphlet, which is in the 5th dialogue, Sade describes a series of behaviours that he deems to be good, described as the natural manner to be, such as: immodesty, adultery, rape, incest, sodomy, and murder also. All these propositions are justified in the name of the natural. That is for Sade the name of the will of the Other. He explains that when you murder somebody, you just accelerate the work of nature a little, and that cannot be a bad thing, because it gives the place to somebody new.

Sade is only against the official murder of the death penalty. He finds that immoral and against the law of the natural because it is decided by men, by a judgement. He prefers the position of Louis the 15th. He says that that is a good position in the case of murder. The king of France says to the duke or baron who killed a man just to enjoy it: I give you pardon, but I will also give it to those who will want to kill you. That is the position of Sade with respect to the law. Whereas for incest or murder, and so on, it is in the name of nature because nature 'wills it so'.

In perverse structure, you have not only this little structure, which leads to the perversion, but also a reference to a will that is beyond this object.

$$w \leftarrow a \rightarrow \$$$

As for fantasy, the structure of perversion gives us also the base for fantasy. But Lacan writes a little further down: "Let us rather perceive that Sade is not duped by his fantasy, to the extent that the rigour of his thought passes into the logic of his life." (p.65)

We accept to be duped! I would say that with Lacan of Seminar XX, the man is looking for the object in his sexual enjoyment ($\$ \rightarrow a$). You see that this is effectively not the same formula as the one for perversion ($w \leftarrow a \rightarrow \$$) because it is the reverse of it ($a \rightarrow \$$).

This is not the structure of the fantasy ($\$ \leftrightarrow a$). This is the structure of the desire of man, regulated by the fantasy ($\$ \rightarrow a$). Although the inverse is realised when this object divides him ($a \rightarrow \$$).

I will give you an example of an analysand of mine. He is so attached to a woman that at the moment of consummation the presence of the object causes anguish in him. The object now divides him and he is impotent at that moment. It is the inversion of the position of male desire. This gives us the position that Lacan writes in the fantasy ($\$ \leftrightarrow a$). This little lozenge is to be understood this way.

We find a similar thesis in the text of Casanova who is always looking for a new object. His is a position of systematic seduction. On each page of the 1000 pages of the text he is looking for a new object. Just once, on these 1000 occasions, the imminence of the act in a certain condition anguishes him and leaves him impotent. It is the moment when the object divides the subject and stops the desire.

Thus, fantasy is to be read on three planes, the imaginary, symbolic and real. On the imaginary plane we have the scenario. On the symbolic plane it is

the sentence, like 'a child is being beaten', a father beats me because he loves me. That is the sentence of the fantasy in Freud. And thirdly, the axiom of the fantasy in the real: it comes at the place of the real.

In order to elaborate on that, some words about a case you know already. It is the case of Emma in the 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' of 1895. It is only half a page in the text of Freud. And you see there that a girl, an adolescent girl, has a phobia: she cannot go into a shop anymore. Freud examines the situation and there are two things that emerge from her history. The first scene is from when she is 8 years old. She goes into a store - I've just come back from New York - and the grocer who serves her touches her genitals through her skirt, laughing. It is not so traumatic. She goes there a second time, and the same thing happens. After that she thinks it is better not to go there again, no more store. The second scene is four years later at 12 years old. She goes into a shop and there are two men who are laughing while looking at her skirt.

What is important is that in the two scenes you have the shop, the men in the shop, you have the fact that they laugh, and you have the clothes. The importance is that they are the same signifiers. Although it starts with the first scene, after which comes the second scene, and then begins the phobia, you must understand that the first scene is not traumatic. I say that to you because Emma says it: 'it was not traumatic'. She does not remember it being traumatic. It only had a certain pleasure. Not enjoyment, but pleasure. Yet she did not understand what exactly happened.

The second scene also is evidently not traumatic, not objectively so, but it is the second scene that makes the first scene begin to be traumatic. After the second scene comes the logical moment of the constitution of the fantasy, at the place of the real.

Of course for a judge, for the attorney, the first scene is the bad scene. This is traumatic, and the man must go to jail. I have no judgment for that - that is not my line of work. For us psychoanalysts, we see that it is the second scene that constitutes the first as traumatic and it constitutes itself after the event, which means that it is constituted as the fantasy. Whether it is real, or not, in any case it is not a screen memory, because she has it. But the fantasy is constituted between the two scenes and at the place of the real. What is the real in this case? Is it in the fact that this man touched her? Or is it the fact that language failed to give her the right signifiers and the right signification of this scene?

Jacques-Alain Miller writes in his seminar 'From the symptom to the fantasy and back again': "The fantasy occupies the place of the real..." - this is the place of the hole, while in this scene something certainly happened, there is a hole of signification - "...and so resists psychoanalytical interpretation." The fantasy resists interpretation, resists reduction, but it is possible to cross it, says Miller. I'll stop here... if you allow me that. We must have time for discussion.

Discussion:

Q: What is the crossing of the fantasy?

What is called the crossing of the fantasy is exactly the fact that if the fantasy comes at the place of the real, where there is a hole, then if you let down

the fantasy you encounter anguish, at that same place. You can perhaps remember, in the texts of Lacan, that when he constructed his graph of desire, he put the fantasy at the same place as anguish. You can deduce from that that when the fantasy comes down - it happens, you have the example of adolescence, when each subject is obliged to modify his fantasy, to re-adapt it - there appears anguish. Each moment that the fantasy disappears a little produces anguish. The crossing of the fantasy means to be able to encounter this anguish and to construct what this fantasy effectively is. To understand what the underlying rule of this fantasy is and after that to construct a new position for the subject that is not without fantasy but a position of knowing what the fantasy is. It is a question for the end of analysis, of course.

But I have a question myself. A point I will develop a little, because I was in New York four weeks ago, to speak about indications and counter-indications in psychoanalysis. We spoke about a series of counter-indications that Lacan gave us, - some of you surely know these counter-indications, the Japanese, the English language, etc, true Catholics... That is not what I developed in New York, but this point; that these counter-indications given by Lacan, but also the IPA, these counter-indications come from an ethical point of view. And from this point of view we may ask the question: Is the perverse position a counter-indication to psychoanalysis? Freud, in 1905, gives the counter-indication of the subject that is ethically not sufficiently strong. It is difficult to interpret this exactly, but we understand the ethical condition.

For Lacan, this position is occupied by the knave. He speaks about the knave in various parts of his teaching, in the Ethics seminar, in Television and in Seminar XX. The knave is in an ethical position. In the 'Ethics' Lacan gives a definition of the knave from political thinking, when he speaks about the difference between the right wing intellectual and the left wing intellectual. The left wing intellectuals are fools, as in the king's fool ('le bouffon du roi'), the man who says the truth just to make people laugh, without being afraid of the consequences for himself. The main thing is that he can say the truth! Whereas the right wing intellectual is a knave, because he pays no attention to the consequences of what he says. It's a realist's position. He does not take into account the consequences of what he says. We have many political examples of that, and Lacan is not an optimist when he adds that for the left wing intellectuals, when they are in groups, they are also knaves. A knave is somebody to whom the consequences of what he says do not matter. He does not care about the consequence for the Other of what he says.

What I want to say is that neither of these two, Freud or Lacan, gives the counter-indication of perversion. And I found a counter-indication of a similar range in the journal of the IPA. It is, I cannot remember who wrote it, somebody from London, but it is a text about the question whether a liar would be a counter-indication for psychoanalysis? It is interesting. Psychoanalysis consists of saying the truth, so that even if a liar says the truth it is not the truth because he is a liar. When a liar is really himself, it is difficult to recognise because he lies. It is an interesting idea, but none of them, and I never see it in the IPA literature, considers perversion a counter-indication for psychoanalysis. It has to be said

that it is not frequent to receive a perverse person for psychoanalysis. Because they do not come to ask something from the analyst. We have here a limit point.

Q: What is the difference between perverse traits and perverse structure?

The difference is, I think, that the fantasy that neurotics put on the scene, in their scenarios with some figures in perverse situations, those are sexual fantasies. But even if a neurotic person realises his fantasy - it is not typical, but it happens - that is imaginary, it is a perverse trait, which you can see as isolated from the whole structure of the person, an isolated trait. It is a moment of perversion proper, but it does not define the whole position of the subject.

Q: Could you say something about the paradox of the Kantian imperative, in its universal form, and the problem of introducing the particularity of the pathological object into this logic?

You know that Lacan discussed, in another text, the one on identification (Seminar IX), the Aristotelian logic, in which it is from the universal, - the 'de tous' in French, the 'for all', that we can deduce that it is not for everybody, not for all. It is the particular deduced from the universal.

Lacan says that the paradox in the Sadean maxim is that the universal form is not possible to realise as universal. It is logically universal, but if you are thinking about making laws for a country it is impossible, because it is impossible to say that it is viable for everybody. What is apparent in this maxim of two sentences, where everybody may say 'I may use your body for my enjoyment', is that this concerns only a singular trait. Everybody may say it but it refers to a particular object.

That is why the universal in this case or this formula is not realisable. It is purely universal, which means that if you try to think of the meaning of this universal you immediately arrive at the little trait of somebody, at this particular object that is put into play.

Q: Is disavowal necessary to explain perverse structure?

It is important to understand that when Freud and Lacan construct the question of perversion in the subjective structures, there is immediately a question. Is perversion a subjective structure? Or is it a consequence of a biological structure, that the level of the drive is a little too high? The difference suggests the question of whether it is choice of the subject.

The first position, of Freud, and of a whole part of the IPA, is that it is a problem of the level of the drive and that it does not depend on the subject, which means that it also does not depend on psychoanalysis and the psychoanalyst. Disavowal, on the other hand, and Lacan used it after Freud, is the question of the position of the subject in the structure. In neurosis we have repression, in psychosis we have foreclosure. What psychical mechanism concerning the subject is playing a part in perversion? It is effectively disavowal, denial. Freud and Lacan will use some different terms, at times, to disavowal. But it is always disavowal of castration, that is important to keep in mind. In this text, 'Kant with Sade', you can see that the exact structure of perversion is to be understood in this way: a, the will, the subject. To speak about disavowal we have to complete

the schema, which is later in the text. At the end of this schema, we have the undivided subject, which means disavowal of castration.

Q: The will is most often incarnated by nature, by the pervert subject, nature in its different guises over the century. Can you think of anything else than nature, to justify the will? - and - Is structure the nature of the subject? You hear that for human beings in evolution the structure of language is the nature of humans, so is it not difficult to imagine to use the symbolic structure, the structure of language as something for perversion to justify itself.

You have another splendid text of a perverse man, in French, Jean Genet, which was commented on by Sartre when he was in jail for something. In the 'Journal of the Thief', we read that it was in the middle of the last century, 1935-40, when Genet was in Barcelona, in Europe, and then also in Berlin, where he wrote that it is not very interesting - I'm not sure exactly but I understand it in this way - it is not very interesting to be a perverse man in a land so perverse. It was the time of Hitler, another name for nature, as all the names of dark gods are. We may ask ourselves if the situation that we see today with some dark gods is not located in the same structure.

It is much more frequently constituted in psychosis. Today I don't know many perverse men who would say it is nature. It is not the fashion. The dark gods today have other names, like fanatic religion, perhaps....

Q: Regarding the question of universalism and particularity in the 'Ethics' and this text Kant with Sade, where Lacan is trying to modify his conception of the subject's relation to the Other via the subject's relation to jouissance which constitutes the structure of the fantasy: My question is how the fantasy supports the subject's relation to the Other when democracy is itself founded on a certain fantasy. The difference between the particularity that comes to support the subject at the level of jouissance and the singularity that emerges in later Lacan, in 'The Sinthome', where the subject is no longer supported in its relation to the Other by the fantasy. What is going on in the Ethics, in order to extract the subject's relation to jouissance and its relation to the Other, and how do you get beyond that?

Very good question! It may be a little difficult, when we try to understand the evolution of the teaching of Lacan from the first to the second Lacan, or the first to the last Lacan, when there are clearly many steps in between. Jacques-Alain Miller has put it very clearly, the fact that at the time of Seminar XX, Lacan moves his theoretical position completely. Because until that moment, the position of Lacan in the first part of his teaching is that jouissance is barred by the Other. It is the Name of the Father, the S1 of the symptom, that lets appear a part of jouissance that continues to exist for the subject. This is also what, in the formula of the Name of the Father, he named the Desire of the Mother, which is the barred jouissance that leaves just a remainder of jouissance that is marked by castration. This is a formula that Miller wrote for the first period of Lacan's teaching. Jouissance is barred because of the subject's entry into language.

The second, the last teaching of Lacan is more difficult, because you have the triad of the symbolic, imaginary and real, with the signifier, with signification and also what is most symbolic in the real: the lie, as well as most real in the

symbolic: anguish. But you have a fourth term that links the three others, namely the symptom.

This means that the last teaching of Lacan is no longer structured with the classical subjective structure, but more with the symptom, which includes language and *jouissance*. It means that *jouissance* is not something different from language but it is in language. If we have here the fantasy and the symptom at the end of analysis, which have been reduced during the analysis, it is a question of calculating whether it is possible to go through the fantasy in order to achieve another situation for the subject. Whereas in this position it is a little different, because here the end of analysis is linked to the identification with the symptom, which now includes the fantasy. The symptom of the last period of Lacan, the *sinthome*, includes the symptom and the fantasy.

The identification with the symptom regards the question that existed from the beginning of psychoanalysis, the question of Freud and Ferenczi and all: when the subject feels better but the symptom has not disappeared, is it finished? Up to what point is it necessary to go in order to have something that is no longer reversible, so that when you stop the analysis the symptom does not return? At this time, on this point we have the beyond of the symptom, which is a '*savoir faire*' with the symptom.

Q: The symptom at the end includes enjoyment, which is not that far from perversion, in which one subject would claim it is his right to enjoyment. What is the difference?

The difference is clear, even though there is an analyst in Brussels who has made this remark on the structure of perversion, using Lacan's writing of the analytical discourse for perversion, saying that the pervert and the analyst are the same. It is not the same, because for the perverse structure there is a realisation at the level of the imaginary. In the psychoanalyst's discourse there is no realisation of the imaginary, the psychoanalyst lends his own person, his being, to the analysand to project the object of the analysand. Of course when we have structures with just some letters it is impossible to understand it without some explanation. Here is a realisation of the position of the object, there it is a position of semblants.

Q: Socially, the argument of paedophilia is that infantile sexuality is now a recognised fact – by psychoanalysts and others - therefore there is no objection when there are two consenting subjects. The signifying logic and the *jouissance* enciphered through it would find its justification in nature. In a more social debate this poses some logical difficulties for those who try to answer it.

Effectively, between two consenting subjects in our world today everything is permitted. But it must be with consent. The limit is that a child cannot consent. The consent of a child is not valid. This is not my limit, it is the limit that society or the law has established for the moment. It was not always like this, because in Sade's period a small child was not a problem if the parents gave consent. Some other things were really criminal though, for example sodomy. When Sade was denounced by a prostitute for sodomy he was immediately imprisoned. It was very, very serious. But children were not.

Then society was modified and now nothing is very serious. Except non-consent, or the consent of a child which is not valid. The consent of somebody that you have power over is not valid. If you are a professor at the university, you can get into some trouble. When you are president of the USA you are absolutely finished. There is no possible consent!

Thank you

Kant with Sade Jacques Lacan; translated by J.B. Swenson, October, MIT press, 1989

Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment

3

VICENTE PALOMERA

'THE SADEAN FANTASY'

Good Afternoon. I am very pleased to be here in London again with you and to go on with the work you have already begun. I believe you have had two previous meetings, one with Jean-Louis Gault and the second with Alexandre Stevens, who have helped me, without knowing it, to prepare my work for today.

This text, 'Kant with Sade', is very important and we are going to see why it is so important to understand these elaborations of the fantasy. Lacan wants to show us a paradigm of fantasy, but he doesn't, as you already know, take a paradigm of fantasy from a clinical case or from his practice – he takes it from literature. Reading the 'Critique of Practical Reason' by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, a great philosopher and on the other hand the Marquis de Sade, Lacan teaches us something about fantasy beginning with a work of art. We could say that, just as we had 'Joyce, the Symptom', we also have 'Sade, the Fantasy'. You know that 'Joyce the Symptom' is a seminar devoted to the symptom by means of the work of Joyce. We are going to do this to the fantasy by means of the work of Sade.

I would like to recall something that you may have already worked on before, namely that in Kant, in the philosopher Kant, the question was whether there was a rule of action, a universal rule of what one must do? Kant poses the question of whether there exists a rule that allows us to know what one has to do in life. This is his starting point, a rule that guides us in our life and tells us how to act. I am saying something very general. The thing that is very, very important in the text that I am going to consider today is a small sentence that Lacan gives on page 57, in the English version of 'Kant with Sade', where he says that the ethical question in Kant means that the object slips away. *"We would agree that throughout the Critique this object slips away but it can be divined by the trace which is left by the implacable pursuit which Kant brings to demonstrating its elusiveness."*

There is thus a hidden object in the 'Critique of Practical Reason' that Lacan wants to bring out. What we are going to see today is how Lacan brings out this object. The relationship that Lacan establishes between Kant and Sade

has this as its aim, to allow us to see this hidden object. The English version says 'it slips away', it's 'elusive', but it is not something that slips away, it is hidden! The main characteristic of the Kantian ethics is that there is no object, according to Lacan, and by means of Sade he wants to make this object appear.

Kant says that when we are dealing with an object, in his ethics, he cannot give a universal rule; universality is not possible if we take into account an object. That is why he tries so hard to determine the object of his ethics. Whereas for Lacan, there is an object in the 'Critique of Practical Reason' and we will see this object appear by means of the Sadean fantasy.

Lacan therefore says something very amazing; by putting together the hate of the morality of Kant, and the hate of immorality of Sade, he creates a monster: Kant with Sade. To say that Sade can reveal the truth that is in Kant was a philosophical scandal. On one side we have the hate of philosophical morality and on the other side, Sade the pervert, saying the truth. Thus, the hate of morality is explained by Sadean perversion.

What does Sade say? What did he propose? He proposed that, in life, you have the right to enjoy the body of another person. To go step by step: in fact, in life, we cannot enjoy the body of another person without his or her permission. There would be social problems if you used the right of enjoyment over the body of another person without his consent. But this is not what Sade is going to tell us. You have the right of enjoyment over your own body – although the question of the enjoyment over one's own body is an analytical problem, and we hear this in our daily practice that it is not so simple for the neurotic to enjoy his own body. The possibility of enjoyment over one's own body has an important place in the analytical practice. That is to say that there is a problem with this right of enjoyment or right to enjoy. The Sadean emphasis on the right to enjoy will give sense to this. That is why, in the 'Philosophy in the Bedroom', Sade demonstrates that one could imagine a society where everyone should have this right of enjoyment over the Other's body. And as we are at the time of the French Revolution and the proclamation of the freedom of mankind or the individual, '*liberté, fraternité, égalité*', Sade says that there is a right to freedom and a right to *jouissance*. But, very importantly, and this is something underlined by Jacques Lacan, a right where the Other can say the same. It is not only that I can say to the Other that I have the right of enjoyment over your body, but that the Other can say the same to me.

Sade is not presenting a society where a despot would say 'I have the right of enjoyment over the bodies of every one of my subjects'. No, it is everybody, who can say this, not one. Like Etienne de la Boetie who has written that fantastic book *Voluntary Servitude*, Sade says that everyone, without exception, has this right. The formula, written by Lacan - because it is not Sade who wrote this formula of the Sadean imperative, but Lacan - says: 'I have the right to enjoy', which would mean that everyone could say 'I have the right to enjoy your body' ; it shows us the very statement or formulation of a word to which I am myself submitted! Because 'I say this', the Other can say the same.

This is very important. Everyone can say 'I have the right', because in this statement we see that he who states it, he who enunciates this statement, he who says 'I', is in fact the Other, in a way in which I am the Other of that Other. It is a paradox, which is why Lacan adds afterwards: "I have the right of enjoyment over your body", *anyone can say to me*'. This 'anyone can say to me' is very important, because it realises the effect that this word has for everyone by means of the big Other. 'Anyone can say' is something that is located in the locus of the Other. It is not that I say 'I have the right' but 'anyone can say to me something that comes from the exterior'. So this 'anyone can say to me' introduces the dimension that it is me and also the Other in this maxim.

Page 58, paragraph 3: *"I have the right of enjoyment over your body, anyone can say to me - and I will exercise this right without any limit stopping me in the capriciousness of the exactions that I might have the taste to satiate."*

Lacan writes this in inverted commas, that is to say, this statement is what we can deduce from the Sadean philosophy. On page 59, the next page, paragraph 5, he speaks of two paradoxes: the Kantian paradox and the Sadean paradox. The Sadean paradox is that the limit of my capriciousness, in the use of the body of the Other, is to the death. It is very difficult to think of a society with this kind of law. Because if every one of us had this right it would be difficult to conceive of the existence of society.

"Certainly these two imperatives between which moral experience can be stretched, to the breaking-point of life, - the breaking point of life is death - are in the Sadean paradox imposed on us as upon the Other, - the big Other - and not as upon ourselves."

We have here the pinpointing of the paradox and on page 59 Lacan writes that the voice comes from the exterior of everyone, which means that everyone who wants to can say it.


"In which the Sadean maxim by pronouncing itself from the mouth of the Other is more honest than appealing to the voice within, ..."

This is the opposition, because the voice of conscience in Kant comes from within, but in the case of the Sadean maxim, Lacan shows that the voice comes from the outside, from the exterior of the subject. The Sadean imperative must be, according to Lacan, compared to and contrasted with the Kantian imperative. His is a moral imperative in the 'Critique of Practical Reason' that shows why there is no object in his ethics and why Lacan says that this object slips away and is hidden.

The fantasy Lacan is interested in is the Sadean fantasy, but more than that, it is the fantasy in perversion.

You must know that the fantasy in perversion is not the same as the fantasy in neurosis. The fantasy in neurosis is a means to get jouissance. Not as a will of jouissance, this V, that is the will, *volonté*, but as a way of maintaining desire according to a certain fantasy which the subject uses to get jouissance. Here you can talk of a desire as a will of jouissance, which could be a possible formula for

perverse desire. Whereas neurotic desire is far away from the will of jouissance. The starting point in the Lacanian text, his thesis is that through the Sadean fantasy, the perverse fantasy, we can know that there is an object in the Kantian ethics, although it is not an object of experience, just as what Lacan calls object little *a* is not an object of experience.



SCHEMA 1

In fact, what I have been asked to comment on today is the central part of this text, namely the structure of the Sadean fantasy. It concerns the first schema, schema one, where you have here the raw subject of pleasure (S), which is in fact, a remainder, as you will see, and here the subject of the unconscious (\$), – the V, a veil and a will too, and desire as a category of causality (d). And over these coordinates runs this sinuous curve, or vector. I am going to go deeper into the details of the structure of the fantasy, but just to recall that in the structure of this text: the Sadean maxim is what, in Lacan's sense, allows us to find hidden things in the Kantian maxim concerning the point of enunciation.

First of all, with Alexandre Stevens, you worked through the analysis of the Kantian maxim. Secondly, there is the Sadean maxim and the third point is the introduction of the fantasy, which is the point I have to tackle today, schema one, and then we will go to schema two at the end. Thus, we have the Kantian maxim, the Sadean maxim, the central part which is the development of the schema, and the fourth part, which is very long, and mainly a consequence of all that has been said before.

In order to understand the central part, it is important to remember the articulation of the two maxims. Comparing the Sadean and the Kantian maxim, we make appear the difference. Kant presents us with the maxim stated by the voice of conscience. His elaborations make us forget that it is in fact an enunciation, that it is as a metaphor of the voice of conscience that this maxim imposes itself on the subject. It is a formulation without any object. According to Kant, what leads us to this formula of an action without reference to any object is a logical necessity. This is why, says Lacan in a very precise manner, the enunciation of the maxim is only as its substance.

Kant says that it is only a question of how to act in a way in which everyone could do the same. Such a maxim is then a very logical elaboration, independent of any object in reality, what Kant called the pathological aspect in the subject. The pathological is not 'pathology' in the sense of psychology, but something that has to do with my wishes, my desire, my affections, and my

pleasure, etc. You cannot institute any ethics, says Kant, if you take into consideration your pathology, that is your tastes, your pleasures, your enjoyment. In order to make a universal that is valid for everyone you have to take out every object. On the other hand it is not a maxim based on an obligation. Kant does not intend this maxim to function like the Ten Commandments: - you must not steal, not desire your neighbour's wife - it is not a moral in the sense of the Ten Commandments, that says what one should do with one's objects. Objects like father, mother, neighbour - you must love your father, you must not hate your father, etc. - According to Kant, you will not develop an ethics by taking into consideration your objects. Not concerning any precise object, the Kantian maxim relates to a law which lacks reciprocity and is outside the infinite dimension.

Lacan says that listening to the voice of conscience supposes an enunciation. What is in question is the enunciation. The Sadean maxim, as it is stated by Lacan, brings out the problem of the enunciation, because it includes its own enunciation: 'I have the right... anyone can say to me'. As Lacan says, the Sadean maxim is more honest than the Kantian maxim, because it reveals the one who enunciates the law. Sade unearths the enunciation of the law which is not stated clearly in Kant. 'Anyone can say to me', is in the locus of the Other, which means that the place of the subject of the enunciation is outside. Thus, in the Sadean maxim, the big Other is incarnated. It is not the voice of nowhere. It is the voice of that function that Lacan calls 'anyone can say'. So if anyone can say it, it is incarnated in everyone. The maxim is imposed on every subject from the big Other. The enunciation of this law does not refer to any unitary subject. It is a divided enunciation, manifested in this 'I have the right of enjoyment over your body - anyone can say to me' which forms two parts. The subject is confronted with an enunciation; the subject is divided into the statement and the enunciation because the place of the enunciation is present! And this is the difference between the Sadean maxim and the Kantian maxim. It is the first difference that Lacan brings out in 'Kant with Sade'.

The Kantian maxim wants to be a law of the compatibility between men. It pertains to not acting or behaving unless it is with reference to the possibility that the Other does the same. The Kantian moral is tackled via the rejection of the pathological. Which poses the question why not accept the Sadean maxim with its pure dimension of the ethics. It asserts that one should not compromise regarding the element of the pathological. According to Kant, no element taken from affectivity or sensibility can be admitted into ethics, and the pathological is everything that belongs to this realm of affectivity, pleasure and unpleasure. While the Sadean maxim is founded on this rejection at the pure level of its formulation, its statement, the Kantian maxim is founded on the rejection of the pathological. It constitutes a rejection of every Good, every compassion, religion, what is good for the Other, sympathy - anything to do with ideals has to be barred. This level of an abstract enunciation is a disorder looking for a logical formulation. It is what happens when you don't introduce any particular object.

Now, let us go to p.61, 7th paragraph: "*Pshaw, Schwärmereien, black swarms, we expel you in order to return to the function of presence in the Sadean fantasy.*"

This is the first line of the part of the text I was asked to comment on today. With this 'pshaw' – I remember, after reading this yesterday, that there is another 'yuck', that has to do with taste, with jouissance. Little Hans, in the Boudoir of his mother, or the bedroom of his mother, first seeing the underpants of his mother, expresses disgust! Lacan emphasised this utterance of the disgust before the jouissance of the mother and the fact that he was completely drowned in the intimacy of the mother. The rejection of this jouissance, his contempt and his exaggeration of it, is what places little Hans on the side of neurosis and not on perversion. The rejection of this jouissance is a choice he makes, and Lacan in *Seminar IV* said that if he had consented to this jouissance maybe he would have become a fetishist, a homosexual or a pervert.

With this '*Pshaw*', Lacan begins his development of the Sadean Schema. What we have done up until now was Lacan's elaboration on the side of the signifier. We could say that the Sadean maxim and the Kantian maxim are statements that constitute the analysis of the signifying part of the text. But now, leaving the signifier and the maxims behind, we go deep into the fundamental aspects of the object to see the relations of the object with the subject. Written, it is exactly what is involved in the fantasy, you can see in the formula of the fantasy ($\$ \leftrightarrow a$) the subject's relation to the object.

In the bottom part of the Sadean schema, Lacan begins with the question of jouissance, '*Pshaw*', the element that does not appear in the Kantian maxim. There is nothing about jouissance in the Kantian maxim, it is very abstract. Jouissance is hidden there, appearing in the Sadean maxim as the 'right to jouissance'. This is the object of the Sadean maxim, how to obtain jouissance, and it is the function of fantasy. Sade does not want to gain sympathy of other human beings, or fend for progress of mankind. He is neither interested in the future nor the happiness of mankind. What I mean is that he is not interested in any of the fantasies that we know and that organise our world; like those fantasies that are generally epitomized in our society, by political parties or the army, etc.


The Sadean fantasy does not hide what it wants, which is why Lacan says that from this point of view it is more honest. Sade states clearly that what he wants is more jouissance. It is for him a question of jouissance, not a question of desire. Sade's way of obtaining jouissance, his fantasy, is the paradigm of the fantasy in perversion.

We are going to study the formula of this fantasy by going through the structure of the Kantian and Sadean reductions. The question is, in what way do the figures in '*Philosophy in the Bedroom*', for instance, get their jouissance? When the characters say 'I am enjoying', '*je jouit*', in the height of jouissance, we can see that their enjoyment is the moment, the brutal instance, in which they go

as far as the death of the partner. What Sade wants to obtain is the pain of the Other. (If we say 'the Other' we have to see who this Other actually is, which is difficult when the Other is written with a capital 'O'). Pain is, thus, in the Sadean experience, a moment of jouissance of the other's body. The objective is to reach this point of pain. Lacan compares the value that pain has, in the Sadean fantasy, with stoicism.

On page 60, 6th paragraph, he says "*Imagine a revival of Epictetus in Sadean experience: 'See, you broke it', he says pointing to his leg. Lowering jouissance to the destitution of such an effect where its pursuit stumbles, isn't this to turn it into disgust?*"


The stoic rejects the subjectification of pain. His ethical position is to withdraw from what is going on before his eyes, in his own body. When I was preparing this, yesterday, I remembered that when we were children, there was this story of a Spanish saint, Saint Lawrence, San Lorenzo, in whose name a huge building near Madrid was built, San Lorenzo del Escorial. It was Philippe the second who built this monastery. Saint Lawrence is a saint who was martyred by being griddled. While he was grilled on one side, he said to his tormentor: 'Don't you see, stupid, that I am already burned on this side?' His story is an example of a stoic. It is an example of the rejection, by the victim, of the subjectification of pain. The same example as Epictetus pointing to his leg and saying 'see, you broke it'. If the victim is a stoic, Lacan says, the sadist's jouissance or enjoyment cannot be produced. To enjoy, the sadist needs the victim to subjectify the pain, which means that the Sadean jouissance depends on the subjectification produced on the other side, on the side of the victim:



On the schema you can see that if here we have the tormentor, and here the Other, you have to separate the part of the tormentor and the part of the Other, which you will not find in the text.

The subject of the fantasy, by his will, has to make the Other, the victim, subjectify his jouissance. His will is thus to pass the bar to the Other and to propose himself as the instrument that produces this division, which is the pain passed to the victim, the Other. The tormentor is not the subject! (Although he is on the side of the subject of the fantasy which pronounces him the object of jouissance.) This is new and unique, whereas, for example in 'Being and Nothingness' by Sartre, there is a very nice development of the question of the

masochist and the sadist, in which Sartre says that the subject is on the side of the tormentor and the object is the victim. Here it is quite the contrary. The subject is produced by the subjectification of pain in the Other.



SCHEMA 1

Lets go step by step. Here, the subject (\$) is the victim. It is not the tormentor. The tormentor is just the instrument. First question: Where is the subject in the Sadean fantasy? Or even better, who is the subject in the Sadean fantasy? The answer to these questions is that the subject is where the division of the subject is produced, where the subjectification or the experience of the lack is produced. To take Lacan seriously, it is always in the production of the lack that the subject emerges. The paradigm in Sade is that the subject is not he who has the fantasy! The manoeuvre in these fantasies is always to set up things in such a way that when the subject emerges, he or she emerges as a barred subject, on the side of the partner.

This is exactly the superego. The function of the superego is to produce anxiety in the partner. This is why the function of the superego, like the function of the tormentor in the fantasy, is to produce the manifestation of lack in the Other. The important point in the perverse manoeuvre is how to bar the Other. It has the same structure as 'I have the right of enjoyment over your body, anyone can say to me', it is this voice which comes from outside. That means that the division of the subject is produced from the outside. The Sadean fantasy is to produce division from the outside, effecting the emergence of the subject in the partner.

The partner is not a subject, yet, there is nevertheless a partner, and then the question is how to produce the subject, how to bar the subject? In contrast, we have to consider this fantasy only from the point of view of the tormentor. His function is to produce, by passing the bar, the subject on the other side in the place of the Other. We could say that he wants to pass this bar here to produce the subject here, in the part of the Other on the opposite side.

We are considering both sides for this Sadean fantasy. The tormentor and the tormentors, in singular and in plural, never experience any kind of anxiety, never. There is no vacillation, no anxiety, because the tormentors pursue the jouissance as an incarnation of strength and will before their victims. That is why in the Sadean fantasy the tormentors are not subjects! I insist on this. They do not have what is essential to be a subject, which is the lack. The peculiar thing in the formula of fantasy is that the pervert occupies the place of the object, not the

place of the subject. It explains why the tormentor puts masks on, namely to reduce himself to a mere function in order to eliminate everything else.

I think that this text is an extraordinary analysis by Lacan! He brings out things that you do not easily see. When he speaks of the black fetish I was reminded of a text by Winnicott. I wrote an article in 1990/1 on a case from Donald Winnicott called the 'Strings'. It deals with a boy who hangs himself with a rope in a tree in front of his mother's eyes. It is something that has to do with the function of perversion in femininity, in that, the only perversion we find in women is with their children. We see this in the discourse of some women, some mothers, that they are tormented by their offspring. The boy in the case by Winnicott is there in the position of the tormentor and the mother is barred.

On page 61 Lacan says: "*This fantasy has a structure that one will find further along and in which the object is only one of the terms in which the quest which it figures can die out. When jouissance is petrified in it, it becomes the black fetish in which the form – most definitely offered in such a place and time, and still today, for one to adore the god – can be recognised.*"

The place of the object represents a real, which is something that is not altered in the law or the rules that are imposed on the subject. Therefore the tormentor (*a*) is a piece of real, we could say. A piece of real means something which is not alterable in the law. It is by definition something that is not signifiable, not of the signifier. The signifier always has a structure, a diacritical structure, meaning you cannot define a signifier other than by means of another signifier; whereas the real is not at the mercy of this law.

The function of the object is to make the subject appear in the partner. And this manifests itself beyond any pathology, in the Kantian sense. To produce pain is the way to obtain a pure, raw point of the subject (\$) beyond any pathological. This is achieved via the object (*a*); it is there in its place to produce this appearance of the raw subject through pain, separating the subject from all that is pathological, so as to maintain the appearance of his vacillation.

This is truly the essential of the analysis that Lacan presents us with. It is the decisive point that determines the entire remainder of the text. Everything we have been considering, concerning the Sadean and the Kantian maxim, leads up to this point, and everything that comes after, in the text, is a consequence of it: The place of the object stands for a piece of real, not altered by the law or the rules imposed on the subject, and functions to obtain the appearance of the subject (\$) by producing pain, which is a way to produce a raw point of the subject beyond the pathological. That is why this arrow indicates the raw subject (*S*). The objective is to use this to take the remainder from the subject. This is what, by means of a quarter turn, we will find in the second schema.


So let's sum up what I've said: The Sadean fantasy constructs the object (*a*) and on the other side the victim (\$). The object and the victim. The tormentor as object *a* manifests himself as will of jouissance or will of enjoyment (*V*) and produces a raw point of the barred subject (\$) in opposition to the pathological subject (*S*). The pathological subject is the subject as such before the emergence

of the lack. You have to produce this subject and that is the operation of the fantasy. It is the structure as such which is indicative of the unconscious: you have the object (a), here is the desire or the will (V), you have here the subject of the unconscious ($\$$), and you have here the pathological subject (S).

The paradox is that on the one hand this is to produce the subject but on the other hand there is the risk that the emergence of the bar bars the Other absolutely, which is to kill the Other. Barring the Other leads to this consequence. From this point of view, if you take into account the structure of perverse fantasy, it becomes clearer why there is no difference between the sadist and the masochist. There is no difference, but there is no correlation either. The masochist is not the victim of the sadist, not a fantasmatic victim of sadism. Lacan says that there is no reversion of the masochistic mechanism.

That is why he says on page 65: *"Notably about the equivocality of what circulates concerning the relation of reversion which would unite sadism to an idea of masochism of which it is hard to imagine from the outside the pell-mell it supports. It would be better to find in it the worth of a little story, a famous one, about the exploitation of man by man: the definition of capitalism as one knows. And socialism? It's the opposite."*

He makes a joke because he wants to explain that there is no correlation, neither a difference, nor a correlation between masochism and sadism. It is less clear in Freud, but for Lacan, the masochist also rejects castration and personifies the threat of the situation. If you read about Wanda Masoch in 'Venus in Furs', - by the way, there is a very interesting comment by Deleuze that I recommend to you, because Lacan praised the book in his seminar, - it appears that Sacher Masoch, to enjoy, had to place himself as a slave for a woman. This would seemingly be an inverse position to the Sadean, yet that is not correct, because, in reality, the true master is he himself. Masoch's fantasmatic scenario is one in which he arranges everything so that he be taken as an object. In the Memoirs, you can see that Mrs. Masoch didn't like to dress herself in furs and to beat her husband. What is revealed without doubt is that Mrs. Masoch did all this because she was in love with her husband. It is essentially a love story. The fact that her husband put her in that position made her anxious, very anxious. Whereas in the fantasy he appears as a victim and she appears as a tormentor, it is the contrary. It is he, the supposed victim, who makes himself the master, here in the same place (a) as the tormentor, with the aim of manifesting himself as an object, a rejected object with little value, thus producing the anxiety on the other side. You can use this same 'Sadean' schema in the case of a masochist.



SCHEMA 1

The masochist too transforms himself into an object, an instrument, and puts the Other, in this case it is Masoch's wife, in the place of barred subject by producing anxiety. The object is to produce anxiety which means that the Sadean fantasy is at stake in the masochist too. It is not an inversion or a corollary but the same thing operating. For Freud, the masochist also rejects castration, as in this case, where the masochist rejects the bar and puts the bar in the Other.

Lets have the example of the man who stands outside girls' schools, the exhibitionist, what is the function of this exhibitionism? It is to pass the castration to the Other by producing anxiety: he finds a girl and he opens the raincoat, he exposes himself and the girl blushes. He produces the bar, introduces the bar in the Other, and makes himself the instrument. It is always the same thing, namely the statics of the fantasy; the fantasy is monotonous and not very creative or imaginative. Reading Sade is very boring, everything is the same thing, there is no variation in the victims, the only interesting thing is the characters of the tormentors. They can be men, women, priests, etc.; there is variety, but the victims are always the same.

As for the voyeur - and you have in England a very important film called 'Peeping Tom' which deals with voyeurism - it is very Freudian what I am going to say: Freud said in '*Triebe und Triebchicksale*', in 'Drives and their Vicissitudes' that voyeurism always becomes sadism, that the reversion of the drive is in the couple voyeurism / sadism and exhibitionism / masochism. We know this from listening to neurotics. The young child who used to spy on the naked sister or mother asks itself: what have I done? I have seen my mother naked! Then he repeats this scenario and after that comes guilt, as a reaction formation and then immediately a sadistic fantasy. Voyeurism resolves always in sadism, and exhibitionism becomes masochism. You can read it in Freud. It is a clinical fact, in the sense of empiricism.

The *a* is a point of real (in the schema) - I haven't talked about *Verleugnung* here - for the moment, for this schema, I have not considered the question of disavowal. It is true that I have mentioned Freud, but for Lacan the paradigm he presents here is different to that of Freud. In fact, if you look at, for instance, 'A child is being beaten', Freud says that listening to patients it appears that the victims of the (sadistic) scenario are either one child, which could be a boy or a girl, or a lot of boys, and a lot of girls. There are a great deal of victims and the tormentor is always the same. Freud takes this from the practice, from what he learnt from his patients. But contrariwise, if you go to Sade, the victims are always the same, namely beautiful women, whom he cannot even describe they are of such poverty of traits, so limited, while the tormentors are not. There is thus a Freudian paradigm and a Lacanian paradigm. I would not say that they are in opposition, but what is at the level of the structure is not so clear in 'A child is being beaten'.

There is a very beautiful and interesting book by Theodor Reich, called 'Masochism in the modern world'. All the clinical examples that Theodor Reich gives us are in fact not perversions but neurotics with masochistic fantasies.

I have pointed out some things about moral masochism in Freud, as well as feminine masochism, which, Lacan says, does not exist. He says that it is a con, a fantasy of men.

In fact, the question is another one. You remember that in the beginning I said something about the hidden object in the 'Critique of Practical Reason'. Well, Lacan gives us the answer in this text. His thesis of this hidden object in the 'Critique of Practical Reason' is the separation between the subject and its pathological dimension. To obtain the field of ethics, without object, becomes what he calls the field of 'pure ethics'. The Kantian operation is to separate the pure subject from affectivity. This separation between the pure subject and affectivity produces an ethics of a hidden object. Well, what Lacan says very importantly is that it is not object *a*, that you must not say that the tormentor is hidden in the 'Critique of Practical Reason'. What Lacan says is that you cannot operate in the 'Critique of Practical Reason' if it is not with a hidden presence of this object as an operator, which is the hidden presence of the tormentor, of the superego.

I am not saying, and Lacan was not saying that Kant was a pervert. We do not know this. But the separation that he proposes, or that this Kantian maxim proposes, is not possible if it is not with a hidden action of the object, a hidden action of the object that we can separate into two elements. The pure subject as a subject of lack or the subject of an essential vacillation without vitality, and on the other side that dimension of what he calls pathological. That is to say affectivity, pleasure, etc.

See Lacan on page 63, 6th paragraph:

"One will see that there is a statics of the fantasy," - very important 'statics of the fantasy! - "by which the point of aphanisis, supposed in $\$$, should be indefinitely recessed in the imagination."


To understand this 'statics of the fantasy', as I was saying before, in Sade, you can see that there is always the same situation that repeats itself, even when the characters sometimes change, a diversity of characters such as a priest, a knight, a gentleman or a woman can act as tormentors. This you can read in Sade's '120 days of Sodom', between the first and the second day there is the repetition of the same scenario with subtle differences. 'Statics' means monotony of the fantasy. And we see this in the analytical experience where it is in opposition to the symptom, which is a dynamics. We could say: 'dynamics of the symptom' but 'statics of the fantasy'. Symptoms change, but the fantasy is always the same, like a logical axiom.

It is true that Lacan spoke of the forest of fantasy, which we can see in all the different scenarios and situations in Sade, but in the end you reach a reduction in the fundamental fantasy, giving you the structure of fantasy in its very few elements. Lacan notes in the paragraph that the victims, the Sadean victims, are always of the same kind, namely beautiful women. This question of what is beautiful is something very important, which Lacan considered in his seminar 'The Ethics of Psychoanalysis'. With the example of Antigone, the

question of beauty is discussed in its function as veil, as barrier before the horror. There is always the beauty an instant before the encounter with the horror. Sade had difficulties writing the subject of the signifier, by which I mean his difficulty with describing the victims. Instead, the subject appears, in all these descriptions that we can deduce from the text, as a pure function, a pure point, the qualities of which are added later. The tormentors, in contrast, have a more detailed personality. They have a particularity as well as a function. We could summarise this as 'the monotony of the victim' and 'the variety of the tormentors', which is what Lacan adds to the Freudian paradigm of 'A child is being beaten' where we find the opposite: diversity in the victims and monotony of the tormentor. It gives us all the elements we need to understand a very important phrase on page 62, 9 paragraphs down, before schema 1:


"Which is only obtained inasmuch as its apparent agent congeals in the rigidity of the object, in the aim that his subjective division be entirely sent back to him from the Other."

Here you have the question of the place of the Other, which is not written in the schema. Lacan says that it (the division) comes from the Other but this Other is not isolated or written as such with a letter in this schema.



But what I wanted to show you is that the 'congealed' is this position; the 'congealed' is a position and the 'apparent agent' is the tormentor. The 'apparent agent', you could say, is congealed with the rigidity of the object. This is what I wanted to point out because we have to understand that these two levels in which 'the subject is congealed in the rigidity of the object', in such a way that his own division, 'that his subjective division be entirely sent back to him from the Other', is why I said that this division comes from the Other ($\$ \rightarrow a$). This gives us a formalisation of perversion that is different from what we knew before, because Lacan shows the division of the subject in the locus of the Other. That is why the manoeuvre of the perverse fantasy, of the perverse subject, is to reject the division of the subject in order to make it appear in the Other, in the locus of the Other ($a \rightarrow \$$).

So now lets go to schema 2.



SCHEMA 2


What is this quarter of a turn and why? Now that we know that schema 1 is the Sadean fantasy, what is schema 2 about? Lacan says that schema 2 is that of Sade's life; not Sade as a writer but Sade's life, because there is an opposition between schema 1 and schema 2. His work, his writings are supported by the fantasy formalised in schema 1, whereas in his normal life there is a different fantasy produced, according to Lacan's thesis.

You can read a very beautiful statement on page 65, 8th paragraph *"Let us rather perceive that Sade is not duped by his fantasy, to the extent that the rigour of his thought passes into the logic of his life."*

Jacques-Alain Miller, in his course 'From the Symptom to the Fantasy' of 1981/2, where he differentiates fantasy from the symptom, put the accent on this phrase. One must not be duped by one's fantasy; to obtain the logic of the fantasy, of one's own fantasy, it must pass into the logic of one's life. It is the definition of analysis: in an analysis one should learn to know the logic of one's fantasy and then pass this logic to the logic of our life. This is what 'not to be duped by our own fantasy' means. It is something that Miller took from this phrase. To lead a life that has its own logic, that has a certain relationship between 'the rigour of his thought and the logic of his life'.

Sade was not duped by his fantasy because his life had a logic in accordance with his fantasy. The fantasy in his writing was not realised by him in his life. That is a very important point. Sade was not a tormentor. Although in his work he places the structure around the function of the tormentor, in his life he was not a tormentor but a victim. Hence this quarter of a turn, which we can only understand on the basis of a formalisation that allows us to know where the subject and where the Other is.

On page 66, every paragraph amounts to a description of the positions of schema 2: 'the will to jouissance', 'division', 'the subject' and 'object a'. *"V, the will-to-jouissance, no longer permits the contestation of its nature, for it has passed into the moral constraint here implacably exercised by the Presidente de Montreuil..."* The Presidente de Montreuil was Sade's mother in law. One has to go to the biography to find that she was in fact Sade's tormentor in his life. The will to jouissance in Sade's life, incarnated in the Other, says Lacan, is what is incarnated in the will of his mother in law, Madame de Montreuil. This will in the moral conviction exercised implacably by the presence of his mother in law, is not on the side of the subject but on the side of this will of the Other.



The position of the desire in Sade's life is here (d); the subject, Sade as victim (\$); and the will of the tormentor (V), here, his mother in law (a); while on the other side you see that if you go to the first schema, you see that the will comes on the left side, on the side of the subject whereas here, in schema 2 it is on the side of the Other. That is why Lacan says that the pathological...: *"This division here re-unites, as S, the raw subject (when I say the pure subject you have to remember that it is here the raw subject) incarnating the heroism proper to the pathological, in the species of the fidelity to Sade which those who were at first complacent toward his excesses will demonstrate, his wife, his sister in law - his valet, why not? – other devotions effaced from his history."*

('Effaced', an important point!) ...this pathological in his life was incarnated by the fidelity and devotion he got from his wife, his sister in law, his valet and a series of people that were devoted to Sade. It would be very difficult to understand this if you thought of Sade as a monster. In his life he was a man protected by women, namely the women of his entourage or his environment. The position of the victims, in schema 2 of Sade in his life, is the position of Sade, in fact. (Apparently he used to give sweets to girls and then have sexual relations with them; and sometimes he used the whip a little, but essentially he was really very careful with it. It seems that his mother in law knew something of this and didn't like it, and considering the times, he was not very well considered but he was not a monster. He used to engage in some, let's say, sadistic practices but they were quite innocent and protected by the women that were at the same time his victims. But to spend 15 years of his life in the Bastille, for these practices, seems to me too much. He was not a blood-monster, not at all. For instance, during the French revolution, he was not in favour of the death penalty!)

What Lacan wants to show us is the fact that if Sade became a victim it is grounded in the objectivity of his life. This means that he had a certain idea (fantasy), which he always repeated, in order to become the victim, again and again the same thing, designed to result in his victimhood. These scenarios of his life related to what was written in his works. That is what '...the rigour of his thought passes into the logic of his life' means.

Thank you

Kant with Sade – Jacques Lacan; translated by J Swenson, October, MIT press 1989

Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment

4

PIERRE-GILLES GUÉGUEN

'DESIRE AND JOUISSANCE'

Today's theme is to comment on the first schema of the Sadean fantasy in 'Kant avec Sade', an assignment I will base on an article developed by Jacques-Alain Miller in his book published in Spanish and entitled 'Elucidacion de Lacan'.

In 'Kant avec Sade', this fundamental text of his 'Écrits', Lacan endeavours to bring forth the status of perversion in psychoanalysis. The offer he had received to write a preface for a complete edition of the works of the "divine Marquis" provided him with the opportunity to examine the state of his doctrine in its contemporary context, conspicuous by the considerable change in moral values that had taken place since the time of Freud. Thus, in this text, he describes the nosology of perversion in the light of the *Zeitgeist* of the post-world war era. Furthermore he attempts to situate psychoanalysis with respect to important writers of the period: Bataille, of course, but also Sartre, Klossowsky and Genet. The article is to be read together with the Seminar on the 'Ethics of Psychoanalysis' (Seminar VII, 1959-60) of which it is a careful rewriting.

As mentioned by Lacan himself on the *dust-jacket* of his 'Ecrits', psychoanalysis could not exist if it was not profoundly embedded in enlightenment rationality, thanks to Freud's attachment to "scientificity". Still, since this never previously heard of discipline was born at the end of the 19th century in the decadent Vienna and was to address moral and social issues – which were omnipresent in the literature of, for example, the French poet Baudelaire and Romanticism at large - Lacan cannot ignore the fact that mankind is not made of purely rational actors as elicited in the British utilitarian tradition or in the German philosophical one.

And indeed, psychoanalysis implies that the subject of consciousness is not transparent to himself, as the invention of the Freudian unconscious and its mechanisms of repression testify.

In 'Kant avec Sade', Lacan reveals how the rejection of any pathological object by Kant and his choice of a maxim of universal duty as a rule of conduct, rests on a profound denial of a hidden object.


As the title of the article indicates this hidden object is brought to light by Sade better than by his contemporary Immanuel Kant, as Sade's mode of jouissance is correlated to a body divided into parts. It is a body made of erogenous zones, so to speak, as Freud had called them, which became partial objects of the drive as developed by Karl Abraham.

Furthermore, 'Kant with Sade', as a Lacanian treaty on perversion, is an introduction to a better distinction between 'moral masochism' and sadism and masochism as perversions.

From the experience of most psychoanalysts one can draw the conclusion that the analytic setting is repulsive to perverts, - at least one can say that when real perverts happen to meet an analyst they do not stay around for very long, because the type of division of the subject required by the analytic experience does not allow them to act out their fantasy in the way they are used to.

And indeed, as Miller indicated in the text mentioned above, 'Elucidacion de Lacan', it is important to distinguish moral masochism from masochism as a perversion (notwithstanding the dissymmetry between sadism and masochism as perversions). This issue is relevant for example in cases of beaten women or in cases of 'loser' personalities.

The difference between the neurotic "Zerlina complex" or the failure neurosis and perversion is a matter of the functioning of the unconscious fantasy. In 'Kant with Sade', Lacan allows us to get an insight into this problem through the use of his mathemes.




SCHEMA 1

Schema 1 shows that the functioning of the fantasy is not the same when it is used in order to sustain desire (as is the case in neurotic structure, which responds to the matheme: $\$ \leftrightarrow a$), and when it is used to establish a perverse jouissance.

Schema 1 indicates the way the Sadean fantasy functions when it is used in a pervert (this holds true for the masochist pervert as well as for the sadist). The expression 'Sadean fantasy' relates to the fantasy as it is used by Sade's characters in his writings.

In order to clarify the schema designed by Lacan, Miller proposes to draw a vertical line, which splits the Z (N) of the schema into two different areas.



The subject resides in the left part of the split schema, presented in Sade's writings by the deeds of his characters. To the right is the side of the Other, represented by the victims in Sade's novels.

As we know, and as Lacan mentioned in 'Subversion of the Subject and Dialectics of Desire' (*Écrits*, 2002, Norton, London/New York), the fantasy always has one foot in the Other: no matter what, human fantasies - whether they be conscious or unconscious - are not a crude enactment of the drive, the drive has to be moulded by the field of language.

One of the main traits of the fantasy of the pervert resides in the fact that the object is rigidified, always the same and always used in the same way, which accounts for the repetitiveness of Sade's writing. The object has to always come back to the same place and with the same traits.

This detail demands our attention in our study of Schema 1 since what we usually call the "object of the fantasy", namely the partner or the other person, (for Sade this is Juliette or Justine), is called "the Other" and does not fall under the inscription *a* for Lacan. The object *a* is on the side of the pervert, on the left side of the divided *Z*. Whereas the object of desire, (the partner of the pervert) is written $\$$ (*S* barred), which signifies that the attempt of the perverse fantasy is to induce the maximum division in the Other. In other words, and Lacan used this formulation in his seminar on 'Anxiety', the perverse position is defined by the active searching for and enjoyment of the anxiety in the Other.

Contrary to common view, anxiety is not produced, as one would expect, by the fact of being taken as an object by another person (although this is often a complaint made by the hysteric). There is more to it: the pervert, as an incarnation of the object, divides the subject up to the point where the subject asks himself what he is for the Other, what his place is in the Other and whether he has a place. The operation of the fantasy of the pervert consists in trying to get the Other, his partner, down to the point of fading, with the will for jouissance or enjoyment. This manoeuvre also includes masochistic perversion and gives an account of the structure of Sade's novels. The partner, be it Justine or Juliette, is always an evidently beautiful girl, flawless, innocent and attractive, while the sadist is not interested in her sex appeal, but in exactly negating this beauty or attractiveness up to the point of dividing her and leading her to death. Indeed, as

Lacan mentions, the only limit for the perfect sadist is the death of the partner. This death is not simply the fact of being dead, as Miller says in his commentary of 1985, or just a matter of reaching death, it is a matter of letting the subject know what he is going to suffer in the ultimate steps of his/her fall towards nothingness, which is not only death as such but includes a second death, as Lacan calls it, which is death in the field of the signifier.

The partner's anxiety is thus attained by means of the signifier. The sadist wants his victim to know where she is going and what she is going to suffer, such is the structure of the sadistic fantasy.

Interestingly, the masochist, with his perverse masochistic fantasy, works exactly along the same lines as the Sadean tormentor. The masochist too has the object on his side; he also demonstrates an unattainable will for enjoyment on his behalf. He attempts to force the so-called sadistic partner towards a point of pure anxiety.

For Lacan there is no reversibility from sadism to masochism. In this area he is more precise than Freud was. Lacan advocates a general formula for the perverse fantasy (be it sadistic or masochistic) that is founded on the endeavour to obtain the maximum division of the partner up to the point of his disappearance (fading), thus raising anxiety in the Other.

This explains the affinity that masochists and sadists (and all perversions generally speaking) entertain with rituals. It also explains, why in the masochist or sadist encounter there is no such thing as complementarity between the tormentor and the victim, contrary to what is often (at least implicitly) suggested. The dream of reciprocity never realises itself because of the structure of the fantasy.

This stresses the importance of signifiers, also shown by the interest of the masochist in the contract. We see this and Lacan refers us to Gilles Deleuze's assessment in the first pages of his introduction to Sacher Masoch's 'Venus with Furs':

Masoch's wife, Wanda, was forced to perform a scenario that was already written, and in which her husband obliged her to comply with what he was asking her to do: beat him and harm him, which she did out of love and in order to comply with his demands. We know from her Memoirs that she didn't like it; instead she was anxiety ridden, (doing it out of love anyway) thus responding to the general structure of masochism. The masochist effectively offers himself as an object, but as an object animated by a will to jouissance.

Such considerations give us perhaps a better insight into what Lacan has in mind when he declares:

"The sinuous line inscribes the chain which permits a calculus of the subject. It is directed, and its direction constitutes an order in which the appearance of the object a in the place of the cause is made clear by the universality of its relation to the category of causality, which, in forcing the threshold of Kant's transcendental deduction, would inaugurate a new Critique of Reason hinging upon the impure." (Kant with Sade p. 63)

The object *a*, for the pervert, is treated as an object of universal value, according to Lacan. It is a rigidified, or more substantialised object, with no possibility of substitution or amendment. We can see this in the case of the fetishist, for whom it always has to be the same object. It is put in the place of the cause made universal, whereas for Kant, there is no possibility of putting an object in the place of the cause, as only reason can reign in this place. While the object is always particular, the Kantian maxim of reason must be universal: a purity devoid of any objectal impurity which explains why Lacan speaks of *"the threshold of Kant's transcendental deduction"*. (p.63)

As Lacan states, the object in the place of the cause in the perverse fantasy is aiming at universality, as if the object was the same for each individual or at least exactly predictable by the subject of pure calculus, transparent to himself.

In that respect, the perverse fantasy appears as an inverted maxim of transcendental reason, but where Kant's maxim of reason is totally pure, Sade's would be the maxim of reason that is totally impure.

"[It] would inaugurate a new Critique of Reason hinging upon the impure." (p.63)

And Lacan specifies the reason why the endeavour of the pervert is bound to fail:


"There remains the V which, in this place, holding the high ground, appears to impose the will dominating the whole affair, but whose form also evokes the union of what it divides while holding together with a vel, that is to say in posing the choice which will make the barred S of practical reason, out of the S, raw subject of pleasure ("pathological" subject)." (p.63)

The will is an instance placed under the maxim of universal reason. And yet, for the neurotic, this will can never be pure or absolute, since, as Lacan says, it always appears as a "vel", an either/or. Either the side of the barred subject or the side of the Other as object. The fantasy usually goes from one side to the other, except in the case of perversion where the fantasy is blocked by the will of enjoyment.

"...that is to say in posing the choice which will make the \$ of practical reason, out of the S, raw subject of pleasure ("pathological" subject)".

In the practical reason, as opposed to the transcendental reason, the barred \$ will transform itself, evolving incessantly from the raw subject of pleasure to the pathological subject and vice versa. For the pervert the fading of the partner is obtained through his utmost division where no place is left for jouissance but also no place for his/her pleasure (no *"plus-de jouir"*). And while the pervert rejects any division on his side, the S barred in the pervert's partner (as seen through the window of the perverse fantasy) has to become devoid of pleasure. The victim must have no enjoyment at all. Conversely, in the neurotic's functioning of the fantasy, the subject vacillates from the position of S barred himself to the position where his will for jouissance dominates. In this oscillation, which allows Lacan to speak of the fantasy "as a supple chain which unites the desire to the Law", the actor of the fantasy loses something. (This is the principle of alienation and separation with the logical loss imposed by the "vel" and described by Lacan in Seminar XI as "the forced choice")

This leads us to the second schema which is designed to elucidate the functioning of the fantasy for the neurotic - including when endowed with some perverse traits. Lacan mentions the fact that this schema describes Sade in his life (having to escape the judge and the lawyers sent after him by his mother in law), while Schema 1 concerns Sade in his writings.



SCHEMA 2

When considering the schema with the *a* and the *S* barred here, as well as the side of the divided subject and the side of the Other, we can see that the will to jouissance is not placed in such a way that it obtains the division of the Other as is the case in schema 1 of the Sadean fantasy.

"It is thus indeed the will of Kant which is encountered in the place of this will which can be called-to-jouissance only to explain that it is the subject reconstituted from alienation at the price of being no more than the instrument of jouissance". (p. 63)

In this sentence Lacan explains that in the operation of alienation (which is what Kant achieves to its utmost point with his maxim of transcendental reason) the subject is also, more secretly 'the instrument of jouissance'. The pervert pretends not to be alienated by the Other which constitutes a rejection of the pathological. Kant pretends to obey only reason and thus also rejects the pathological. Neither of them is right and they both are 'instruments of jouissance'. The neurotic subject, on the other hand, is indeed alienated, as is exposed in Lacan's saying: desire is the desire of the Other. To a certain extent, he is an instrument of the jouissance of the Other, but through castration he is subject to the operation of 'separation'.

Kant's will, the will of pure reason or the maxim that would be valid for everyone, is to be found in the place where this will can be called to jouissance inasmuch as the subject suffers from the superego. This will of jouissance, says Lacan, is finally of the same structure as Kant's will and the Freudian superego. But, while Kant tries to erase all that is impure from his moral will, we have (with Sade) an inversion of Kant's will into the realm of the impure. And indeed, the clinic often shows that people who are perverse, real perverts, are also people who tend to show very strong moral traits, who tend to be very rigid.

"Thus Kant, in being tortured 'with Sade', that is to say with Sade filling the office, for our thought as in his sadism, of an instrument, confesses to what is plain to see about the "What does it want?" which henceforth is not missing for anyone." (p.63)

In this paragraph, it is important to stress the word 'instrument'- already present in the preceding quotation - since the position of the pervert leads him to make of himself the instrument of the Other, under the apparent paradox, that he seems to use his partner as an object for his jouissance.

It has to do with the voice of conscience that Lacan specifies. While the Freudian superego was conceptualized as an instance of prohibition, of an interdiction caused by the castration complex, of a moral Law, Lacan tends to think of the superego not as the internal voice that prohibits things but as the voice that never stops whispering "*Jouis*", namely a categorical imperative.

The Lacanian superego is this imperative that pushes one to adopt a position of being the perfect object, of being the universal object, of letting oneself be the instrument of the Other's jouissance. And indeed this position is well illustrated by the pervert who seldom presents himself as being against the established order.

Since desire is always the desire of the Other, in Lacanian psychoanalysis the very possibility of desire is linked to the question of the Other. What does the Other want? For the pervert who puts himself at the place where the question of the desire of the Other cannot be asked, this question is foreclosed. The pervert behaves as if he knew what the Other wants. He makes himself the instrument of the Other in such a way that his partner cannot (at least ideally) ask himself what the Other wants besides jouissance. There is no place left for the victim's own desire and no place for the desire of the pervert, the compass of the fantasy being blocked on the jouissance index.

"The graph may now be used", says Lacan, "in its succinct form, in order to find the way through the forest of the fantasy, which Sade in his work develops on the level of a system." (p.63)


Here I would underline the term 'forest of the fantasy', which evokes two things: One, the multiplication of fantasies; the intricate world of fantasy of which the fundamental fantasy is always a central pillar. It is doubtful that an analysis could change the fundamental fantasy. Although, at some point of his teaching, Lacan thought we could maybe cross over the fundamental fantasy, at the end of Seminar XI (when he raises the question of what happens to the drive when the subject has crossed over the line of the fantasy), in his later teachings, Lacan ultimately suggests that the fantasy is not really trespassed in analysis. It can be reduced to being less active in the life of the subject, but it cannot be totally suppressed. Or, to state it a little differently, fantasy can be made more flexible through analysis, less static, more apt to procure a *plus-de-jouir*, but the aim of analysis is not to suppress it, nor could such an attempt succeed at all.

"One will see that there is a static of the fantasy, by which the point of aphanisis, supposed in \$, should be indefinitely recessed in the imagination. Whence the hardly believable survival that Sade grants the victims of the trials and tribulations which he inflicts upon them in his fable. The moment of their death seems to be motivated only by the need to replace them in a combinatory, which alone requires their multiplicity." (p.63)

First of all, Lacan notes that the fantasy of the pervert leads to some sort of interchangeability between the victims. And indeed the sentence "need to replace them in a combinatory, which alone requires their multiplicity" responds to what we may observe in the now in vogue serial killers. What the pervert wants is to divide the victim. He doesn't need the partner to be marked by any kind of singularity. This is probably why the young woman is always healthy and beautiful and as impersonal as a magazine model.

The lengthening of the process until death is required in order to obtain the culmination of division in the victim that is so important to Sade. And here the best example is the shoe fetishist: up to a point the woman is not as important as the shoe...The partner has no singularity. All is achieved as long as he or she complies with the ritual. The object is thus on the side of, what we usually call, the subject, which is here the pervert.

Secondly, if we follow Lacan's advice and refer ourselves to the graph of desire, we will find out that in the upper part of the graph the \$ barred is included as part of the matheme of the drive ($\$ \leftrightarrow D$) on the right side, as well as in the matheme of the fantasy ($\$ \leftrightarrow a$) on the left side.



GRAPH OF DESIRE

According to Lacan, the subject's fantasy has one foot in the Other, S(A), the Other as the Other of the unconscious. The subject's demand is addressed to the Other and produces an effect of castration, because the subject, facing in return the demand of the Other, does not know what the proper answer is. But not knowing what to answer makes him find the answer in his fantasy as a way to sustain his desire. This explains why the subject as such is not usually blocked in the \$ barred position. There is a perpetual oscillation from *a* to \$. The diamond of the matheme of fantasy, <>, is intended to account for this ongoing movement (\$<>*a*).

"Unique (Justine) or multiple, the victim has the monotony of the relation of the subject to the signifier, in which, to trust our graph, she consists." (p.63)

Be it Justine or Juliette, the character of the victim is monotonous because the victim is reduced to a signifier, to \$, where there is no consistency of jouissance left for her. She is not supposed to enjoy the treatment that is done to her; she is supposedly reduced to an idea, a last coverage for what lies beyond death and thus an occasion for the pervert's jouissance, while anonymous in all the meanings that this signifier can convey.

*"Being the object *a* of the fantasy, situating itself in the real, the troupe of tormentors (see Juliette) can have more variety."* (p.63)

While in the perverse fantasy the victim is placed as a pure signifier, S barred, as we mentioned, the tormenter is placed at the place of the object; he is identified with the object that gives him his consistency. Lacan underlines here the words '*being the object *a* of the fantasy situating itself in the real*'. In Sade's writings, the victim is reduced to a pure symbolic artefact through pure division, while the tormenter is reduced to an instrument, an object (*a*) in the real, as Lacan says. '*This troupe of tormentors can have more variety*'. Another result being that, as opposed to the victims, who are interchangeable, the tormenters are not so easily transposable: although they are all supposed to want the same thing, namely, in the end, the death of the victim, the fact that they are at the place of the real gives them more particularity. They are painted, by Sade, with more vividness, including their cruelty and their vile traits, than the victims.

"The requirement, in the figure of the victims, for a beauty always classed as incomparable (as well as inalterable, as we have just said) is another affair, which cannot be taken care of with some banal postulates, quickly fabricated, on sexual attraction." (p. 63)

On the contrary, it has nothing to do with sexual attraction because the victim is not particularised. Here Lacan quotes his Seminar 'The Ethics of Psychoanalysis'.

"One will rather see in it the grimace of what we have demonstrated, in tragedy, about the function of beauty: a barrier so extreme as to forbid access to

a fundamental horror. Dream of the Antigone of Sophocles and of the moment when the '...verse 781...' explodes." (p.63)

The beauty is not here in order to fulfil some sort of sexual attraction, on the contrary, as we have already mentioned, it plays the function of an ideal, hiding and covering up the sexual as such. It is the standardized beauty of top models, of magazines, of plain wallpaper and therefore a beauty that hides the horror, which is what the pervert is really attracted to. Yet, as mentioned previously, the object, the sexual as such, the drive as autistic, is on the side of the pervert and not on the side of the victim.

"This excursion would not be appropriate here, if it did not introduce what could be called the discordance of two deaths, introduced by the existence of condemnation. The between-two-deaths of this side is essential to show us that it is none other than the one by which the beyond sustains itself". (p.64)

The two deaths is a recurring theme in Lacan's writings but especially developed in the example of Antigone in Seminar VII, 'The Ethics of Psychoanalysis'. There is first the death as biological limit, and second the death brought about by the signifier. When the signifier disappears we die again. The example Lacan uses is precisely the example of Sade himself. Effectively, after his biological death Sade wanted all the signifiers that could be attached to his name to disappear as well. He was therefore not only calling for the biological death but for a death within the realm of the signifier. In Sade's writings it is required that after all their tribulations, Justine or Juliette end up dying biologically. Yet, the death in the signifier is placed before their death, since they ideally have to be consenting to it, whereas the death in the signifier is usually placed after the real death. The operation of the sadistic fantasy is to try to obtain the death of the subject or the reduction of the subject to the bar in the signifier, before her final death. This is the kind of process Antigone has to suffer.

Of course, the characters that are portrayed by Sade are always characters that come from nowhere, with no attachments, no one to remember they have lived after their death. The situation is organised in such a way that the victims are supposed to come from nowhere and go nowhere having no symbolic attachments. They die by the signifier for the enjoyment of the sadist before they even reach their own death.

"It can be clearly seen in the paradox which Sade's position with respect to hell constitutes. The idea of hell, a hundred times refuted by him and damned as the means of subjection used by religious tyranny, curiously returns to motivate the actions of one of his heroes, nevertheless among those most enamoured with libertine subversion in its reasonable form, namely the hideous Saint-Fond. The practices whose utmost tortures he imposes upon his victims are founded on the belief that he can render the torment they cause eternal for them in the beyond. A conduct and a belief whose authenticity the character underlines by his concealment of the former from the gaze of his accomplices and by his difficulty in explaining the latter. Thus we hear him a few pages later attempt to render

them plausible in his discourse by the myth of an attraction tending to bring together the "particles of evil". (p.64)

According to Lacan, for Sade, as well as for Kant, the ideal maxim of reason, (transcendental reason for Kant and the maxim of reason of the impure for Sade), excludes the idea of God, or, on the side of the impure, exclude the idea of Satan. For both, the subject is a subject of pure logic and of transparency to itself.

But in his introduction to Sade's works, Lacan notices that the effort to foreclose a transcendental address fails. The particularly malevolent Saint-Fond in 'Story of Juliette', demonstrates the failure of perversion to succeed by a sort of return of the repressed. He may well want to incarnate the forces of evil but still needs some transcendental point to ascertain his position, something the true pervert would not need.

This may well be one of the reasons why Kant wrote the 'Critique of Practical Reason'. Practical reason doesn't obey the law of pure reason. Hence the paradoxes he has to introduce: asking what one ought to do in extreme circumstances when pure reason and humane feelings contradict. As Lacan states, this necessity also appears in Sade's Saint-Fond, because if he was strictly perverse he would not even think of raising the problem of morality.

Kant opens the era of enlightenment because, for the first time in the history of western philosophy, the issue of God is replaced by the problem of transcendental reason, which is supposed to eliminate the reference to God. Still in Seminar XI, Lacan, when exploring the logical roots of psychoanalysis, refers to Descartes rather than to Kant, because the status of reason in Descartes (with the essential reinterpretation Lacan makes) is more dialectical with respect to transcendence than in Kant.

In this paragraph Lacan notices that there is some impurity in Sade's systematic thought (and by implication in Kant's) as long as the idea of Hell (for his victims) comes to Saint-Fond's mind. Lacan underlines how this flaw appears to Sade himself, to the extent that he tends to erase it by speaking of 'particles of evil' as an attempt to rejoin what would be an extreme position of realism:

"Thus we hear him [Saint-Fond] a few pages later attempt to render them plausible in his discourse by the myth of an attraction tending to bring together the "particles of evil".... (p.64)

For Lacan, in spite of Kant's efforts to deny jouissance, he does not succeed in erasing it totally. Nor could he erase it from his life regardless of his strivings. Jacques-Alain Miller, in his course No.6 in 1999/2000 'Les us du laps', lets us know that one of Kant's sources was Juvenal, the roman poet and particularly a satire from Juvenal, that Kant quoted.

Kant was a bachelor all his life with a reputation of never having approached a woman while leading a totally organised life with a time and place for everything - this satire by Juvenal quoted by Kant, is about a man trying to convince another man not to take a woman by saying: 'why do you care about women? They are so complicated, they just don't obey rules, they will try to command you and do all the bad things in life' to which Miller voices the suspicion that Kant stayed away from women and tried so hard to build a system

for the universality of reason because he was afraid of the "pas-tout féminin", the feminine not-all, the non-universal.

"This incoherence in Sade, neglected by the Sadean specialists, who are sort of hagiographers themselves, would be clarified by noting the term, formally expressed in his writing, of the second death. The assurance which he expects from it against the horrific routine of nature (the one which, to listen to him elsewhere, crime has the function of breaking) would require it to be pushed to an extremity where the fainting of the subject would be double: with which he symbolises in the wish that the decomposed elements of our body, in order not to reassemble, be themselves annihilated." (p.64)


This taste for destruction and annihilation, this nihilism of Sade, has been very well put to the screen by Pasolini in 'The 120 days of Sodom', set just before the end of the last war, when everything was about to disappear and to be destroyed during the Nazi and fascist regime in Italy.

And Lacan states once again the importance of Freud's concept of the death drive to be distinguished from nihilism. In this period of his teaching, the concept of the death drive (in dialectical opposition to the drives as such) is underlined as essential for Lacan, especially since it tends to be ignored by many psychoanalysts of his time for whom *"Freud is useful only in congresses."* (a way of saying that it is clinically justified, and not only intellectually).


Along this line, Lacan develops considerations of the various forms in which the death drive is liable to present itself, (besides perversion), such as Buddhism, related to "amentia" and melancholia, another non-dialectical form besides nihilism. Lacan has the idea that the promise of reincarnation made by the Buddhist faith is very close to the fear of the melancholic, not to be able to die (the reverse of Sade's theory of the second death):

"Those dreams after which the dreamer remains overwhelmed, from having, in a condition which is felt as an inexhaustible rebirth, been in the depth of the pain of existing." (p.65)

In the second schema, as we have already mentioned, Lacan presents us with Sade in his life as a neurotic. He was not at all a sadist or a tormenter, as has been confirmed by some of his biographers. In the sexual encounters with his valet, which were fairly rare, he would be more in the passive position than in the position of tormenter. Most of the time he was put in prison trying to get his mother in law to intervene and be let out. His life, then, didn't substantiate much the position he describes in his works.



SCHEMA 1



SCHEMA 2

Therefore, one of the consequences of the first schema, concerning the position of the tormenter is that there is something that is put on the side of the subject, here, the will of jouissance which in reality should come from the Other. This we can find in the second schema, more according to Freud's concept of the superego as a voice from outside, not from within. And indeed, jouissance, the push to jouissance, (understood as it is in these years by Lacan as dangerous) comes from the Other, in as much as the social Other prescribes the forms and the style of jouissance we may or may not have. Prescribing the forms of jouissance we may not have it directs the forms of jouissance we may have. Similarly, by directing the forms of jouissance we may have it prescribes which forms of jouissance we shouldn't have. That is why the law is intertwined with the fantasy, linked to the fantasy.

While, as Jacques-Alain Miller emphasises, a right to jouissance is delegated to each one in the Sadean maxim (each one can tell me 'I want to use your body and I will give you mine'), it doesn't really function like the law but more like a contract. It is a contract of universality because anyone can say this to me and I have to answer back. We have then here a universality of the contract, whereas in Kant we had the universality of the law.

This remark is of great importance in a time of "human rights" when anyone is entitled to claim their right to jouissance. But, ignorant of it as he may be - as Miller points out - the tormenter in the perverse fantasy is not alone.

There is a demand from the Other, a demand of the Other, which he denies, taking the will of jouissance onto his side, making it unilateral. If, in life, this will to jouissance is on the side of the Other (second schema), in the first schema it is the contract that rules the position of the tormenter.

In the second schema the Other says what is possible and what is not possible and prescribes the ways in which jouissance is permitted. This is why Lacan tells us that the second schema is an inversion of the first one. While in the Sadean fantasy, "V, the will-to-jouissance...", is unilateralised, in the neurotic position, which is the position of Sade in his life, the will to jouissance "...has passed into the moral constraint, here implacably exercised by the *Presidente de Montreuil* upon the subject of whom it is evident that his division does not require being joined in a single body." (p.66)

This moral constraint can also be applied to Sade through the legal system. "(Let us remark that only the *First Consul* seals this division with his administratively confirmed effect of alienation.)"

Putting the Marquis de Sade in the Bastille is an administrative way of signing his division. The so-called 'divine Marquis', who (in his writings) allegedly found no limit to his hubris, led in fact a miserable life, nothing like a tormenter at all!

"This division here reunites, as S, the raw subject incarnating the heroism proper to the pathological, in the species of the fidelity to Sade which those who were at the first complacent toward his excesses will demonstrate, his wife, his sister in law – his valet, why not? – other devotions effaced from his history." (p.66)

This raw subject here is the object choice, the partner. The partners of Sade in his life are his mother in law, his faithful wife, his valet...in short, some people who loved him. They were not puppets or subjects of the law; they are pathological subjects who endure things, who have feelings and affects; they are bodily incarnated; that is what the raw subject is; and though they try to compel him to enforce the law, they still suffer because of him. Thus the division is not unilateralised in the second schema as it is in the first one.

The barred subject is Sade himself as a person, who, like everyone else, except the pervert, is barred, because he is guilty of what he has done. This is indicated by the fact that he disappears, trying to escape the punishment. So, being barred, for us, is being sensitive to division, which means being sensitive to guilt - unconscious guilt. Guilt is an essential way of finding out whether a subject is divided or not.

However, as Lacan mentions, Sade's works were doomed to disappear for a long time:

"Unbelievably Sade disappears without anything, even less than in the case of Shakespeare, remaining of his image, after in his will he had ordered that a thicket efface even the trace upon the stone of a name that would seal his destiny." (p.66)

...only to be discovered again, allowing Jules Janin, a literary critic, to proclaim that Sade's writings will never disappear. While Sade himself wanted to disappear, the joke is that the works will never disappear. In every respectable library they are masked by Saint John Chrysostom or the *Pensées* of Pascal, who belong to the same tradition. On the first row, there are those well thought of books and on the second row, hidden behind them, there are the books of Sade. It is a way of saying that there is a link between Sade and the highest thought of civilisation like Chrysostom or Pascal.

"Sade's work is boring, you agree in saying, yes, as thick as thieves, Mister Judge and Mister Academician, but still able to make you one by the other, one and the other, one in the other, get upset."

One may ask why Sade can be at the same time so exciting and so boring. The boredom is probably linked to the idea of the body being put into pieces according to the system of the contract, in other words, to some stillness of the fantasy in each man, be it a judge and academician, or a thief!

"For a fantasy is indeed quite upsetting since one does not know where to set it, because it is there, wholly in its nature as fantasy which only has reality as discourse and which expects nothing from your powers, but which demands that you set yourself straight with respect to your desires." (p. 66)

Thereby Lacan formulates the clinical notation that stipulates that the fantasy for each one of us, including the pervert, is independent of the will of the subject. One does not design one's fantasy; one's fundamental fantasy depends on how one is related to the symbolic order and the imaginary effects resulting from it, giving a view on what we call "reality". One does not choose one's fantasy, but, according to Lacan, *"one has to set oneself straight with respect to one's desires."*

Through the process of eliciting what one's deepest fantasy is about, a decision about one's jouissance is made possible. The difference is that it is an enlightened decision, not a decision of somebody who just follows the rules of the ways of his fantasies. However, Lacan, at the end of his teaching, had to find out that there is a remainder, namely the symptom, which is the remainder that keeps the goals of psychoanalysis from being pure and ensures the link between psychoanalytic discourse and civilisation.

Kant with Sade Jacques Lacan; translated by J. Swenson, October, MIT press, 1989

Fantasy and the Limits of Enjoyment

5

PIERRE NAVEAU

'THE MOTHER-DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIP'
Thread and Needle

I will speak about the last page of the text, where Lacan writes:

Of what Sade is lacking here, we have forbidden ourselves to say a word [on that point]. One may sense it in the gradation of the Philosophy [the Philosophy in the Boudoir] toward the fact that it is the curved needle [...] which is finally called upon to resolve a girl's Penisneid, and quite a big one.

Be that as it may, it appears that there is nothing to be gained by replacing Diotima with Dolmancé, someone whom the ordinary path seems to frighten more than is fitting and who [...] closes the affair with a Noli tangere matrem. Violated and sewn up, the mother remains forbidden. Our verdict upon the submission of Sade to the Law is confirmed. ('Kant with Sade' p. 75)

My objective is to comment on these lines of the text.

Sadism is, in this text, an affair between a mother and her daughter. That is a very paradoxical point.

Lacan underlines that Sade is not psychotic — he is submitted to the law. Why? Because, for him, the mother remains forbidden. The title of my presentation is 'Thread and Needle'. You will see why.

The limit between pleasure and jouissance

Jouissance is forbidden. Lacan says precisely: "*Jouissance is forbidden to he who speaks as such*". ('Subversion of the Subject and Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious', in *Écrits*, Routledge, London and New York)

But, it is not the law itself that bars the subject's access to jouissance. It is pleasure that sets the limit on jouissance. This means that there are two laws: Law with a capital 'L' and law with a small 'l'.

My thesis is that the Sadean philosopher tries to find a solution to the problem of the difference between these two laws. On one side, there is the Law of prohibition of *jouissance*, and we can add, of prohibition of the *jouissance* of the mother, and, on the other side, there is the law of pleasure, or rather the law of permission of pleasure. In effect, pleasure erects a barrier against *jouissance*. Thus pleasure is a defence against *jouissance*. We could speak of an antinomy between pleasure and *jouissance*, a natural and a cultural barrier.

For psychoanalysis, the limit between pleasure and *jouissance* is embodied by the phallus. The phallus bears the mark of the prohibition of *jouissance*. Lacan formulates what he considers a principle — the principle of sacrifice. The Sadean philosopher, like Dolmancé — you will hear very much about Dolmancé, who is the principal character in the 'Philosophy in the Boudoir' and appears, at the end of the text, when Lacan says *'there is nothing to be gained by replacing Diotima with Dolmancé'* — the Sadean philosopher, like Dolmancé, rejects this limit. The affect that is linked with that rejection is anger. The Sadean philosopher is an angry man; Dolmancé is always boiling with rage. The presence of the tormentor in "sadistic experience" *"is reduced"*, as Lacan says, *"to being no more than its instrument."* But the fact that the *jouissance* of the tormentor, the executor, is petrified — it is the word used by Lacan — in this experience, does not withdraw it from the humility of an act to which he cannot escape as a being of flesh and, as such, as the slave of pleasure.

I will explain why the Sadean philosopher is an angry man: The fact that his *jouissance* is petrified in the sadistic experience *"does not withdraw it from the humiliation of an act..."*, the sexual act, *"to which he cannot but come as a being of flesh..."* as Lacan says, *"and, to the bones, the serf of pleasure"*. In that sense, a being of flesh and bones is submitted to the law of pleasure. And the Sadean philosopher too, as a being of flesh and bones, is submitted to that law! The expression of Lacan is a poetic one. He says in 'Kant avec Sade': the Sadean philosopher, as a being of flesh and bones, is *"submitted to pleasure whose law is"* — it's a quotation — *"to turn it always too short in its aim"* (Kant avec Sade, *Écrits*, 1966, Speaker's own translation). Lacan describes that unavoidable limit in these poetic terms: *'Always precocious is the fall of the wing'*. Lacan comments on this metaphor by giving the following indication: *"This wing here"*, he says, is raised *"to the function of representing the link of sex to death"*. It is why the Sadean philosopher must sustain his effort with sadistic fantasy. The name of such an effort is anger, or rage!

So what is *jouissance*? *Jouissance* is the inaccessible point that the tormentor tries to reach beyond pleasure. This paradoxical point can only be reached on the other's body, because the crossing over the frontier between this side and beyond produces pain. Lacan emphasises this point. He says that pain begins at the point where pleasure ends. *"Always, and however prolonged pain is supposed to be, it has nevertheless its term, the fainting of the subject"*. Lacan indicates here what the aim of sadistic experience is. It is precisely the fainting of the subject. The Sadean philosopher takes the place of the Other who aims at the subject's splitting. This gives us a sort of formula: here is the place of the

subject and here is the place of the Other. The tormentor takes this place and, therefore, his effort is to create the splitting of the subject:

Other | Subject

(a <> \$)

He takes the place of the Other. The pervert (and for Lacan this is a characteristic of perversion) takes the place of the Other.

Lacan wrote on the blackboard, at the beginning of *Seminar XX 'Encore'*, this sentence: "*The jouissance of the body of the Other is not the sign of love.*" (*Encore*, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, W.W. Norton & Company, p. 4)

My thesis is that the Sadean philosopher is the enemy of love. He bets on jouissance against love. So we encounter here another antinomy, the antinomy between jouissance and love. Jouissance is an experience, it is not a sign. Love, on the other hand, is a sign. As Lacan says about Sade in *Encore* "*Love is impossible and the sexual relationship drops into the abyss of nonsense*" (p. 87). From this point of view, Lacan says that "*neurosis is not perversion, neurotics dream of being perverts, but neurotics have none of the characteristics of perverts*" ('Subversion of the subject and dialectic of desire'). Why? Because the place of the neurotic and that of the pervert in the fantasy are not the same. The characteristic of perversion is that there is a direct connection between sexual behaviour and its a-morality. Perversion is a knowledge. It's a knowledge which lacks in the neurotic. Perversion is a know-how to do with sexuality.

The maxim of the Sadean philosopher proposes the formulation of the right to jouissance, you know this maxim, it has been commented on by my predecessors. "*I have the right of enjoyment over your body, anyone can say to me, and I will exercise this right, without any limit stopping me* (the limit between pleasure and jouissance) *in the capriciousness of the exactions that I might have the taste to satiate*" (Kant with Sade, p. 58). The right to jouissance is the right to cross over the frontier between pleasure and jouissance. It is the right to go from this side of the frontier to beyond.

Lacan says that the Sadean problem is the problem of morality. He refers to Freud on that point. In 'Civilisation and its Discontents', Freud writes that the problem of morality is the problem of evil. Jouissance is evil. Jouissance is evil, because it implies suffering for the Other, for my neighbour. Lacan establishes a connection between 'Civilisation and its Discontents' and 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle'. Freud shows in 'Civilisation and its Discontents' that there is an innate tendency to evil in man. Freud writes there in a Sadean style, as Lacan indicated, and I quote: "*Man tries to satisfy his need for aggression at the expense of his neighbour. 1. To exploit his work without any compensation. 2. To use him sexually without his consent. 3. To appropriate his goods. 4. To humiliate him, to inflict suffering upon him, to torture and kill him.*" (Freud writes this in 'Civilisation and its Discontents'). Lacan underlines that, for Freud, pleasure keeps the subject away from jouissance. The pleasure principle, as an unpleasure principle,

naturally embodies a beyond. But the pleasure principle is calculated to keep the subject on this side of the border, rather than to push him to go beyond it. Lacan says, in the *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, that Sade wants always to go beyond. The name of his desire is to go through; to go beyond. But he is submitted to the law. So there are two kinds of transgression of the law: the transgression of the law of pleasure and the transgression of the law of the prohibition of jouissance.

Comment on the 'Philosophy in the Boudoir'

In the 'Philosophy in the Boudoir', there are six characters on the stage. There is a sister and her brother, Madame de Saint-Ange and Le Chevalier, a virgin girl, Eugenie, the Sadean philosopher, Dolmancé, his valet Augustine, and the mother of Eugenie, Madame de Mistival. I will comment only on the last dialogue, the seventh dialogue, because it is here that Madame de Mistival comes in, and gives us the relation between the mother and her daughter.

There are a sister and her brother, a master and his servant, and a mother and her daughter. The father is absent, but, as we will see, he is indirectly present. Before the arrival of Madame de Mistival, the five characters are present, while Dolmancé is teaching bad manners to Eugenie. In Sade's work, the philosopher is also a teacher and Pierre Klossowski, who wrote a book about Sade, has found a term which characterises this kind of teacher. This word is '*scelerat*' in French. Klossowski's book is entitled '*The Philosopher Scelerat*'. 'Villain', I think, is the right term: '*The Philosopher Villain*'. So we are in the seventh dialogue, and I have to demonstrate that, for Lacan, sadism is a question of the relation between a daughter and her mother. It is an enigma. And we have to solve this enigma: What is the scenario that was invented by Dolmancé?

Eugenie's mother, Madame de Mistival, is being announced and enters.

Madame de Mistival: "*I have heard that my daughter is here*".

Madame de Saint-Ange: "*Hearing your words, one might think that your daughter is in bad hands?*"

(The five characters are all half naked or naked)

MdeM: "*If one is to judge by the state in which I now find her, I am not wrong in deeming her in bad position*".

Dolmancé: "*If I were in her place, I would have already had you thrown out of the window.*"

(First threat)

MdeM: "*I am not a woman to be thrown out of the window. I have no idea of what you are.*" (She will have a strong idea of what he is) "*But from the state in which I find you, I can quickly reach a conclusion regarding your bad manners.*"

[To Eugenie:] "*Eugenie, follow me.*"

Eugenie: "*Excuse me, Madame, but I cannot give in to your request.*"

MdeM: "*What ? My daughter resists me!*"

D: [Sniggering] "*It is, as you can see, Madame, a case of formal disobedience. Do not tolerate it! Would you like whips to be brought in to punish this sullen child?*"

E: "If the whips were brought in, I'm afraid that they would be used upon Madame rather than upon me."

MdeM: "Impertinent creature!"

D: "Let's have no insults here! All of us here are Eugenie's protectors."

(Dolmancé is sniggering again here. What do they protect? Her virginity? Her jouissance?)

[Approaching Madame de Mistival] "Be careful, you might regret your abruptness with her." (It's tit for tat; you might regret your bad manners with your daughter.)

MdeM: "What? My daughter is to disobey me and I am not able to make her recognise my rights on her?"

D: "Rights? What are these rights, Madame?"

(He is always angry. You must imagine him as always furious, enraged; remember the famous discourse of Dolmancé on the right to jouissance.)

"What are these rights, Madame? Do you believe that they are legitimate? Your daughter is only a consequence. She is the result of sexual relations between your husband, Monsieur de Mistival, and you."

(We can hear, on that point, the contempt of Dolmancé!)

There will now be a problem. I myself will be split between 'half-saying' and 'all-saying'. It is a delicate question. It is my point of view that sadism pushes to 'all-saying'. In French, it is *mi-dire* and *tout-dire*. Do you have a better term? 'Saying-all', perhaps. But Bruce Fink's translation gives 'all-saying'.

So, I apologise for the terms of the Sadean philosopher...

D: "When Monsieur de Mistival shed the drops of spunk inside your cunt which brought Eugenie into being, did you have her in mind during the sexual act? How do you expect her to be grateful to you today, just because, formerly, you discharged when Monsieur de Mistival dared to fuck your selfish cunt?"

(Jouissance is selfish. Sade himself says that) "When your husband was fucking you, you were enjoying to be fucked and you were not thinking of your child. Why would your daughter be grateful to you?"

(As you can see, jouissance, for Dolmancé, is separated from the Other, and from love. Dolmancé wants to separate the child from its mother. In a certain way, he is like a father who would separate the child from its mother. Dolmancé's postulate is that a father and a mother have no feelings for their children; and that children have no feelings for their mother and father. One can say that, for the Sadean philosopher, love is not natural. Love is a cultural creation. There is no love between parents and children. Jouissance and love are as opposed as nature and culture can be.) "What do we see? The son hates his father; the father keeps his son away from him." Love is a fiction, love is an illusion. Dolmancé identifies the father with, as he says, a few drops of sperm – so that the father has no debt towards anybody. He owes nothing to his son. The father is a father in himself. In a word, he is just an instrument, to use Lacan's word. He exists only for himself, not for someone else, which is the opposite definition of the father for Lacan.

The definition of the father for Lacan is that a father creates a link between desire and law. For the Sadean philosopher, it is the contrary. The father breaks off the links. He does not create any link: a father is a selfish being, because jouissance is selfish; the father breaks the link between the child and the mother, between jouissance and desire, between jouissance and love. What Dolmancé says, in his discourse on the right to jouissance, is that the son has no debt towards his father, he owes nothing to him: *"They gave you life, but they hold not a single right to ask for any of these feelings, like pity, gratitude and love."*

Then comes the objection of Madame de Mistival:

MdeM: *"But the care, the care I have given her!"*

D: *"Care? What care? It is the product of social convention, since you had done no more for her than what is required by social convention. Eugenie surely owes you nothing."*

(The parent's education is reduced, by Dolmancé, to a simple duty.)

"And her education has been so poor. It was an error, for which we are now obliged to replace all the useless principles you put into her head. Here are your six mistakes: First mistake — You spoke to her of God as if there was such a thing. Second mistake — You spoke to her of virtue, as if virtue was a necessity. Third mistake — You spoke to her of religion, as if religion was not the result of the deception of the strongest one and of the imbecility of the weakest one. Fourth mistake — You spoke to her of Jesus-Christ, as if that scoundrel was anything else than a deceitful rascal and a villain."

(Blasphemy is very important in sadism. My question is : Is Dolmancé not speaking about himself ? Dolmancé is a villain, he is the villain philosopher.)
"Fifth mistake — You have told her that to fuck is a sin, whereas to fuck is the most delightful action in life. Sixth mistake — You have wanted to give her good manners, as if a young girl's happiness were not in immorality and debauchery, as if the happiest of women were not the one who wallows in filth and libertinage, the one who defies prejudices and scorns reputation." So Dolmancé's verdict is: *"You have done nothing for your daughter, Eugenie owes you nothing but hate and contempt."*

MdeM: *"But my daughter is doomed, it is clear."* (She has now a more precise idea of what Dolmancé is) *"Unfortunately, it is clear that, my daughter, you are among monsters here. Tear yourself from them and come with me. I beg you on my knees."* [And she falls on her knees.] (It's a demand of love.)

D: [still sniggering] *"What a touching scene. Go ahead Eugenie."*

E: [naked] *"My dear Mama, I give you my buttocks. Kiss them, my dear Mama, suck them with your mouth, it is all your Eugenie can give you."*

[She gives her mother her buttocks to kiss.] (It's her answer to her mother's demand of love.)

"Dolmancé, I shall always prove myself worthy of having been your pupil. Dolmancé, you are my master and I am your pupil." (We must remind ourselves here that, for Dolmancé, the buttocks are the most valuable part of the body.)

MdeM: [thrusts away her daughter, curses her child]

"You are no longer my child, cursed be the day on which I gave you life."

(Dolmancé has succeeded in breaking off the link between a mother and her daughter)

D: "*But it is an insult — You are no longer my child ! You must be punished. You have repulsed Eugenie with too much brutality, it is a crime, and a punishment is required for this crime. Undress yourself and strip yourself naked to receive this punishment for your brutality.*" (The guilty mother is condemned to be in the same state in which they are, naked. In fact, to be a naked woman, for Madame de Mistival, is to be offended and humiliated. The aim of Dolmancé is to humiliate the mother in full view of her daughter. It is a point that has been underlined by Pierre Klossowski in his book.)

[Augustine, Dolmancé's valet, undresses Madame de Mistival, who seeks to defend herself.]

MdeM: [to Madame de Saint-Ange] "*I will make a complaint.*"

MdeS-A: "*You will not be able to do so.*"

MdeM: "*Am I to be killed here?*"

D: "*Why not ?*"

(Madame de Saint-Ange intervenes here to say that she has learnt from Eugenie that, the day before, Monsieur de Mistival used the whip on his wife and mistreated her until blood came. Thus, the whip comes into play through Eugenie's father ! We are, at this point, in the zone of crime. It is a crime to touch the mother. And, here, it is clear that the mother's body is an incarnation of what Lacan calls the body of the Other. Her body represents here the body of the Other. This point links jouissance with crime. In jouissance, there is a crime which is implied, because it is forbidden to touch the mother's body.)

D: "*I have never seen a body more mistreated than this.*" [He kisses her arse.]

MdeM: "*Leave me or I'll scream for help.*"

MdeS-A: [seizes her by the arm]

"*Listen to me, whore:*" (The mother, now the crime is being accomplished, is treated like a whore)

"*You are a victim sent to us by your husband. You must now submit to your fate, for nobody can save you from it. What will your fate be ? I have no idea. I can say only this : You will be tortured, but the choice of torture is up to your daughter. She will give the order and you are going to suffer.*"

(We are deciphering the end of Lacan's text. It clearly stated that the moving force of torture is the revenge of a daughter against her mother, even if Dolmancé is exclusively interested in his unique object, the buttocks of Madame de Mistival.)

D: "*Now Eugenie, come here and put your buttocks next to your mother's. I should like to compare your arses.*"

(The most important thing in the daughter / mother relation is the negation of sexual difference, and the sadist or pervert knows how to deny sexual difference. Next, Dolmancé, in a logical threat, sodomises Eugenie's mother. He says, at that point, that he is the rival of Madame de Mistival's husband, Monsieur de Mistival.)

"I can tell that your husband has often trod this path." (Which means that sodomy is not a discovery for Madame de Mistival.)

MdeM: "You are hurting me."

(This complaint does not stop Dolmancé. Very importantly, pain is not recognised as a limit by the Sadean Philosopher. He seeks to reach jouissance. He breaks through the limit between pleasure and jouissance. Lacan insists on this point of the equivalence between jouissance, pain and unpleasure.)

D: "You suffer, you weep, you scream!" (And I have jouissance!)

[Eugenie uses a dildo and thrusts it into both her mother's vagina and anus.] (She has the phallus.)

E: "Come, my dear Mama. Let me serve you as a husband. But this instrument is thicker than your husband's one." [At that moment, Dolmancé buggers Eugenie] [She cries victory]: "Here I am, at once incestuous, adulteress and sodomite !"

(Lacan reveals that the secret of this Sadean affair is Eugenie's *Penisneid*, as he wrote on page 75. And as the sadistic fantasy wants it, at this precise point, Madame de Mistival loses consciousness. This point is crucial.)

[Madame de Saint-Ange moves as if to help her, but Dolmancé stops her]

D: "There is nothing so lustful as the sight of a woman who has fainted."

(Lacan shows that what the pervert hates in the mother is the woman! The pervert seeks to reach in the mother the point where she is a woman. So in the 'Philosophy in the Boudoir', the name of this splitting of the subject is the point where the mother is a woman. It is a splitting between mother and woman. Jacques-Alain Miller used the expression: 'the splitting of the mother between mother and woman', at a conference in Lausanne. The subject's fainting — the point where the mother is a woman — is the true secret of Dolmancé's jouissance.)

[Madame De Mistival is whipped by Dolmancé. She slowly comes back to life.]

MdeM: "Why do you call me back from the darkness of the grave ? Why do you plunge me again into the horrors of life?"

D: [whips her]

"Because, my dear mother, everything has not been said yet !" (This sentence is essential!)

"You must hear your sentence: I have a valet who suffers from one of the most serious cases of syphilis. He will shoot his bad seed in both of this lady's orifices. As long as she will be ravaged by this disease, the whore will remember not to disturb her daughter, when Eugenie wishes to fuck." (He defends the daughter against her mother.)

MdeM: "Such terrible punishment! Such horrible damnation!"

[The valet does what his master orders him to do.] (He violates her. The poison has been inoculated into the mother who finds herself between life and death. And then, there is the famous idea which is expressed by Madame de Saint-Ange, who reveals herself not to be an angel.)

MdeS-A: "We must now be certain that the poison circulating in Madame's veins cannot escape. To that end, I propose that Eugenie will stitch up her cunt and her

arse so that the poison will, all the more promptly, destroy her bones."

E: "Good idea ! Quickly fetch me thread and needle!"

(There we are. In 'Kant with Sade', Lacan wrote : "One may sense it in the gradation of the 'Philosophy in the Boudoir' towards the fact that it is the curved needle which is finally called upon to resolve a girl's *Penisneid*, and quite a big one.")

"Open your thighs, my dear mama, so I may sew you tightly, so you may give me no more little brothers or sisters.

[Madame de Saint-Ange gives Eugenie a large needle, through the eye of which is passed a heavy red-waxed thread. Eugenie sews the vagina of her mother.]

MdeM: "Oh my God, what pain!" [Dolmancé is laughing like a madman, writes Sade]

E: "My dear Mama, now it is done." [And Dolmancé takes the needle and sews up the anus of Madame de Mistival.] (He is the master of everyone's anus.)

D: "All has been said." (For Lacan, this expression is the mark of the sadistic fantasy, which means no more words and silence. Jacques-Alain Miller calls this *all has been said* the silence of the fantasy.)

D: "May this lesson serve to remind you that your dear daughter is old enough to do what it pleases her to do. It pleases her to fuck, she loves to fuck, she was born to fuck. If you do not want to be fucked yourself, the best thing for you to do is to let her do whatever she wants."

(We now understand why the book bears an epigraph of a sentence that is absent in the English translation: 'A mother must make her daughter read this book. It is a story of a daughter's revenge against her mother.')

Conclusion

Firstly — Dolmancé, the Sadean Philosopher, sustains the cause of a daughter's hatred for her mother. In a word, Dolmancé sustains the cause of a daughter's *Penisneid*, as Lacan says on page 75.

Secondly — Lacan is the only psychoanalyst to have shown this point, namely that Eugenie's mother is sewn up: "Violated and sewn up, the mother nevertheless remains forbidden." The villain philosopher does not know it, but he is, as a sadist, submitted to the law. He does not know that God is dead and he does not know that he is the subject of the law. It is the last sentence in 'Kant avec Sade'.

Discussion:

Q: *The pervert's desire is to go beyond. In what way does this differ from the desire of the analyst?*

$$\underline{a} \rightarrow \underline{\$}$$

$$S2 // S1$$

Discourse of the Analyst

The analyst wants the subject to go beyond. The subject is the Other, not the analyst himself. The discourse of the analyst shows its difference to the pervert's fantasy. Lacan says that the analyst gives this position to the subject, in order to be the Other for him. The name of this place is the place of the Other. The pervert steals this place from the subject. The problem lies in the gap between pleasure and jouissance. This gap corresponds to a knowledge. Is it a Sadean drive to want to go further in knowledge. It is a question, but the position is not the same.

Q: To come back to those two different kinds of law, you mentioned stages of pleasure and limit in terms of real, symbolic and imaginary. In which way?

The terms of Lacan are that the one is natural and the other is cultural. The cultural one is the symbolic principle and the natural one — is it real?

Q: If it was the case, there is possibly something to be said about the difference between pleasure and jouissance with regards to the real. Both are linked to the real in different ways. If the Sadean philosopher is fundamentally angry, you presented Eugenie as being very angry too, but here the anger is linked to the Penisneid. One cannot just say that the sadist is angry on behalf of her.

In 1960, there was Pierre Klossowski and Jacques Lacan who sustained this thesis, namely that the pervert takes the side of the girl. That is a strong thesis, and very unusual. You say that it can't be the whole question. Perversion can't be reduced to this. It is a problem, but the end of Lacan's 'Kant avec Sade' puts the accent on that point. From a logical point of view, is there an equivalence between sodomy and taking the side of the girl? Why not? There is a path to take, I must develop this.

I think that to take the side of the girl is a position against woman. And then, against the difference between man and woman, which is the Freudian point of view. He wrote a text about perversion, in which he says that the motive of perversion is the denial of the sexual difference. I think we can understand that if the pervert is submitted to the law, it means that the Oedipus complex works, that it has a function for the pervert. In Sade, we have a certain approach to the father, namely as a villain. Several aspects correspond here: the preference of the girl against the mother and the denial of the difference between men and women. When Dolmancé says to the daughter and mother to both show him their backsides, it is an image of that denial. Lacan says that, in Sade's text, Dolmancé is like a father. He is a wicked father, a father of jouissance. As a villain, he is a father substitute. He prefers the cause of the girl to the cause of the woman. This preference is indicated by his taste for sodomy. The matheme of sadism is precisely to prefer the girl to the woman. Lacan is marked by his reading of Klossowski, I think.

Q : *Is this equivalence an equivalence between Dolmancé and the girl, as they share the denial of castration ?*

For Dolmancé, castration anxiety is not a question. It is what is lacking in this text. Where is Dolmancé's anxiety? The pervert treats the problem of the girl, because he wants to avoid his own problem, the anxiety of castration. Sodomy is the negation of sexual difference. The religion of Dolmancé is that every human being has an anus. He is the master in this religion and an expert.

Q: *Would you say that this denial of castration has something to do with the denial of the castrated Other or the barred Other? In relation to what you said about the pervert trying to reach in the mother the point where she is a woman. To reach femininity beyond motherhood which, in Seminar XX, is the barred Other. There is a failure on the side of the pervert to love and to recognise the barred Other. Is the anger the failure to reach that point ?*

Yes. And it begins in the way of speaking. It is an important point. There is a way of speaking which wounds the modesty; it is the project of the pervert to wound the woman's modesty. The most important thing, for me, in Dolmancé's discourse, is his way of speaking. If I have to write something about this text, I would write about his way of speaking. Because each word that comes out of his mouth tries to wound, to do evil. The Other must be a wounded Other.

Q : *You have talked about the pervert's will to go beyond, to touch on jouissance, to touch upon the woman in the mother. On page 74, Lacan wrote : " Sade thus stops, at the point where desire is knotted together with the law. If something in him held to the law, in order there to find the opportunity Saint Paul speaks of, to be sinful beyond measure, who would throw the first stone ? But he went no further." We have talked about the role of Oedipus in perversion and the role of the father reduced to this point. What would it mean for the pervert to go beyond that point ?*

The 'Philosophy in the Boudoir' is not a treaty on desire. On desire — not a word. "Of what Sade is lacking here, we have forbidden ourselves to say a word." It is important. Lacan shows that, in the text of Sade, there is nothing about desire. It is a question. Jacques-Alain Miller asked the question about Picasso's paintings. With regard to the paintings of Picasso, is it a question of jouissance or of desire? Is Picasso speaking about desire in his paintings? And, I think, Jacques-Alain Miller's feeling is that he is not. And here it is the same question perhaps. Page 75: "Of a treatise truly about desire, there is thus little here, even nothing." And that is the sin of Sade, the moral cowardice of Sade.

Sade seems to be very courageous, very audacious. But, on that point, he is a coward. Not a word about desire. When you defend the cause of the girl, you are not interrogating yourself about desire, about your desire. That is very consistent, in Lacan's position. If it was a question of desire, Sade would speak about a son, as he is a man. "Sade thus stopped at the point where desire is knotted together with the law" because his preoccupation is the relation between the law and jouissance. "The Oedipal father knots the law to desire". This is a sentence of Lacan. The father knots the law to desire. So if Dolmancé is a figure of the father, it is not this kind of father. It is a father who denies desire. It is clear that Dolmancé does not want to hear anything about desire. If Madame de

Mistival, or any other character, says "my desire is...", it would be a strange question for him. It is Greek for him.

Q: My question before was if nature was the final word about it. In a way, it is surprising that Lacan uses that word nature, when nature is precisely a signifier of the Other mostly used by perverts to justify everything. Why is it that the difference between pleasure and jouissance is called the law? As if we believe in the laws of nature. And if we use that term, we use it differently from the law of the symbolic or the social understanding of it.

Lacan answers with Levi-Strauss that the prohibition of incest is second and the law of pleasure is first. In a certain way, the prohibition of incest, the Law with a capital 'L', is a form which human beings give to the natural law of pleasure. In that way, there is only one law for Lacan. He says it in the 'Subversion of the Subject...' (It is at the moment where he speaks about Levi-Strauss): "It is not the Law itself that bars the subject's access to jouissance, rather creates out of an almost natural barrier a barred subject." So, for Lacan, in this passage, it is the same thing. The Law with a capital 'L' and the law with a small 'l' is the same thing. As the human being is a cultural being, he gives this form to the law. For Aristotle, it is the first law of life, the law of pleasure and unpleasure. It means that the pervert is treating this primary law, which is the law of life or the difference between pleasure and pain.

Q: We talked about the distinction between those two laws. The natural law of pleasure and jouissance and the cultural version of that law which is the Oedipal law of the prohibition against the mother. In what way, is that not the version of courtly love which dresses up the impossibility and makes it into an artificial prohibition? Is that the same? You wouldn't think of the pervert as the knight of courtly love.

Prohibition is a fiction. But the pervert is against love. It is difficult. Lacan says that Gide is a pervert. Can we say that Andre Gide is the enemy of love? Dolmancé rejects love and the idea of love. We can understand this. It is a specified position towards the Other. The Other is approached not as a being that can be loved, nor desired.

Q: It is the reduction of the Other to object. The reduction from love, as making the Other exist, to jouissance as a reduction of the Other to object. That is why desire is a register that then no longer features.

This is why Lacan says that Sade teaches us something about our fantasies because, in our fantasies, there is a difficulty with love. It is the definition of a fantasy. There is something in the way.

Q: There is a disjunction between the all saying and love, which is on the side of the half saying, and also on the side of the Other. Could you say something about this paradox between the all-saying in disjunction with love?

When you are saying it all, you don't love. Lacan is the first psychoanalyst who said this; that when you want to say everything, you wound modesty. You do not take account of the Other. And, in Lacan, there is a definition of the fantasy that in your fantasy you substitute the Other with the object. The way to write the fantasy is this: a / A. In your fantasy, the Other is reduced to being an object. You cannot love an object, the object can be the cause of your desire, but, if you love

him, it is as a subject that you love him.

Q: *Is that also applicable to the question about the difference between the pervert and the analyst, where the analyst attempts to separate the object and the Other and in a way those two mathemes show how it is the same terrain.*

Yes, I think a man has to learn to love the cause of his desire, but it is not a given thing. He has to learn this.

Q: *Are you saying that the Other of love does exist?*

When you love, you make the Other exist as a contingency, yes. The problem is that it is the same with religion. To make God exist, you love him. That is why there is a relation between God and woman, as Lacan says in *Encore*. What is very enigmatic in Sade is women's jouissance. Very enigmatic!

Kant with Sade – translated by J.B. Swenson, October, MIT press, 1989

Philosophy in the Bedroom – translated by Seaver and Wainhouse, Arrow Books, 1965, London

